Download or read book Multiproduct Price Competition written by Junichi Watanabe and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Multiproduct Price Competition with Heterogeneous Consumers and Nonconvex Costs written by Luis H.B. Braido and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper extends the oligopolistic model of price competition to environments with multiple goods, heterogeneous consumers, and arbitrary continuous cost functions. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an endogenous sharing rule is proven to exist. It is also shown that, in environments with fixed costs and constant marginal costs, all (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibria exhibit price dispersion across stores. Furthermore, the paper identifies scenarios in which prices will be necessarily random. In these markets, stores keep each other guessing because, given the fixed costs, they would incur a loss if their price strategies were anticipated and beaten by competitors. This is interpreted as an important economic feature that is possibly behind random price promotions such as weekly specials.

Download or read book A Model of Multiproduct Price Competition written by Yair Tauman and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Multi Product Price and Assortment Competition written by Awi Federgruen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We address a generic price competition model in an industry with an arbitrary number of competitors, each offering all or a subset of a given line of N products. The products are substitutes in the sense that the demand volume of each product weakly increases whenever the price of another product increases. The cost structure is linear, with arbitrary cost rates.Our demand model is the unique regular extension of a set of demand functions that are affine in a limited polyhedral subset of the price space. A set of demand functions is regular if it satisfies the following conditions: under any given price vector, when some product is priced out of the market, i.e., has zero demand, any increase of its price has no impact on the demand volumes. Depending on the set of prices selected by the competing firms, a different product assortment is offered on the market.We characterize the equilibrium prices, product assortment and sales volumes in the price competition model, under this demand model. Under minimal conditions, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists; while multiple price equilibria may arise, they are equivalent in the sense of generating an identical product assortment and sales volumes.

Download or read book Multiproduct Firms written by Chun-Hsiung Liao and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Multiproduct Competition with Demand Complementarity written by Yakov Bart and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers written by Daniel Hosken and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Multi Product Price Optimization and Competition Under the Nested Logit Model with Product Differentiated Price Sensitivities written by Guillermo Gallego and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study firms that sell multiple substitutable products and customers whose purchase behavior follows a Nested Logit model, of which the Multinomial Logit model is a special case. Customers make purchasing decision sequentially under the Nested Logit model: they first select a nest of products and subsequently purchase one within the selected nest. We consider the multi-product pricing problem under the general Nested Logit model with product-differentiated price sensitivities and arbitrary nest coefficients. We show that the adjusted markup, defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of price sensitivity, is constant for all products within a nest at optimality. This reduces the problem's dimension to a single variable per nest. We also show that the adjusted nest-level markup is nest-invariant for all the nests, which further reduces the problem to maximizing a single-variable unimodal function under mild conditions. We also use this result to simplify the oligopolistic multi-product price competition and characterize the Nash equilibrium. We also consider more general attraction functions that include the linear utility and the multiplicative competitive interaction models as special cases, and show that similar techniques can be used to significantly simplify the corresponding pricing problems.

Download or read book Multiproduct Competition with Finite Capacity Increments Applications to Internal Pricing and Cost Allocation written by Uday Sadashiv Karmarkar and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Sequential Multi Product Price Competition in Supply Chain Networks written by Awi Federgruen and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a general model in which, at each echelon of the supply process, an arbitrary number of firms compete, offering one or multiple products to some or all of the firms at the next echelon, with firms at the most downstream echelon selling to the end consumer. At each echelon, the offered products are differentiated and the firms belonging to this echelon engage in price competition. The model assumes a general set of piece-wise linear consumer demand functions for all products (potentially) brought to the consumer market, where each product's demand volume may depend on the retail prices charged for all products; consumers' preferences over the various product/retailer combinations are general and asymmetric. Similarly the cost rates incurred by the firms at the most upstream echelon are general as well.We initially study a two-echelon sequential oligopoly with competing suppliers, each selling multiple products through a pool of multiple competing retailers. We characterize the equilibrium behavior under linear price-only contracts. In the second stage, given wholesale prices selected in the first stage, all retailers simultaneously decide on their retail prices to maximize their total profits among all products of all suppliers they choose to do business with. In the first stage, the suppliers anticipate the retailers' responses and all suppliers simultaneously maximize their total profits from all channels by selecting the wholesale prices. We show that in this two-stage competition model, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium always exists. Multiple subgame perfect equilibria may arise but, if so, all equilibria are equivalent in the sense of generating unique demands and profits for all firms. We subsequently generalize our results to supply chain models with an arbitrary set of echelons, and show how all equilibrium performance measures can be computed with an efficient recursive scheme. Moreover, we establish how changes in the structure of the supply chain network, or changes in the model parameters, in particular, exogenous cost rates, or intercept values in the demand functions, impact on the system-wide equilibrium. These comparative statics results allow for the quantification of cost pass-through effects and the measurement and characterization of the brand value of different retailers and suppliers.

