Download or read book Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U S Supreme Court written by Thomas H. Hammond and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2005 with total page 330 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.
Download or read book The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior written by Lee Epstein and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2021-06-17 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.
Download or read book Supreme Court Decision Making written by Cornell W. Clayton and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 1999 with total page 359 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What influences decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court? For decades social scientists focused on the ideology of individual justices. Supreme Court Decision Making moves beyond this focus by exploring how justices are influenced by the distinctive features of courts as institutions and their place in the political system. Drawing on interpretive-historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theory, a group of leading scholars consider such factors as the influence of jurisprudence, the unique characteristics of supreme courts, the dynamics of coalition building, and the effects of social movements. The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics. Original essays contributed by Lawrence Baum, Paul Brace, Elizabeth Bussiere, Cornell Clayton, Sue Davis, Charles Epp, Lee Epstein, Howard Gillman, Melinda Gann Hall, Ronald Kahn, Jack Knight, Forrest Maltzman, David O'Brien, Jeffrey Segal, Charles Sheldon, James Spriggs II, and Paul Wahlbeck.
Download or read book Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts written by Scott A. Comparato and published by Bloomsbury Publishing USA. This book was released on 2003-09-30 with total page 191 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applying strategic approaches to both interest groups as amici curiae and state supreme court justices, Comparato investigates the influence of judicial retention methods and the ballot initiative on their behaivor. The results demonstrate that they behave strategically, attempting to achieve their goals within the confines of the institutional setting. What impact do state-level institutions have on the behavior of state supreme court justices and interest groups participating as amici curiae in those courts? Specifically, is the information provided by interest groups conditioned on the judicial retention system, or whether the state uses the ballot initiative, and does that information impact the decision-making process of the justices? Comparato answers these questions by employing strategic theories of judicial and group behavior, with groups motivated by the attainment of policy and group maintenance, and state supreme court justices motivated by policy and the continued maintenance of their position on the court. He argues that the information provided in amicus curiae briefs allows both groups and state supreme court justices to achieve their respective goals. In order to answer these questions, Comparto analyzes litigant and amicus curiae briefs as well as judicial decisions from seven state supreme courts to evaluate the effects of state-level institutions on the types of information provided to state supreme court justices, and how those justices respond to that information. The results suggest that interest groups do behave strategically, providing information to justices that they believe will be useful in helping the justices retain their seats on the court and achieve their desired policy outcomes. There is also support for the expectation that the information provided by litigants and amici, as well as the retention method, have a direct impact on the decision-making of justices.
Download or read book Strategy on the United States Supreme Court written by Saul Brenner and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book reveals how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Download or read book Supreme Court Agenda Setting written by U. Sommer and published by Palgrave Macmillan. This book was released on 2014-05-21 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Much research is devoted to the decision-making power and precedent set by the Supreme Court. Less attention, however, is given to the strategic behavior during case selection. This book argues that case selection is done strategically, and by means of various criteria - influencing its constitutional position and importance.
Download or read book The Constrained Court written by Michael A. Bailey and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-09-11 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? The Constrained Court combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman show how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, Bailey and Maltzman document that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The authors find considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, Bailey and Maltzman show that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. The Constrained Court shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.
Download or read book Institutional Games and the U S Supreme Court written by James R. Rogers and published by University of Virginia Press. This book was released on 2012-10-05 with total page 606 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices’ votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government. Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum
Download or read book Supreme Court Agenda Setting written by U. Sommer and published by Palgrave Macmillan. This book was released on 2014-05-21 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Much research is devoted to the decision-making power and precedent set by the Supreme Court. Less attention, however, is given to the strategic behavior during case selection. This book argues that case selection is done strategically, and by means of various criteria - influencing its constitutional position and importance.
Download or read book The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior written by Lawrence Baum and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 2009-10-22 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From local trial courts to the United States Supreme Court, judges' decisions affect the fates of individual litigants and the fate of the nation as a whole. Scholars have long discussed and debated explanations of judicial behavior. This book examines the major issues in the debates over how best to understand judicial behavior and assesses what we actually know about how judges decide cases. It concludes that we are far from understanding why judges choose the positions they take in court. Lawrence Baum considers three issues in examining judicial behavior. First, the author considers the balance between the judges' interest in the outcome of particular cases and their interest in other goals such as personal popularity and lighter workloads. Second, Baum considers the relative importance of good law and good policy as bases for judges' choices. Finally Baum looks at the extent to which judges act strategically, choosing their own positions after taking into account the positions that their fellow judges and other policy makers might adopt. Baum argues that the evidence on each of these issues is inconclusive and that there remains considerable room for debate about the sources of judges' decisions. Baum concludes that this lack of resolution is not the result of weaknesses in the scholarship but from the difficulty in explaining human behavior. He makes a plea for diversity in research. This book will be of interest to political scientists and scholars in law and courts as well as attorneys who are interested in understanding judges as decision makers and who want to understand what we can learn from scholarly research about judicial behavior. Lawrence Baum is Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.
