Download or read book History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960 1968 Part 1 2011 written by and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 528 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Peace War and Partnership written by William A. Taylor and published by Texas A&M University Press. This book was released on 2023-12-14 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering the period from World War II through the Trump presidency, Peace, War, and Partnership: Congress and the Military since World War II unpacks the vital and dynamic relationship between Congress and the military, two entities that have worked together, at times with different purposes, to solve myriad important issues impacting the United States in both peace and war. Congress and the military have had their periods of cooperation. However, they have also had alternating periods of resistance to each other, based on distinct conceptions of national interests and divergent strategies. Their partnership has been a symbiotic relationship in which one entity or the other has ebbed and flowed in power depending on the circumstances. They have altered each other in far-reaching ways and transformed American society as a result of their liaisons. Peace, War, and Partnership analyzes the significant, powerful, and central relationship between Congress and the military. It investigates intersections of policy, politics, and society to theorize the impact of this relationship on the United States in the modern era. This work also offers a better understanding of earlier attempts by policy makers in Congress and the military to provide national security, contextualizing highly relevant current issues such as military service, proliferation, foreign intervention, national security, joint operations, diplomacy, alliances, mobilization, post-conflict resolution, citizenship, and military innovation. It illuminates crucial questions involving military policies in American democracy, and their sway on America historically and today, sparking and informing public debate about its implications now and for the future.

Download or read book The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960 1968 1960 1968 written by Graham A. Cosmas and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 524 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book So Much to Lose written by William J. Rust and published by University Press of Kentucky. This book was released on 2014-06-17 with total page 376 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Before U.S. combat units were deployed to Vietnam, presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy strove to defeat a communist-led insurgency in Laos. This impoverished, landlocked Southeast Asian kingdom was geopolitically significant because it bordered more powerful communist and anticommunist nations. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which traversed the country, was also a critical route for North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. In So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos, William J. Rust continues his definitive examination of U.S.-Lao relations during the Cold War, providing an extensive analysis of their impact on US policy decisions in Vietnam. He discusses the diplomacy, intelligence operations, and military actions that led to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed in Geneva in 1962, which met President John F. Kennedy's immediate goal of preventing a communist victory in the country without committing American combat troops. Rust also examines the rapid breakdown of these accords, the U.S. administration's response to their collapse, and the consequences of that response. At the time of Kennedy's assassination in 1963, U.S. policy in Laos was confused and contradictory, and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited not only an incoherent strategy, but also military plans for taking the war to North Vietnam. By assessing the complex political landscape of Laos within the larger context of the Cold War, this book offers fresh insights into American foreign policy decisions that still resonate today.

Download or read book The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960 1968 1960 1963 written by Jack Shulimson and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 526 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Silent Guns of Two Octobers written by Theodore Voorhees and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 2021-09-27 with total page 381 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Silent Guns of Two Octobers uses new as well as previously under-appreciated documentary evidence to link the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Checkpoint Charlie tank standoff to achieve the impossible—craft a new, thoughtful, original analysis of a political showdown everyone thought they knew everything about. Ultimately the book concludes that much of the Cold War rhetoric the leaders employed was mere posturing; in reality neither had any intention of starting a nuclear war. Theodore Voorhees reexamines Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s leadership, decision, and rhetoric in light of the new documentary evidence available. Voorhees examines the impact of John F. Kennedy's domestic political concerns about his upcoming first midterm elections on his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis through his use of back-channel dealings with Khrushchev during the lead-up to the crisis and in the closing days when the two leaders managed to reach a settlement.

Download or read book The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960 1968 1964 1966 written by Jack Shulimson and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 672 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book America and Vietnam 1954 1963 written by Michael M. Walker, Col., USMC (Ret.) and published by McFarland. This book was released on 2022-08-31 with total page 392 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The conventional narrative of the Vietnam War often glosses over the decade leading up to it. Covering the years 1954-1963, this book presents a thought-provoking reexamination of the war's long prelude--from the aftermath of French defeat at Dien Bien Phu--through Hanoi's decision to begin reunification by force--to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Established narratives of key events are given critical reappraisal and new light is shed on neglected factors. The strategic importance of Laos is revealed as central to understanding how the war in the South developed.

