Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions written by Andrzej Skrzypacz and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions written by Andreas Blume and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions written by Natalia Fabra and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.

Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Real Time U S Electricity Auctions written by Richard M. Benjamin and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The theory of infinitely repeated games finds that players will likely learn to collude, given sufficient incentive to do so, enabling them to capture greater payoffs than those attainable in the static setting. The theory posits that cooperation can arise in this framework if individuals believe that their current actions will affect opponents' future strategies. That is, cooperation can be sustained in infinite games if opportunistic behavior triggers a punishment mechanism that discourages “cheating.” This paper models the restructured electricity spot market as an infinitely repeated, uniform last-price auction. It does so by starting with the framework of von der Fehr and Harbord (1992, 1993), who solved for an electricity market's static Nash equilibrium. Next, it derives the payoffs attainable under the static and the proposed dynamic Nash (or collusive) equilibrium, assuming that deviations from the dynamic Nash equilibrium are met with a “grim trigger” strategy (i.e., playing the static Nash equilibrium from that point onwards). The paper finds that the proposed equilibrium constitutes the sole pure-strategy equilibrium of the dynamic game, contradicting von der Fehr and Harbord's (1992, 1993) conclusion that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in their framework. The paper explains that the implied threat of future punishment allows the players to reach a self-enforcing collusive equilibrium with greater payoffs than those of the static Nash equilibrium.

Download or read book Collusion in Repeated Auctions and the Role of Communication written by Christian Fischer and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Collusion in repeated auctions with cheap talk messages written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Este trabalho apresenta um modelo de conluio em leilões repetidos de primeiro preço estático, ou seja, um esquema de conluio que usa a mesma regra de conluio em toda a fase de cooperação, independente da história do superjogo. Neste ambiente, introduzimos um mecanismo de comunicação sem custo, por meio do qual os jogadores transmitem sua ordenação de preferências sobre os bens a serem leiloados no jogo estágio. A partir deste modelo, obtemos um aumento da receita esperada agregada por parte dos participantes do leilão frente a um modelo de conluio estático tácito. Além disso, o resultado de dominância do conluio dinâmico com comunicação - esquema no qual a regra de conluio depende de toda a história pública do superjogo - apresentado por Aoyagi (2002), frente a qualquer conluio estático nãose verifica. Outro ponto a se destacar é que o refinamento do sistema de comunicação, por meio de um aumento do número de bens ordenados em cada mensagem, embora leve a um aumento da receita esperada, pode gerar uma elevação da taxa de paciência necessária para a manutenção do conluio.

Download or read book Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions written by Emmanuel Dechenauxy and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Reserve Prices and Tacit Collusion in English Auctions written by Allison E. Brodie and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an experimental setting, a fixed number of identical goods are produced and sold individually in a repeated ascending auction. Secret reserve prices with different restrictions are set on each item. In a baseline treatment, four bidders compete when the reserve is fixed. Baseline behavior is a reference point for comparison in potentially collusive auction settings involving two buyers. Two-buyer treatments study bidding behavior under three conditions: (i) set reserve price, (ii) small random reserve window, and (iii) large random reserve window. Under a set reserve two buyers tacitly collude. With a random reserve tacit agreement is evident, but less stable.

Download or read book Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Externalities written by Ki-eun Rhee and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication written by Masaki Aoyagi and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.

Download or read book Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions written by Jacques Robert and published by Montréal : Université de Montréal, Dép. de sciences économiques. This book was released on 1999 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bid Rotation and Collusion in Repeated Auctions written by Masaki Aoyagi and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Tacit Collusion and Multiple point competition written by Birger Wernerfelt and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and Prevention written by Jin Li and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a “collusion incubator” environment based on a type of public, symmetrically “folded” and “item-aligned” preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non-public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, “folded” and “item aligned” patterns of preferences, creating head-to-head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a “maverick.”

Download or read book Best Practices for Online Procurement Auctions written by Parente, Diane H. and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2007-12-31 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.

Download or read book Auction Design Ad Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions written by Patrick Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Collusion and the Choice of Auction written by Jeroen Hinloopen and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: