Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard written by William Jack and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets an Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information written by Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance purchases are observable, each firm will ration the amount of insurance its clients can purchase and insist that they purchase no insurance from other firms. This paper focuses on the alternative situation where firms cannot observe their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. We show that firms will still attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate purchases, but now they must do so indirectly. One possibility is that all firms sell only policies with a sufficiently large amount of coverage that individuals choose to purchase insurance from only one firm. Another possibility is that each firm offers a latent policy in addition to its regular policy. Latent policies are not purchased in equilibrium, but serve to restrict entry. If an entering firm offers a supplementary policy, an individual will purchase not only this policy plus his previous policy but also the latent policy. The latent policy is designed so that the individual reduces effort by enough to render any entering policy unprofitable.

Download or read book Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with moral hazard written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard written by and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints written by Roman Inderst and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets the Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard II Existence and Nature of Equilibrium written by Arnott, Richard J and published by Kingston, Ont. : Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University. This book was released on 1982 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Competitive Insurance Markets written by Peter S. Faynzilberg and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Under the conditions conjectured by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)as leading to market failure, we demonstrate the existence of a uniqueequilibrium in a risk-sharing economy with adverse selection. This equilibrium may be separating or partially pooling: in an economy withthree types, for instance, the low- and the medium-risk buyer segmentsmay be offered the same insurance policy.In equilibrium, buyers' indirect utility decreases with their propensityfor accident. When low-risk buyers are prevalent, sellers subsidizetheir operations across segments: they derive a positive profit in thelow-risk segment and incur a loss of equal magnitude in the rest ofthe economy. This leaves high-risk buyers better off than under thefirst-best policy they purchase when sellers are perfectly informed.In contrast to the putative equilibrium of the Rothschild-Stiglitzmodel, the second-best equilibrium depends on the structure of thebuyer population and converges to the first-best of the correspondinghomogeneous population as low- risk buyers become increasingly prevalentin the economy.

Download or read book Competitive Insurance Markets Ii written by Peter S. Faynzilberg and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Under the conditions conjectured by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) as leading to extreme market failure, we show the existence of a unique incentive-efficient equilibrium. In terms of its sensitivity to the structure of the buyer population, this equilibrium may be flexible or rigid. Closed-form illustrations of equilibria and the solution methodology, which is based on the characterization of Nash equilibrium in terms of selective efficiency (Faynzilberg, 2003), are also provided.

Download or read book A Game theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection written by Wanda Mimra and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium Contract Distributions in a Competitive Insurance Market written by Gerald David Jaynes and published by . This book was released on 1976 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1992 with total page 748 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

Download or read book Competitive Insurance Markets I written by Peter S. Faynzilberg and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Inter-firm rivalry and its impact on the stationarity of the economy are formalized in terms of selective efficiency that extends the Pareto and the Caldor-Hicks efficiency comparisons. Nash equilibrium of agents' decision-making is shown to be sufficient for an economy to be in equilibrium. Conversely, the extant practice of reliance on ad hoc quot;concepts of equilibriumquot; renders the resulting models overspecified. The ensuing loss of internal consistency explains the absence of a putative equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), commonly interpreted as extreme market failure.

Download or read book Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection written by Jonathan A. K. Cave and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 1984 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report examines possible outcomes of greater competition in insurance markets. The report describes the nature of insurance offerings in equilibrium if firms offer multiple policies; but it replaces the conventional assumption that each policy must earn nonnegative profits with the more realistic requirement that the portfolio of policies offered by the firm earn nonnegative profits in the aggregate. Theorems regarding the existence, optimality, and uniqueness of the subsidy equilibrium are presented, together with a simple characterization of the subsidy equilibrium and a comparison with existing equilibrium notions. Because the subsidy patterns, from low to high, that emerge under this formulation appear to characterize multiple-option insurance plans such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, this model may be more useful than conventional methods in the analysis of such plans.

Download or read book Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse selection with endogenously determined information structures. Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) characterized the self-selection equilibrium under the assumption of exclusivity, enforcement of which required full information about contracts purchased. By contrast, the Akerlof price equilibrium described a situation where the insurance firm has no information about sales to a particular individual. We show that with more plausible information assumptions -- no insurance firm has full information but at least knows how much he has sold to any particular individual -- neither the RS quantity constrained equilibrium nor the Akerlof price equilibrium are sustainable. But when the information structure itself is endogenous -- firms and consumers decide what information about insurance purchases to reveal to whom -- there always exists a Nash equilibrium. Strategies for firms consist of insurance contracts to offer and information-revelation strategies; for customers -- buying as well as information revelation strategies. The equilibrium set of insurance contracts is unique: the low risk individual obtains insurance corresponding to the pooling contract most preferred by him; the high risk individual, that plus (undisclosed) supplemental insurance at his own actuarial odds resulting in his being fully insured. Equilibrium information revelation strategies of firms entail some but not complete information sharing. However, in equilibrium all individuals are induced to tell the truth. The paper shows how the analysis extends to cases where there are more than two groups of individuals and where firms can offer multiple insurance contracts.

Download or read book Price Equilibrium Efficiency and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we investigate the descriptive and normative properties of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard when firms offer "price contracts" which allow clients to purchase as much insurance as they wish at the quoted prices. We show that a price equilibrium always exists and is one of three types: i) zero profit price equilibrium - zero profit, zero effort, full insurance ii) positive profit price equilibrium - positive profit, positive effort, partial insurance iii) zero insurance price equilibrium - zero insurance, zero profit, positive effort. We also demonstrate circumstances under which the linear taxation of price insurance allows decentralization of the social optimum (conditional on the unobservability of effort), and when it, does not, whether it is at least utility-improving