Download or read book The Effects of Delay in Bargaining written by Jessica Fong and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Delay in negotiations is common in many settings, but the effects of delay have rarely been studied empirically in the field. We measure the causal effect of delay using data from millions of negotiations on eBay. We find that for both buyers and sellers, the longer the bargaining party delays, the less likely the opponent is to continue the negotiation by countering. However, the downstream consequences vary. The more the seller delays, the more likely the negotiation will fail, but the more the buyer delays, the more likely the seller will accept the buyer's offer. The effects of delay are robust; they exist even under short amounts of delay (under 6 hours) and for negotiations for low-priced goods. We find that these effects are consistent with models of strategic delay, in which delay acts as a signal of bargaining power.

Download or read book Theories of Bargaining Delays written by John Kennan and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment written by Chaim Fershtman and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Delays in Bargaining Games with Complete Information written by Jozsef Sakovics and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Strategic Delay in Bargaining written by Anat R. Admati and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining written by In-koo Cho and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining written by Yossi Feinberg and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information written by József Sákovics and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Durability Deadline and Election Effects in Bargaining written by Alp Simsek and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a tractable model of bargaining with optimism. The distinguishing feature of our model is that the bargaining power is durable and changes only due to important events such as elections. Players know their current bargaining powers, but they can be optimistic that events will shift the bargaining power in their favor. We define congruence (in political negotiations, political capital) as the extent to which a party's current bargaining power translates into its expected payoff from bargaining. We show that durability increases congruence and plays a central role in understanding bargaining delays, as well as the finer bargaining details in political negotiations. Optimistic players delay the agreement if durability is expected to increase in the future. The applications of this durability effect include deadline and election effects, by which upcoming deadlines or elections lead to ex-ante gridlock. In political negotiations, political capital is highest in the immediate aftermath of the election, but it decreases as the next election approaches.

Download or read book Bargaining and Delay written by Charles E. Hyde and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Quantification of Delay and Disruption in Construction and Engineering Projects written by Robert Gemmell and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 838 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Delay and disruption often impacts entire projects and is prevalent throughout the entire construction and engineering industries - no project or construction professional is immune to the effects. This book is aimed at any construction professional anywhere in the world who is involved in preparing, assessing, managing and/or deciding issues concerning the assessment of additional time to complete the work, and also additional payment for delay and/or disruption to the progress of a construction or engineering project. Delay and disruption is endemic in the construction industry and leads to time and cost overruns. It is therefore essential that delays and/or disruptions are identified early so that corrective action can be taken. However, when delay and/or disruption actually occurs, the issue of quantifying the period of any delay, the effects of disruption, and the quantification of the resulting loss during, and especially at the end, of a project is complicated.

Download or read book Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining written by Werner Güth and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Analysis of the Effects of Compulsory Arbitration on Bargaining written by Steven L. Boyce and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book No Extension without Representation Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Collective Bargaining written by Alexander Hijzen and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2016-07-21 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In many countries, notably across Europe, collective bargaining coverage is enhanced by government-issued extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties to all firms and workers in the same sector. This paper analyses the causal impact of such extensions on employment using a natural experiment in Portugal: the immediate suspension by the government that took office in 21 June 2011 of the (until then) nearly automatic extensions. The combination of this suspension and the time needed for processing the extension applications resulted in a sharp and unanticipated decline in the extension probability of agreements signed several month earlier around 1 March 2011. Our results, based on a regression discontinuity design and matched employer-employee-agreement panel data, suggest that extensions had a negative impact on employment growth. Moreover, the effects tend to be concentrated among non-affiliated firms. The lack of representativeness of employer associations is a potentially important factor behind the adverse effect of extensions. Another is the role of retro-activity in combination with the administrative delay in processing extensions. This is particularly relevant in the context of a recession.

Download or read book Delays in Bargaining with Incomplete Contracts written by Andrew Wait and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Adverse Selection Impatience and Immediate Or Delayed Bargaining Agreements written by Richard J. Fairchild and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A standard result in bargaining with symmetric information is that agents exploit all gains from trade, and reach efficient agreements immediately. Models of delayed and inefficient agreements are typically based on asymmetric information regarding bargainer types. However, such models often require permanent or temporary departures from rationality by at least one player. We develop a simple asymmetric information model in which a rational bargainer may or may not make a tough proposal in order to signal his type. We demonstrate that when the adverse selection effect dominates, delayed agreements are likely, whereas when impatience dominates, immediate agreements are likely. Our model provides a useful structure for an experimental bargaining game. It enables us to predict equilibrium offers, and whether agreements will be immediate or delayed. We discuss the design and predictions of this experiment.

Download or read book Optimism and Bargaining Delay written by 莊亞涵 and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: