Download or read book Legislative Oversight of the Executive Branch written by Charlene Wear Simmons and published by California State Library. This book was released on 2002 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Congressional Oversight written by Walter J. Oleszek and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. A fundamental objective of congressional oversight (CO) is to hold exec. officials accountable for the implementation of delegated authority. This objective is especially important given the huge expansion of executive influence in the modern era. Clearly, given the role and scope of the fed. establishment, the importance of Congress¿s review function looms large in checking and monitoring the delegated authority that it grants to fed. departments and agencies. This report: (1) highlights several reasons for the expansion of the fed. gov¿t.; (2) discusses a few definitions of CO; (3) spotlights 3 purposes of oversight; (4) comments upon CO laws and rules; (5) reviews CO techniques; and (6) identifies incentives and disincentives to CO. Illus.
Download or read book Congressional Oversight Methods and Reform Proposals written by Walter Oleszek and published by . This book was released on 1973 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy written by Morris S. Ogul and published by University of Pittsburgh Pre. This book was released on 2010-11-23 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Congressional supervision of the way the executive implements legislative mandates-"oversight" of the bureaucracy-is one of the most complex and least understood functions of Congress. In this book, Morris Ogul clarifies the meaning of oversight and analyzes the elements that contribute to its success or neglect. Ogul's work is based on case studies from nearly one hundred interviews with congressmen, committee staff members, lobbyists, and members of the executive branch., as well as an examination of relevant congressional documents.
Download or read book Congressional Oversight Manual written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Presidential and Congressional Oversight of the Executive Branch written by Janna Marie King Rezaee and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Given gridlock in Congress, presidents and subunits of Congress are increasingly pursuing their policy goals in the executive branch. Yet we know little about how they go about doing so. In Chapter 1, I introduce the broad notion of positive agenda control by the president. Up until this point, the existing literature has been narrowly focused on presidents' negative agenda control over agencies (Moe 1985; Nathan 1983) and has only recognized positive agenda control in terms of executive orders (Moe and Howell 1999; Howell 2003). I argue that presidents direct their resources toward allied agencies to strengthen, pass, and implement policies the president supports. Using a newly collected dataset, I look at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the most important innovation in presidential power in 35 years, and I show that Presidents Clinton and Obama were disproportionately likely to use OIRA to review the policies of relatively more liberal agencies and President George W. Bush was disproportionately likely to use OIRA to review the policies of relatively more conservative agencies. This finding differs from the conventional wisdom that OIRA is a presidential watchdog and it changes how we think about presidential power in administrative oversight. In Chapter 2, together with Abby Wood and Sean Gailmard, I turn to congressional committees and their pursuit of policy goals in the executive branch. We introduce the theory that congressional committees use oversight of bureaucracy as a means to mitigate agency problems they face with the bureaucracy. Up until this point, scholars have not systematically connected the oversight activity of Congress to the democratic problems created by delegation. The landmark analysis of Aberbach 1990 placed oversight in a framework centered on Congress and the broad contours of the national policymaking environment, without taking into account agency policymaking activity. In contrast, we present a principal-agent model of oversight and find support in a newly-collected dataset of on-the-record legislative hearings for the model's three observable implications: legislative oversight is increasing in agency policymaking activity, increasing in the amount of ideological conflict between committees and agencies, and increasing in the amount of ideological conflict between House and Senate committees during divided Congresses. Our results provide evidence that committees oversee agencies not merely to position-take for the next campaign cycle, but to influence actual policy outcomes. In Chapter 3, I return to a focus on the president and I treat limiting lobbyist influence as a policy goal in its own right. I argue that lobbyists going "offensive" in their lobbying strategies combined with underwriting some of the work of under-resourced agencies puts lobbyists in a position to set the agenda in the executive branch. I contribute a bargaining model in which an agency, the president, and a lobbyist each have agenda-setting power some of the time. I derive the conditions under which the president, so long as he or she is not perfectly ideologically aligned with the agency, can limit the influence of the lobbyist on the agency's policies by acting as a "tough" bargaining agent. This model reveals a tradeoff from the standpoint of the agency between working with an ideologically aligned president (an ally on policymaking goals) and working with an ideologically unaligned president who can help limit lobbyist influence.
