Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure written by Eric S. Rosengren and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure Classic Reprint written by Janusz an Ordover and published by . This book was released on 2015-08-05 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure The competitive effects of vertical mergers have long been a source of controversy in economics and antitrust. This paper is concerned with vertical foreclosure, one of the central issues in that debate. Vertical foreclosure concerns the exclusion that results when unintegrated downstream rivals are foreclosed from the input supplies controlled by the firm that integrates. Analogous effects occur when unintegrated upstream competitors are foreclosed from selling to the downstream division of the integrated firm. While the foreclosure argument has been accepted in leading court decisions and policy guidelines, critics maintain that the theory itself is logically flawed. They claim that a vertically integrated firm will have no incentive to exclude its rivals, and if it did try to exclude them, rivals could protect themselves by contracting with other unintegrated firms. This controversy can be seen more clearly by making the vertical foreclosure theory more specific. According to the theory, a single vertical merger can disadvantage downstream rivals as follows. Consider a market in which the supply of inputs is competitive before the merger and there are no production efficiency benefits gained from vertical integration. After the merger, suppose the upstream division of the now-integrated firm refuses to supply inputs to the rivals of its downstream division. This foreclosure of rivals from these supplies means that remaining suppliers will face less competition. As a result, they may be able to increase their profits by raising their input prices to the unintegrated downstream firms. These higher prices benefit the vertically integrated firm. If rivals costs of inputs are increased, they will be forced to reduce their production and raise the prices they charge in the downstream market. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy written by Barbara J. Spencer and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine conditions under which a low cost vertically integrated manufacturer has an incentive to export an intermediate product to its higher cost (vertically integrated) rival rather than to vertically foreclose, fully cutting off supplies. The nature of supply conditions in the importing country, the size of an import tariff on the final good and optimal policy by the exporting country are all shown to be important for this decision. The exporting country may gain by taxing exports of the final (Cournot) product even though, under Cournot competition, an export subsidy is optimal in the absence of a market for intermediates. In this case, optimal policy also requires an export tax on intermediates, but the higher tax on final goods serves to divert sales to the more profitable market for intermediates increasing the extent of vertical supply. It is optimal to tax the export of both goods or to subsidize the export of both goods. It is never optimal to tax one and subsidize the other.

Download or read book Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure written by Ordover Janusz A and published by Palala Press. This book was released on 2016-05-05 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Download or read book Vertical Mergers Foreclosure and Raising Rivals Costs Experimental Evidence written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure written by Janusz A. Ordover and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure and the Regulation of Vertical Mergers written by Jun Lu and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure written by Alexander Schrader and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Exclusionary Practices written by Chiara Fumagalli and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-01-11 with total page 651 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure Tax Spinning and Oil Taxation in Oligopoly written by Alexander Schrader and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets written by Stephen Martin and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit to restricting output to the monopoly level, as does the use of public contracts. Public contracts are not a perfect substitute for vertical integration, however: integration allows more surplus to be extracted from the unintegrated downstream firm, a bargaining effect that has been underemphasized in the recent foreclosure literature. Motivated by some observations that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory, we extend the theory to allow downstream firms to have heterogeneous (rather than purely passive or symmetric) out-of-equilibrium beliefs.

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specification written by Jay Pil Choi and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure with Investment written by Jay Pil Choi and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure Versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment written by Pio Baake and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level. We allow the upstream firm to make an ex-ante capital precommitment. We show that, if integration is outlawed, the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output. We show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration.

Download or read book Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control written by Roger D. Blair and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-10 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications written by Jay Pil Choi and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications. In this model, vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would, as an independent firm, provide a generalized input. The changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails; vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm's costs at the downstream level. The choice of a specialized input by the integrated firm serves as a natural commitment mechanism not to supply the rival downstream firms and, thus, enables us to dispense with the controversial price commitment assumption in the literature. We derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.