Download or read book The Relationship of Earnings Management Share Buyback Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the Impact on Firm Performance written by Sitraselvi Chandren and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 592 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Share Buybacks written by Gilbert Amahoro Ndayisaba and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2023-12-05 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates elements from agency theory and signalling theory and draws upon recent changes in the Australian payout policy and incentives pay for risk-averse employees to provide theoretical and empirical analyses that explain the paradox of the popularity of on-market stock buyback activities in a market environment characterised by reasonably high share prices. The authors utilise a dynamic model that rationalises this paradox, which is divided into three components. The first component predicts that executives may be conducting on-market stock buyback programmes (SBPs) to adjust equity-based remuneration for risk-averse employees, thereby motivating their performance without granting them additional costly equity incentive plans (EIPs); the second component predicts that companies are likely to invest in SBPs to increase the ownership stakes of employees in the firm, thereby inducing risk-averse employees to increase their productivity which increases firm value; while the third component predicts that shareholders would benefit from incentives-induced buybacks if a firm’s opportunity cost of funds spent on buybacks is less than its inverse price-to-earnings ratio. The authors’ findings highlight differences in the market responses towards announced repurchase motives, implying that not all incentives-induced buybacks are value-destructive buybacks. Specifically, the widespread assumption that SBPs stifle investments in human and capital stock may be subjective as the findings show that incentives-induced buybacks may be value-creative or value-destructive depending on share repurchase motives of SBPs. This book will be a useful guide for scholars and researchers of finance, corporate finance, financial economics and financial accounting.

Download or read book The Relationships Between Corporate Governance Mechanisms Earnings Management and Future Operating Performance written by Lara Mohammad Al Haddad and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Changing Face of Corporate Ownership written by Michael J. Rubach and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2021-11-19 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: First Published in 2000. This book examines the shareholder activism of institutional investors and the effect of shareholder activism on portfolio performance. Institutional shareholder activism includes both traditional mechanisms of influence (e.g., filing shareholder proposals) and relationship investing (e.g., long-term interorganizational contacts between owners and a corporation’s top managers).

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Accruals Earnings Management written by Leonidas C. Doukakis and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines the association between corporate governance and accruals earnings management using a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) consisting of 55 individual corporate governance measures. Prior literature has focused primarily on certain individual corporate governance measures, overlooking the multidimensional character of corporate governance. Based on a sample of firms listed on the Athens, Milan and Madrid Stock Exchanges, we find an inverse relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. Corporate governance provisions seem to constrain the tendency of management to manage earnings leading to higher credibility for financial statements. Additional tests suggest that the negative relationship holds for large and middle capitalization firms, but not for the small capitalization sample. In addition, corporate governance provisions limit upwards but not downwards earnings management. This study emphasizes the multilevel character of corporate governance and suggests the usage of comprehensive measures of corporate governance in the academic research. This study also stresses the importance of introducing corporate governance mechanisms in order to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. Practitioners are expected to evaluate the corporate governance provisions that each firm has put in place while policy makers are expected to mandate the application of a wide range of corporate governance mechanisms.

Download or read book The Effect of Investor Sentiment on Earnings Management written by Lin Chen (Ph.D.) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The association between investor sentiment and corporate reporting decisions/outcomes has been recently examined in the accounting and finance literature. As an important outcome of corporate reporting decisions, earnings management (EM) may be affected by investor sentiment. In this dissertation, I examine two research questions. The first is whether investor sentiment is associated with the propensity of firms' engaging in the two primary forms of EM: accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). The second question is whether firms' internal governance strength and external audit quality would moderate the association between investor sentiment and AEM as well as REM. For the first research question, the results are mixed depending on the proxy of investor sentiment. Specifically, when Michigan Consumer Confidence Index is used as the sentiment proxy, I find a significant and positive association between investor sentiment and the propensity of (1) AEM, (2) the overall measure of REM and (3) the specific REM mechanism through accelerating sales. However, when investor sentiment is proxied by the index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), I find no relation with the propensity of AEM and only a positive association with the propensity of REM through accelerating sales. Regarding the second research question, I find no evidence that either the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms or quality of external auditors affect the association between investor sentiment and AEM. In terms of REM, the evidence is also mixed depending on which sentiment proxy is used.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Earnings Management written by Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates whether a firm's corporate governance practices have an effect on the quality of its publicly released financial information. In particular, we examine the relationship between audit committee and board of directors characteristics and the extent of corporate earnings management as measured by the level of positive and negative discretionary accruals. Using two groups of US firms, one with relatively high and one with relatively low levels of discretionary accruals in the year 1996, we find that earnings management is significantly associated with some of the governance practices by audit committees and boards of directors. For audit committees, income increasing earnings management is negatively associated with a larger proportion of outside members who are not managers in other firms, a clear mandate for overseeing both the financial statements and the external audit, and a committee composed only of independent directors that meets more than twice a year. We also find that short-term stocks options held by non-executive committee members are associated with income increasing earnings management. Income decreasing earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of at least a member with financial expertise and a clear mandate for overseeing both the financial statements and the external audit.For the board of directors, we find less income increasing earnings management in firms whose outside board members have experience as board members with the firm and with other firms. We also find that larger board, the importance of the ownership stakes in the firm held by non-executive directors, and experience as board members seems to reduce income decreasing earnings management.Our results provide evidence that effective boards and audit committees constrain earnings management activities. These findings have implications for regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as they attempt to supervise firms whose financial reporting is in the gray area between legitimacy and outright fraud and where earnings statements reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company, as pointed out by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999).

