Download or read book The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design written by Zvika Neeman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012-03-22 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2014-03-13 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Börgers and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2015 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Download or read book On Combinatorial Optimization and Mechanism Design Problems Arising at Container Ports written by Sebastian Meiswinkel and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-05-17 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sebastian Meiswinkel studies optimization problems that arise at container ports from a classic optimization as well as from a mechanism design point of view. The first part of this dissertation is focused on scheduling problems with selfish job owners that have private information about their characteristics. Afterwards the transportations of containers between the quay and a storage area is considered. Variants of this problem are analyzed for utilization of reach stackers and straddle carriers.
Download or read book The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information written by David Aaron Miller and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design with Semi exclusive Information and Wrong Beliefs written by Mingjun Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design theories have established basic framework in studying economic problems where agents have private information and behave in their own interests. This framework provides a workhorse for exploring how to implement social choice rules in general. One typical issue is to analyze the decision-making by a social planner or a designer who aims to achieve efficient outcomes that maximize the joint welfare of all agents. Not surprisingly, efficiency essentially requires that the designer know the agents' private information and then choose the corresponding socially optimal outcome. However, the difficulty of mechanism design problem is to characterize these incentive constraints where agents find it optimal to reveal their private information truthfully. Specifically, sufficiently rich private information could entail non-implementability of efficient social choice rules. To overcome this difficulty, this dissertation considers a class of semi-exclusive information structures where agents may observe signals about payoff signals, and a class of problems where agents may have wrong beliefs or the mechanism designer is not informed about the agents' valuation functions, and proposes mechanisms that implement efficient allocations.
Download or read book Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions written by Y. Narahari and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2009-04-03 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph focuses on exploring game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text.
Download or read book Cloud Logistics written by Falco Jaekel and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-06-25 with total page 544 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Falco Jaekel develops a reference architecture for cloud logistics systems. The reference architecture shows how to apply the principles and concepts of cloud computing (e.g. virtualization, service-orientation) to logistics system design and thus how to deliver certain physical logistics capabilities such as transport and storage with the essential cloud characteristics (e.g. on-demand, rapid elasticity, pay-per-use). Within certain scenarios, this innovative mode of delivery can reconcile logistics efficiency with effectiveness and thus may enable firms to achieve competitive advantage in dynamic environments.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steve Tadelis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-06 with total page 416 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Download or read book Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-05-22 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Download or read book MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS written by DEBABRATA DATTA and published by PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd.. This book was released on 2017-04-01 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Managerial Economics, also known as business economics or Applied Microeconomics, helps in dealing with business decisions and management units effectively. This book discusses the theories and applications of Managerial Economics with the help of its various quantitative techniques like operations research, mathematical programming, game theory for strategic decisions, and other computational methods. Divided into 8 sections and 24 chapters, the book shows how conveniently one can find a solution to the business problems, such as Risk analysis, Production analysis, Pricing, Budgeting, Sales promotion and so on with Managerial Economics tools. Section I analyses the economic behaviour of the consumers; Section II discusses producers’ behaviour and issues related to the production; Sections III, IV and V talk about markets and firms and their types. The concluding Sections VI, VII and VIII delve on the application part of Economics in human resource management, finance, marketing and strategy. The chapters are well-supported with the cases, figures and important facts. The book is equipped with pedagogical aids in the form of Summary, Glossary, Important Terms, Numerical Problems and Multiple Choice Questions. Intended for the postgraduate students of Management, the book will be equally beneficial for the practising Managers.
Download or read book Optimization and Games for Controllable Markov Chains written by Julio B. Clempner and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2023-12-13 with total page 340 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book considers a class of ergodic finite controllable Markov's chains. The main idea behind the method, described in this book, is to develop the original discrete optimization problems (or game models) in the space of randomized formulations, where the variables stand in for the distributions (mixed strategies or preferences) of the original discrete (pure) strategies in the use. The following suppositions are made: a finite state space, a limited action space, continuity of the probabilities and rewards associated with the actions, and a necessity for accessibility. These hypotheses lead to the existence of an optimal policy. The best course of action is always stationary. It is either simple (i.e., nonrandomized stationary) or composed of two nonrandomized policies, which is equivalent to randomly selecting one of two simple policies throughout each epoch by tossing a biased coin. As a bonus, the optimization procedure just has to repeatedly solve the time-average dynamic programming equation, making it theoretically feasible to choose the optimum course of action under the global restriction. In the ergodic cases the state distributions, generated by the corresponding transition equations, exponentially quickly converge to their stationary (final) values. This makes it possible to employ all widely used optimization methods (such as Gradient-like procedures, Extra-proximal method, Lagrange's multipliers, Tikhonov's regularization), including the related numerical techniques. In the book we tackle different problems and theoretical Markov models like controllable and ergodic Markov chains, multi-objective Pareto front solutions, partially observable Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains, Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, Lyapunov-like function in Markov chains, Best-reply strategy, Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms, Bayesian Partially Observable Markov Games, bargaining solutions for Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky formulations, multi-traffic signal-control synchronization problem, Rubinstein's non-cooperative bargaining solutions, the transfer pricing problem as bargaining.
Download or read book Social Organization and Mechanism Design written by Claude d' Aspremont and published by De Boeck Supérieur. This book was released on 1999 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By presenting a collection of contributions by leading experts, this book illustrates the variety of issues that the discipline of "mechanism design", as a branch of game theory, is capable of dealing with : voting rules, trial procedures, public good production, cost-sharing, monopolistic regulation, bequest function, etc. However, the book illustrates also the fundamental unity of the basic questions : information gathering, communication, individual as well as coalitional strategic and dynamic behavior.
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 1 written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-08-14 with total page 431 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publisher description
Download or read book OPTIMIZATION AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH Volume III written by Ulrich Derigs and published by EOLSS Publications. This book was released on 2009-02-09 with total page 438 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Optimization and Operations Research is a component of Encyclopedia of Mathematical Sciences in the global Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), which is an integrated compendium of twenty one Encyclopedias. The Theme on Optimization and Operations Research is organized into six different topics which represent the main scientific areas of the theme: 1. Fundamentals of Operations Research; 2. Advanced Deterministic Operations Research; 3. Optimization in Infinite Dimensions; 4. Game Theory; 5. Stochastic Operations Research; 6. Decision Analysis, which are then expanded into multiple subtopics, each as a chapter. These four volumes are aimed at the following five major target audiences: University and College students Educators, Professional Practitioners, Research Personnel and Policy Analysts, Managers, and Decision Makers and NGOs.
