Download or read book The Determinants of Executive Compensation in the Commercial Banking Industry written by David A. Romer and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.

Download or read book Some Principal Determinants and Equitable Perceptions of Chief Executive Salaries in the Commercial Banking Industry written by Bruce Benjamin Burnes and published by . This book was released on 1972 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with standard measures of vega and delta, to risk-increasing business policy choices. Moreover, these linkages became stronger after 1999, when financial industry deregulation created new growth opportunities for commercial banks. Our results suggest that compensation committees provided new incentives for bank CEOs to exploit these growth opportunities, and also to shift from traditional on-balance sheet portfolio lending to less traditional investments (e.g., private-issue mortgage-backed securities) and nontraditional fee-generating activities. Apart from these strategic reallocations, our results also suggest that bank boards designed CEO compensation contracts to limit excessive risk taking, especially after deregulation.

Download or read book A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay written by Eli Talmor and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. The analysis is conducted for the financial sector as a whole and for each of three sub-groups: commercial banks, brokerage and other non-depository institutions, and insurance companies. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and external ownership, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm performance, and board strength and find evidence that the board of directors provides a monitoring function and that a strong board appears to be a substitute with incentive compensation for aligning incentives. These findings, when viewed with subsequent firm performance, support an efficient contracting argument.

Download or read book The Influence of the Board of Directors on the Executive Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Nesrine Ayadi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this study is to examine the effect of the attributes of the board of directors on the compensation of the CEO of thirty European commercial banks. This research uses a technique of static panel data over the period 2004-2009. The study was conducted on a sample of thirty banks in four European countries. The results of our study suggest that the relationship between the size of the Board and the CEO's compensation is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, our results show that the presence of a proportion of independent directors in the Board improves the compensation of the CEO. They also indicate that improving the compensation of the CEO is also due to his power in the Board since he is its chairman. This study shows that the Board of directors acts as the primary mechanism of internal control designed to align the shareholders and managers' conflicting interests. However, the Board has an important role in defining the executives' compensation; therefore, its power depends on the members that compose it. This study also indicates that the independence quality of the board's members affects the compensation policy to improve the CEO's compensation depending on the banking performance. Moreover, this study suggests that the banking performance is related to the CEO's compensation through the attributes of the board. It therefore gives an overview of the impact of a complementary relationship between the board mechanism and that of the CEO's compensation. This study provides an overview on the complementary between the mechanism of the board and the CEO's compensation.

Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

Download or read book Determinants of Executive Compensation written by Ellen Pavlik and published by Praeger. This book was released on 1991-06-21 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a thorough study of what determines executive compensation levels, challenging prior research which tended to focus solely on the influence of corporate financial performance.

Download or read book Executive Pay and Performance written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.

Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation in the U S Commercial Banking Industry written by Chris R. Crumley and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 512 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Study of the Relationship Between Firm Performance and CEO Compensation in the United States Commercial Banking Industry to 25 Pages 26 to 50 Pages 51 to 75 Pages 76 to 100 Pages 101 to 125 Pages 126 to 150 Pages 151 to 175 Pages 176 to 200 Pages 201 to 225 Pages 226 to 250 Pages 251 to 269 written by Chris R. Crumley and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 269 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Expense Preference Behavior in Commercial Banks written by Richard J. Arnould and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation in the Danish Bank Sector written by Silas Mygind Flytkjaer and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For a long time remuneration of top executives has been a hot topic in the business debate. A lot of people have complained that executives and board members have been too greedy and an absence of morals at the highest executive level has been argued. Especially in the banking sector these concerns have been made as the financial crisis of the late 2000 s highlighted the paradox of various top executives receiving very high bonuses while at the same time their banks were going bankrupt or being saved by government interventions. But what is the whole system behind most executive incentive schemes? Which factors make the banking sector different from other sectors? Which guidelines already exist in the area? Can shareholder and stakeholder interests be balanced? And can we make systemic changes to better, and smarter, align performance with compensation? These are among the questions that this book will answer.

Download or read book Top Executive Compensation written by Conference Board and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation written by and published by . This book was released on 1978 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consists of a biennial survey of compensation of chief executive officers and financial and accounting management, with updating issue published in alternate years.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by . This book was released on 2004-11-22 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, "Pay Without Performance" points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.