Download or read book The Impact of Corporate Governance and Firm Specific Characteristics on Earnings Management of Listed Firms in Switzerland written by Katarina Svilar and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Share Ownership and Corporate Performance written by Jayesh Kumar and published by Independently Published. This book was released on 2021-03-07 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This MPhil thesis examines whether the corporate governance framework (ownership structure) influence the firm performance and dividends payout policy. We consider the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, institutional, and managerial ownership on the firm performance and profits payout policy for an unbalanced panel of 2478 Indian corporate firms over 1994 to 2000.We find that after controlling for observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a fixed-effects panel data framework, the shareholding by institutional investors and directors affects firm performance. We also find that the equity ownership by dominant group influences firm-performance only in case of managerial ownership. We find no evidence in favor of the endogeneity of ownership structure. Unobserved firm heterogeneity is found to be significant. We also find that the ownership by foreign and corporates does not influence firm performance.In analyzing the dividends payout behavior, we suggest an empirical model explain the dividend payout behavior, with the help of a firm's financial structure and investment opportunities along with dividends, earnings, and ownership structure. Using a fixed-effects panel data approach, we find evidence of dividends' dependence on past dividends. Ownership by the corporate and directors is positively related to profits payout in level, and corporate ownership is negatively related in its square. Institutional ownership has an inverse effect on dividends in comparison to corporate ownership in standards as well as in its squares.We find no evidence in favor of an association between foreign ownership and dividend payout growth. We also find support for the hypothesis of a positive association between dividends and past earnings. Debt equity is found to be negatively associated, whereas recent investment opportunities are positively associated with dividends payout. We do not find evidence of the tax or group affiliation effect on payout policy.

Download or read book The Role of Corporate Governance in Reducing the Negative Effect of Earnings Management written by Nopphon Tangjitprom and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance in reducing the negative effect of earnings management. The accounting data for U.S. firms during 2002-2010 were collected from WorldScope database and the corporate governance data were from ASSET4, which is an affiliate of Thomson Reuter. Earnings management can be harmful to firm value if it arises from managerial opportunism, whereas it can also be beneficial if managers intend to convey some information about future earnings or reduce the volatility of reported earnings. The empirical evidence has shown that earnings management has a negative effect on firm value. However, the negative effect of earnings management is neutralized by the role of corporate governance, which helps to reduce managerial opportunism. Firms with a lower CG score face the negative effect of earnings management, whereas firms with a higher CG score face a less-negative effect from earnings management. In other words, managerial opportunism with earnings management is lower in good-governance firms. Therefore, corporate governance provides a crucial role in reducing the negative effect of earnings management.

Download or read book Shareholder Voting Behavior and Its Impact on Firm Performance written by Cihan Demirtas and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This research explores the influence of shareholder votes on corporate governance and firm performance within U.S.-listed companies. By exercising their right to vote, shareholders can express their approval or disapproval of corporate governance practices. To comprehensively examine the effects of shareholder votes, this study adopts a configuration approach that considers both the firm and shareholder perspectives. The analysis focuses on shareholder proposals as a key indicator of different configurations of shareholder voting strategies. Leveraging data from the S&P 500, the study uncovers several significant findings. Firstly, shareholder proposals pertaining to director incentives and monitoring demonstrate a positive association with high firm performance when supported by shareholders at the board of directors level. Secondly, the specific design of shareholder proposal configurations relating to director incentives and oversight significantly impacts firm performance, leading to varying outcomes of both high and low performance. Lastly, a congruence between shareholder-proposed director incentives and monitoring practices emerges as a key driver of high firm performance, while misalignment between these factors results in poorer performance. This research contributes to the governance literature by providing valuable insights into the configurations of shareholder proposals that yield high or low shareholder returns. Moreover, it introduces a typology of shareholder voting, shedding light on the diverse strategic approaches employed by shareholders to influence corporate outcomes. Furthermore, this study advances the understanding of strategic management and shareholder activism. By considering the combined effects of shareholder proposals, it offers explanations for the mixed results observed in prior research on single governance mechanisms. The research also addresses conflicts between shareholders and the firm, as well as among shareholders themselves, thereby providing valuable insights at the intersection of strategy and principal-agent theory.