Download or read book Price Competition in Sequential Multi Product Oligopolies written by Awi Federgruen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze a general model in which, at each echelon of the supply process, an arbitrary number of firms compete, offering one or multiple products to some or all of the firms at the next or possibly subsequent echelons or directly to the end consumer. At each echelon, the offered products are differentiated and the firms belonging to this echelon engage in price competition. The model assumes a general set of piece-wise linear consumer demand functions for all products (potentially) brought to the consumer market, where each product's demand volume may depend on the retail prices charged for all products; consumers' preferences over the various product/retailer combinations are general and asymmetric. Similarly the cost rates incurred by the firms at the most upstream echelon are general as well. We initially study a two-echelon sequential oligopoly with competing suppliers, each selling multiple products indirectly through a pool of multiple competing retailers or directly to end consumers. In some cases, a supplier may choose to sell some or all of its products simultaneously via its direct sales channel and indirectly via some or all of the retailers. We characterize the equilibrium behavior under linear price-only contracts. In the second stage, given wholesale prices and prices of direct sales channels selected in the first stage, all retailers simultaneously decide on their retail prices to maximize their total profits among all products of all suppliers they choose to do business with. In the first stage, the suppliers anticipate the retailers' responses and all suppliers simultaneously maximize their total pro ts from all channels direct or indirect channels by selecting the wholesale prices and direct sales channel prices. We show that in this two-stage competition model, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium always exists. Multiple subgame perfect equilibria may arise but, if so, all equilibria are equivalent in the sense of generating unique demands and profits for all firms. We subsequently generalize our results to supply chain models with an arbitrary set of echelons, and show how all equilibrium performance measures can be computed with an efficient recursive scheme. The model may, also be used to evaluate the impact of various structural changes in the supply chain network.

Download or read book Multiproduct Competition Learning by Doing and Price Cost Margins Over the Product Life Cycle written by Ralph Siebert and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Competition Under Mixed Multinomial Logit Demand Functions written by Margaret P. Pierson and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we postulate a general class of price competition models with mixed multinomial logit demand functions under affine cost functions. In these models, the market is partitioned into a finite set of market segments. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of this class of models in the case where each product in the market is sold by a separate, independent firm. We identify a simple and very broadly satisfied condition under which a pure Nash equilibrium exists and the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the solutions of the system of first-order-condition equations, a property of essential importance to empirical studies. This condition specifies that in every market segment, each firm captures less than 50% of the potential customer population when pricing at a specific level that, under the condition, is an upper bound for a rational price choice for the firm irrespective of the competitors' prices. We show that under a somewhat stronger, but still broadly satisfied, version of the above condition, a unique equilibrium exists. We complete the picture by establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium, indeed a unique Nash equilibrium, for markets with an arbitrary degree of concentration, under sufficiently tight price bounds. We discuss how our results extend to a continuum of customer types. A discussion of the multiproduct case is included. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for structural estimation methods.

Download or read book Monopolistic Competition Multiproduct Firms and Optimum Product Diversity written by Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Competition in Multi Sided Markets written by Guofu Tan and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies a general model of price competition among platforms offering differentiated services in multi-sided markets. We incorporate a general form of both within-side and cross-side externalities into a discrete choice model of random utility maximization by consumers on each side of the markets. We consider a two-stage game in which the platforms choose prices (or user fees) simultaneously in the first stage, followed by consumers on all sides simultaneously deciding which platform to join (single-homing) in the second stage. We show that in a symmetric setting with full market coverage, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in prices and the equilibrium price on each side follows a simple rule: The price equals the cost, plus a mark-up due to product differentiation, minus a subsidy due to cross-side externalities. The subsidy to each side accounts for the degree of the aggregate marginal externalities of that side imposed on all the other sides. As competition among platforms increases, both the product differentiation effect and the cross-subsidy are shown to decrease. As such, the price on one side can decrease while the price on another side may increase with the number of platforms. We also discuss the incentives for platforms to merge and the extent of excessive free entry of platforms into the markets as compared to the social optimum. We further compare uniform pricing rule with discriminatory pricing across different sides of the markets and find that the average price across sides under the discriminatory pricing is higher than the uniform price when the externalities are small or when the number of platforms is large. The impacts of consumers' outside options on the equilibrium prices are also studied.

Download or read book Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing written by Giovanni Nero and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Revealed Preference Tests for Price Competition in Multi product Differentiated Markets written by Yuta Yasui and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Assumptions on competitive structure are often crucial for marginal cost estimation and counterfactual predictions. This paper introduces tests for price competition among multi-product firms are introduced. The tests are based on the firm's revealed preference (revealed profit function). In contrast to other approaches based on estimated demand functions such as conduct parameter estimation, the proposed tests do not require any instrumental variables even though the models can accommodate structural error terms. In this paper, I employ a demand structure introduced by Nocke and Schutz (2018), the discrete/continuous choice model, which nests the multinomial logit demand and CES demand functions. Any price and quantity data can be rationalized by price competition under a discrete/continuous choice model and increasing marginalcosts. Adding more assumptions on the demand function, such as logit, CES, or the co-evolving and log-concave property produces some falsifiable restrictions.