Download or read book Journalism and the American Experience written by Bruce J. Evensen and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-02-12 with total page 404 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Journalism and the American Experience offers a comprehensive examination of the critical role journalism has played in the struggle over America’s democratic institutions and culture. Journalism is central to the story of the nation’s founding and has continued to influence and shape debates over public policy, American exceptionalism, and the meaning and significance of the United States in world history. Placed at the intersection of American Studies and Communications scholarship, this book provides an essential introduction to journalism’s curious and conflicted co-existence with the American democratic experiment.

Download or read book Westmoreland s War written by Gregory Daddis and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2014 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.

Download or read book Air Power s Lost Cause written by Brian D. Laslie and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2021-05-14 with total page 273 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam. Filling a substantial void in our understanding of the history of airpower in Vietnam, this book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the air wars in Vietnam. Brian Laslie traces the complete history of these air wars from the beginning of American involvement until final withdrawal. Detailing the competing roles and actions of the air elements of the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force, the author considers the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. He also looks at the air war from the perspective of the North Vietnamese Air Force. Most important for understanding the US defeat, Laslie illustrates the perils of a nation building a one-dimensional fighting force capable of supporting only one type of war. ,

Download or read book Zero Sum Victory written by Christopher D. Kolenda and published by University Press of Kentucky. This book was released on 2021-10-26 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The military expert and author of Leadership presents “the most thoughtful analysis yet of America’s recent conflicts—and future challenges” (Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal). Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in America’s favor, capacity-building efforts, and tactical victories, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government’s fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why these operations failed to achieve favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government’s insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize, modify, or abandon losing strategies. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.

Download or read book Presidents and Their Generals written by Matthew Moten and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2014-11-05 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A military historian traces the long struggle of American presidents to assert their power over uncooperative generals. Since World War II, the United States has been engaged in near-constant military conflict abroad, often with ill-defined objectives, ineffectual strategy, and uncertain benefits. In this era of limited congressional oversight and “wars of choice,” the executive and the armed services have shared the primary responsibility for making war. The negotiations between presidents and their generals thus grow ever more significant, and understanding them becomes essential. Matthew Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war, demonstrating how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leaders’ personalities. Early presidents established the principle of military subordination to civil government, and from the Civil War to World War II the president’s role as commander-in-chief solidified, with an increasingly professionalized military offering its counsel. But General Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination to President Harry Truman during the Korean War put political-military tensions on public view. Subsequent presidents selected generals who would ally themselves with administration priorities. Military commanders in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan did just that—and the results were poorly conceived policy and badly executed strategy. The most effective historical collaborations between presidents and their generals were built on mutual respect for military expertise and civilian authority, and a willingness to negotiate with candor and competence. Upon these foundations, future soldiers and statesmen can ensure effective decision-making in the event of war and bring us closer to the possibility of peace. Praise for Presidents and Their Generals “This highly readable book, impressive in scope, is a major contribution to understanding the important yet often-shifting dynamics of civil-military relations in the U.S.?past, present, and future.” —W. A. Taylor, Choice “The author's opinions are precise and witty and based on comprehensive knowledge of his subject, as he clearly demonstrates how wars are lost by the arrogant and/or incompetent. A brilliant, fascinating picture of how wars badly begun and poorly run can affect an entire country?usually at the hands of just a few men.” —Kirkus Reviews (starred review)