Download or read book Monitoring Mechanisms Risk and Equity Prices written by Yang Ni and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the measure of the effectiveness of corporate governance? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This thesis sheds light on these questions by examining the consequences of two kinds of corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, religion as an external mechanism and independent directors as an internal mechanism. Though recent work in finance and accounting provide evidence that religion is an effective external monitoring mechanism, whether it has pricing effects has yet to be examined. I explore this issue by investigating the relation between the degree of religiosity surrounding a firm's headquarters and the firm's cost of equity capital in Chapter 2. I find that firms located in more religious counties of the U.S. exhibit a lower cost of equity capital. The effects are also more pronounced for firms and during periods lacking alternative regulation mechanisms. Finally, I find that the effects of religion on the firm's cost of equity capital are more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetry. The second part of my thesis is motivated by the considerable debate on whether board independence is an effective internal monitoring mechanism. I offer a new perspective by examining the relationship between firm risk and board independence. I find that board independence is associated with a significantly lower level of idiosyncratic risk. Further tests suggest that firms' idiosyncratic risk is negatively related to the independence of audit committees and nominating committees, but positively related to the independence of compensation committees. In addition, I find that firms with greater board independence display lower degrees of operating risk exposure, and are less prone to stock price crashes. My thesis makes several important contributions to the literature. First, my thesis shows that studying the important social factors that influence different agents and determine the deeds of collective groups may be important for corporate governance research and practice. Furthermore, my results provide robust evidence supporting the view that religion facilitates economic development. Finally, my findings provide an explanation for the insignificant relationship between board independence and firm performance documented by recent literature.

Download or read book The Effect of Corporate Governance on Management s Real Earnings Management Decisions written by Yaser Youssif and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family Controlled Companies written by Sasson Bar-Yosef and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of board of directors' structure improve monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these is the managers' decision to manage earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management, in widely-held public companies, is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence on the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is interesting in particular as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies, characterized by a potentially low board independence environment. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters (i) proportion of independent directors on board, and (ii) lack of CEO/Board Chairman duality function, with special attention paid to the case where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family. Our empirical results provide evidence that, indeed, the impact of board independence on earnings management is weaker in family-controlled companies. The same effects are also found for the cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling-family, even though she is not also the Board Chairman.

Download or read book Earnings Management and Firm Performance The Case of Open Market Share Repurchases written by 聶聖文 and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Investigation of the Impact of Corporate Governance on Decision to Expense Employee Stock Options written by Ling Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporations have the choice of expensing (using the fair value method), or non-expensing (using the intrinsic value method and provide pro forma disclosure in financial statement footnotes) of employee stock options. The current study examines how corporate governance factors affect such choices. Prior studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2000) have indicated that certain corporate governance factors have an impact on corporate accounting behavior, including earnings management. Based on the assumption that expensing employee stock options is a good practice of accounting that improves earnings quality, it is hypothesized that these corporate governance factors would affect companies' option expensing decisions, in ways similar to how they affect companies' other earnings management choices. A series of hypotheses relating to specific corporate governance factors are developed. These corporate governance factors include: Board independence (percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO/board chairman split, and tenure of independent directors), board expertise (governance expertise and financial expertise), board diligence, board ownership, board size, CEO tenure, and internal blockholders (cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders, and whether the largest blockholder is the CEO). A sample of firms that elected to expense employee stock options up to early September 2003 is identified from the report of Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (2003), and a control sample of non-expensing firms is selected based on certain matching principles. The final sample consists of 235 expensing firms and 235 matched control firms, 470 firms in total. A logit regression is conducted. The dependent variable is companies' decisions on whether or not to expense employee stock options. The independent variables are corporate governance factors and control variables. Regression results indicate that the following corporate governance factors have statistically significant impact on option expensing decisions in the directions predicted: finance expertise, board diligence, and whether the CEO is the largest blockholder. Regression results indicate a statistically significant impact on option expensing decisions, which is in the opposite direction than predicted, for the cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders. The impacts of all other corporate governance factors are statistically insignificant.

Download or read book Investment Dividends Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives written by Mahmoud Agha and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.