Download or read book Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests written by Christian Ewerhart and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favorite while, similarly, the strongest type of the favorite tries to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess commitment power, or when information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.
Download or read book Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Stochastic Entry written by Qiang Fu and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.
Download or read book Voluntary Disclosure Under Imperfect Competition written by Lucy F. Ackert and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Forward Looking Voluntary Disclosure in Proxy Contests written by Stephen P. Baginski and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using a unique, hand-gathered sample of 893 forward-looking voluntary disclosures by 70 proxy contest firms during 1992-2001, we examine whether managers temporarily alter the frequency and tone of their disclosures during proxy contests. Broadly consistent with the corporate control contest hypothesis, we find that, after controlling for performance and other determinants of disclosure, managers increase the frequency of forward-looking voluntary disclosures during the proxy contest relative to the pre-proxy period. After the proxy contest is resolved, managers decrease forward-looking voluntary disclosures. We also find that, after controlling for earnings-based performance and concurrent period stock returns, the voluntary forward-looking disclosure news is more positive, on average, during proxy contests relative to the pre-contest period. In addition, we find limited evidence that disclosure news is more positive during proxy contests relative to the post-contest period, suggesting that the more positive tone of the disclosures during proxy contests is temporary. Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods that model the endogeneity of the proxy contest event and to controlling for management tenure and turnover. In summary, proxy contest voluntary disclosure behavior is consistent with increased incentives to convince shareholders that managers are in control of the operating environment and to signal that poor past performance is transitory.
Download or read book Mandatory Disclosure and Asymmetry in Financial Reporting written by Jeremy Bertomeu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article examines the demand for disclosure rules by informed managers interested in increasing the market price of their firms. Within a model of political influence, a majority of managers chooses disclosure rules with which all firms must comply. In equilibrium, disclosure rules are asymmetric with greater levels of disclosure over adverse events. This asymmetry is positively associated with the informativeness of the measurement and increasing in the level of verifiability and ex-ante uncertainty of the information. The theory also offers implications about the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, when both channels are endogenous.
Download or read book The Evolution of Cheating in Asymmetric Contests written by Aleksander Berentsen and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry written by Nemit Shroff and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 2005, the SEC enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes 'gun jumping' restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more pre-offering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these pre-offering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi-exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.
Download or read book Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Stochastic Entry written by Qiang Fu and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: French Abstract: Politique de divulgation dans des concours à la Tullock quand l'entrée est stochastique et asymétrique. On examine comment une politique de divulgation ou non du nombre des participants à un concours peut être optimisée pour donner des incitations aux participants quand leur participation est le résultat d'aléas exogènes. Dans le contexte généralisé d'un concours à la Tullock avec deux joueurs qui sont asymétriques tant dans leurs valeurs que dans leurs probabilités d'entrée, on définit les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour lesquelles la non divulgation est préférable à la pleine divulgation. On découvre que la comparaison dépend seulement de l'effet de balance exercé par les probabilités d'entrée sur l'effort total anticipé. La politique optimale de divulgation doit balancer au mieux la concurrence. Ces conditions sont maintenues quand la précision r des concours à la Tullock est choisie de manière endogène par le designer du concours.
Download or read book Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication written by Anastasia Antsygina and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study optimal information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning but can learn them, publicly or privately, from the designer. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort, and commits to it before observing the realized value profile. A distinct feature of our model is that conditional on receiving private information from the designer, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages. As our results show, the contestants have incentives to share their private information with each other if and only if the values of winning are positively correlated. At the same time, learning is rarely perfect because mixing between the two types of messages leads to higher expected payoff in the communication game. Since with a positive probability communication results in an asymmetric contest associated with lower expected effort, the designer prefers concealment to any other disclosure policy available. This result is in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark where private disclosure is best when the values of winning are sufficiently positively correlated.
Download or read book Regulation Fair Disclosure and Information Asymmetry written by Vesna Straser and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: With the institution of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on October 23, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed higher transparency requirements on the voluntary disclosure practices of public companies. This paper investigates whether the regulation induced companies to commit to higher or lower levels of voluntary disclosures by studying the changes in information asymmetry. The analysis is based on the extant economic theory suggesting that increases in the quantity and/or quality of disclosures should reduce companies' levels of information asymmetry. We study two proxies of information asymmetry - the probability of informed trading and the adverse selection component of the spread. After the implementation of Regulation FD we find a significant increase in both proxies of information asymmetry and the probability of new information events that contain private information while the proportion of informed traders decreases. An analysis of the volume of disclosures shows that the regulation was successful in increasing the quantity of available public information. Combined with the previous results we are able to conclude that, at least initially, companies responded to the regulation by providing more public information of lower quality.
Download or read book Voluntary Disclosure and the Role of Product Market Competition written by Narayanaswamy Ramaswami and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 338 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Effect of Product Market Competition on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure Decisions written by Yong-Chul Shin and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. Firms, considering a disclosure, trade off attaining financial market valuation-related benefits vs. protecting long-term product market advantage. Based on economic theory, I propose that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure: Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more; price competition drives them to disclose less. When firms are competing on capacities, firms disclose more information to lower the cost of capital needed for capital investments. In contrast, when firms are competing on prices, they disclose less information because proprietary costs are high and the benefit from any decreased cost of capital is low due to less acute need for additional capital. By estimating the signs of the slope of reaction curves to identify the type of competition facing firms in oligopoly markets, I find that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above what pervious literature has documented as the firm's external financing needs. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than firms engaged in price competition. Further analysis after including as benchmarks firms with no strategic interaction, shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than no-strategic-interaction firms.
Download or read book Competition and Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information written by Zhe Jin and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 404 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Conceptual and Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility Entrepreneurial Orientation and Financial Performance written by Paiva, Inna Sousa and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2020-02-28 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the last few years, we have witnessed the enormous success of corporate social responsibility and business all over the world. These developments, including those in which governments foster both growth through entrepreneurship and achievement of sustainable development by creating tools for worldwide impact to reconcile business interests with the demands of communities, have been unequivocal concerning job and wealth creation. Replacing short-term visions, however, has become instrumental to business success throughout the industry. Conceptual and Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Financial Performance is a pivotal reference source that explores corporate social responsibility through the lens of entrepreneurship and firm performance in an effort to change the approach towards long-term growth. While highlighting topics such as risk management, stewardship theory, and CEO duality, this publication explores contributions to societal welfare and methods of business creation. This book is ideally designed for managers, executives, human resources professionals, entrepreneurs, developers, academicians, researchers, industry professionals, and students.
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics written by Francesco Parisi and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017-04-13 with total page 626 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering over one-hundred topics on issues ranging from Law and Neuroeconomics to European Union Law and Economics to Feminist Theory and Law and Economics, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics is the definitive work in the field of law and economics. The book gathers together scholars and experts in law and economics to create the most inclusive and current work on law and economics. Edited by Francisco Parisi, the Handbook looks at the origins of the field of law and economics, tracks its progression and increased importance to both law and economics, and looks to the future of the field and its continued development by examining a cornucopia of fields touched by work in law and economics. The uniqueness of its breadth, depth, and convenience make the volume essential to scholars, students, and contributors in the field of law and economics.
Download or read book Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking written by R. D. Congleton and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2015-02-27 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political econo
Download or read book Earnings Management written by Joshua Ronen and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-08-06 with total page 587 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