Download or read book The Myths of Tet written by Edwin Moïse and published by University Press of Kansas. This book was released on 2017-11-21 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Late in 1967, American officials and military officers pushed an optimistic view of the Vietnam War. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) said that the war was being won, and that Communist strength in South Vietnam was declining. Then came the Tet Offensive of 1968. In its broadest and simplest outline, the conventional wisdom about the offensive—that it was a military defeat for the Communists but a political victory for them, because it undermined support for the war in the United States—is correct. But much that has been written about the Tet Offensive has been misleading. Edwin Moïse shows that the Communist campaign shocked the American public not because the American media exaggerated its success, but because it was a bigger campaign—larger in scale, much longer in duration, and resulting in more American casualties—than most authors have acknowledged. MACV, led by General William Westmoreland, issued regular estimates of enemy strength in South Vietnam. During 1967, intelligence officers at MACV were increasingly required to issue low estimates to show that the war was being won. Their underestimation of enemy strength was most extreme in January 1968, just before the Tet Offensive. The weak Communist force depicted in MACV estimates would not have been capable of sustaining heavy combat month after month like they did in 1968. Moïse also explores the errors of the Communists, using Vietnamese sources. The first wave of Communist attacks, at the end of January 1968, showed gross failures of coordination. Communist policy throughout 1968 and into 1969 was wildly overoptimistic, setting impossible goals for their forces. While acknowledging the journalists and historians who have correctly reported various parts of the story, Moïse points out widespread misunderstandings in regard to the strength of Communist forces in Vietnam, the disputes among American intelligence agencies over estimates of enemy strength, the actual pattern of combat in 1968, the effects of Tet on American policy, and the American media’s coverage of all these issues.

Download or read book Air War Over North Vietnam written by Stephen Emerson and published by Pen and Sword. This book was released on 2018-02-28 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In early 1965 the United States unleashed the largest sustained aerial bombing campaign since World War II, against North Vietnam. Through an ever escalating onslaught of destruction, Operation Rolling Thunder intended to signal Americas unwavering commitment to its South Vietnamese ally in the face of continued North Vietnamese aggression, break Hanois political will to prosecute the war, and bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict. It was not to be. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and fears of widening the conflict into a global confrontation, Washington policy makers micromanaged and mismanaged the air campaign and increasingly muddled strategic objectives and operational methods that ultimately sowed the seeds of failure, despite the heroic sacrifices by U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots and crews Despite flying some 306,000 combat sorties and dropping 864,000 tons of ordnance on North Vietnam 42 per cent more than that used in the Pacific theater during World War II Operation Rolling Thunder failed to drive Hanoi decisively to the negotiating table and end the war. That would take another four years and another air campaign. But by building on the hard earned political and military lessons of the past, the Nixon Administration and American military commanders would get another chance to prove themselves when they implemented operations Linebacker I and II in May and December 1972. And this time the results would be vastly different.

Download or read book No Sure Victory written by Gregory A. Daddis and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2011-06-01 with total page 355 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina. Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam. Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

Download or read book Socializing Militants How States End Asymmetric Conflict with Non State Militants written by Jeremiah Rozman and published by Vernon Press. This book was released on 2023-05-09 with total page 518 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen states engaged in long-term conflicts with asymmetrically weaker non-state actors (NSA). States aim to end these conflicts as quickly as possible by combining force and diplomacy to socialize these militants—meaning give them the characteristics of states—in order to make a credible bargain achievable. The militant’s characteristics determine the state’s optimal strategy. In times of conflict, politicians and pundits often march out an oft-cited phrase in support of negotiations: “if you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies.” This is only possible when the opponent is willing to make peace under acceptable terms and able to enforce abidance. Some opponents have an ideologically driven fundamental purpose that precludes renouncing violence under terms that a state could accept. Others have reasonable demands and are structured in a way that allows productive negotiations. In other cases, the non-state militant is not yet the type that can be bargained with but can be socialized into this type through a state’s correct application of force and diplomacy. I call this “socialization logic.” I argue that optimally, states tailor their strategy to socialize with their opponent, to make it possible to successfully negotiate peace. In practice, the state’s strategy is often distorted by its internal and external constraints. Socialization logic provides a novel typology of non-state militants based on how well interstate conflict bargaining concepts can be applied to them. It looks beyond tactics, to systematize a framework for understanding how leaders tailor strategy towards non-state opponents based on their characteristics. Socialization logic examines the NSA type as endogenous to the strategy that the state employs and provides a framework for leaders to design a strategy to end the conflict. Finally, socialization logic synthesizes critical NSA attributes (ideology, leadership structure, and governance function) and the state’s strategy (distorted by constraints) into in an interactive model. Through 41 interviews, primary and secondary source data, I analyze the United States’, Russia’s and Israel’s asymmetric conflicts with militants and demonstrate that socialization logic most comprehensively explains their strategies throughout those conflicts.