Download or read book Legislative Oversight written by Wisconsin. Legislature. Legislative Council and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Congressional Oversight written by Martin O. James and published by Nova Publishers. This book was released on 2002 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Throughout history congress has engaged in oversight of the executive branch -- the review, monitoring and supervision of the implementation of public policy. The first several Congresses inaugurated important oversight techniques as special investigations, reporting requirements, resolutions of inquiry, and use of the appropriations process to review executive activity. Contemporary developments, moreover, have increased the legislature's capacity and capabilities to check on and check the Executive. Public laws and congressional rules have measurably enhanced Congress's implied power under the Constitution to conduct oversight. Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1946. That act required House and a Senate standing committees to exercise 'continuous watchfulness' over programs and agencies within their jurisdiction. Since the late 1960s Congress has shown increasing interest in oversight for several major reasons. These include the expansion in number and complexity of federal programs and agencies; increase in expenditures and personnel, including contract employees; rise (until recently) in the budget deficit; and the frequency divided government, with Congress and the White House controlled by different parties. Major partisan disagreements over priorities and processes also heighten conflict between the legislature and the executive. Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide variety of channels, organisations, and structures. These range from formal committee hearings to informal Member contracts with executive officials, from staff studies to support agency reviews, and from casework conducted by Member offices to studies prepared by non-congressional entities, such as statutory commissions and offices of inspector general.
Download or read book Legislative Oversight and Budgeting written by Rick Stapenhurst and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2008 with total page 362 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This volume brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies in section III demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversight tools available to the legislature vary based on constitutionally defined powers of the legislature, institutional arrangements between the branches of government, divisions of authority between national, regional, and local governments, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the legislature, and the resources available to it. The budget process provides critical opportunities. Section II of this volume is devoted to examining budget oversight from the formulation and approval of the budget, to implementation and the ex post examination of the public accounts. Special attention is also paid to mechanisms to assist parliaments such as Public Accounts Committees and independent parliamentary budget offices. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, legislative strengthening practitioners, and students of legislative development.
Download or read book Congressional Record written by United States. Congress and published by . This book was released on 1971 with total page 1380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)
Download or read book Styles of Oversight written by Keith Weston Smith and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 468 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Congressional Oversight written by Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service and published by . This book was released on 1976 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Legislative Oversight written by Edwin L. Jackson and published by . This book was released on 1976 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Broken Branch written by Thomas E. Mann and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2008 with total page 289 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two nationally renowned congressional scholars review the evolution of Congress from the early days of the republic to 2006, arguing that extreme partisanship and a disregard for institutional procedures are responsible for the institution's current state of dysfunction.
Download or read book Political Opposition Legislative Oversight and the Performance of the Executive Branch written by Alexander Poulsen and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches is a cornerstone of democracy. This system of checks and balances, however, can be circumvented by partisan loyalties if legislators strategically avoid exerting oversight when their own party controls the executive branch. It is thus an empirical question whether the separation of powers prevents the abuse of power in practice. We answer this question by measuring the extent to which members of political opposition parties in a city council effectively check the mayor's performance in Brazil. We employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of an additional politically opposed legislator, and we find that political opposition increases oversight action and decreases corruption, with the effect fully concentrated on mayors facing reelection pressure. We trace the impact of oversight, via a reduction in healthcare spending irregularities, all the way to impacts on healthcare service delivery and health outcomes.
Download or read book Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight written by Riccardo Pelizzo and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2013-11-12 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The purpose of the book is to investigate parliaments’ capacity to oversee government activities, policies and budget legislation. By analysing the survey data that the World Bank Institute in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union collected from 120 parliaments, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst show what tools are available to parliaments worldwide, which tools are more or less common, how oversight capacity can be estimated, how oversight capacity is related to other institutional and constitutional factors. In addition to discussing the conditions under which oversight capacity is greater, the authors perform some analyses to assess the policy implications of oversight capacity. Specifically, they look at the impact of oversight capacity on the quality of democracy and on the level of good governance.
Download or read book Keeping a Watchful Eye written by Joel D. Aberbach and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2001-06-29 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Congressional oversight activity has increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Congressional committees now spend more of their time holding hearings to review the activities of federal agencies, and committee staff members are busy collecting information about what goes on during program implementation. This book examines the reasons behind the surprising growth of congressional oversight. Using original data collected for this project, Joel D. Aberbach documents the increase in oversight activity and links it to changes in the political environment. He explores the political purposes served by oversight, the techniques Congress uses to uncover information about the activities of the federal bureaucracy, and the reasons why topics get on the oversight agenda. He concludes that even though the U.S. government system was not designed with a large administrative sector in mind, its ability to expose bureaucratic behavior to public scrutiny is impressive, and the Congress plays a vital role in this endeavor.