Download or read book Strategy on the United States Supreme Court written by Saul Brenner and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2009-02-16 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Download or read book Judges and Their Audiences written by Lawrence Baum and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-01-10 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What motivates judges as decision makers? Political scientist Lawrence Baum offers a new perspective on this crucial question, a perspective based on judges' interest in the approval of audiences important to them. The conventional scholarly wisdom holds that judges on higher courts seek only to make good law, good policy, or both. In these theories, judges are influenced by other people only in limited ways, in consequence of their legal and policy goals. In contrast, Baum argues that the influence of judges' audiences is pervasive. This influence derives from judges' interest in popularity and respect, a motivation central to most people. Judges care about the regard of audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Judges and Their Audiences uses research in social psychology to make the case that audiences shape judges' choices in substantial ways. Drawing on a broad range of scholarship on judicial decision-making and an array of empirical evidence, the book then analyzes the potential and actual impact of several audiences, including the public, other branches of government, court colleagues, the legal profession, and judges' social peers. Engagingly written, this book provides a deeper understanding of key issues concerning judicial behavior on which scholars disagree, identifies aspects of judicial behavior that diverge from the assumptions of existing models, and shows how those models can be strengthened.
Download or read book Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court written by Richard L. Pacelle, Jr and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-06-13 with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There are three general models of Supreme Court decision making: the legal model, the attitudinal model and the strategic model. But each is somewhat incomplete. This book advances an integrated model of Supreme Court decision making that incorporates variables from each of the three models. In examining the modern Supreme Court, since Brown v. Board of Education, the book argues that decisions are a function of the sincere preferences of the justices, the nature of precedent, and the development of the particular issue, as well as separation of powers and the potential constraints posed by the president and Congress. To test this model, the authors examine all full, signed civil liberties and economic cases decisions in the 1953–2000 period. Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court argues, and the results confirm, that judicial decision making is more nuanced than the attitudinal or legal models have argued in the past.
Download or read book The Behavior of Federal Judges written by Lee Epstein and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-07 with total page 491 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.
Download or read book The Choices Justices Make written by Lee Epstein and published by SAGE. This book was released on 1997-01-01 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions. Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.
Download or read book Elements of Judicial Strategy written by Walter F. Murphy and published by . This book was released on 2016-07-13 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Now in a readily available republication edition (in library-quality hardcover format), and adding a substantive, detailed 2016 Foreword by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, this classic of law and political science is presented to a new generation of thoughtful observers of the U.S. Supreme Court and how its justices create judicial decisions. As Epstein and Knight write, this book is "extraordinary. It's the rarest of rare: a breakthrough of the path-marking, even paradigm-shifting, variety...." Its initial publication offered a "huge conceptual breakthrough. ELEMENTS was the first to offer a strategic account" of judging, and its "framework forever changed the study of judicial behavior." It remains influential to current thought, extending even in its "global reach," and is an important part of modern social sciences and law. /-/ First outlining the sources and instruments - and limitations - of judicial power, the author then shows how policy-oriented justices might take advantage of their power positions to maximize their impact on the formation and execution of public policy. In this book Walter F. Murphy attempts to understand how, under the limitations which the American legal and political systems impose, Supreme Court justices can legitimately act to further their policy objectives. Murphy also considers ethical issues raised by the model of judicial decision-making he describes. Throughout, systematic analysis is supported by prodigious research and fascinating real-world examples over the years and in very different judicial administrations. /-/ Part of the Legal Legends Series from Quid Pro Books, this republication edition uses modern presentation and yet embeds the page numbers of the original print editions, for purposes of continuity, referencing, course assignment, and convenience to the reader. It is also available in quality eBook formats and a new paperback edition. NOTE: only the new editions from Quid Pro Books contain the new formatting and additional introduction, even if this description appears under used copies of older printings. /-/ About the Author: Walter F. Murphy taught constitutional law to generations of students at Princeton, where he held the chair of McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence first occupied by Woodrow Wilson. Born in Charleston, S.C., Murphy served as a Marine in Korea with a Distinguished Service Cross and a Purple Heart. He graduated from Notre Dame and George Washington University, and earned a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago. His novels include the New York Times bestseller The Vicar of Christ, which won the Chicago Foundation for Literature Award and was preceded by his unprecedented research in Vatican archives and access to church and papal sources. His other acclaimed nonfiction works include Congress and the Court and Constitutional Democracy.
Download or read book The Politics of Precedent on the U S Supreme Court written by Thomas G. Hansford and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2008-07-21 with total page 170 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court offers an insightful and provocative analysis of the Supreme Court's most important task--shaping the law. Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs analyze a key aspect of legal change: the Court's interpretation or treatment of the precedents it has set in the past. Court decisions do not just resolve immediate disputes; they also set broader precedent. The meaning and scope of a precedent, however, can change significantly as the Court revisits it in future cases. The authors contend that these interpretations are driven by an interaction between policy goals and variations in the legal authoritativeness of precedent. From this premise, they build an explanation of the legal interpretation of precedent that yields novel predictions about the nature and timing of legal change. Hansford and Spriggs test their hypotheses by examining how the Court has interpreted the precedents it set between 1946 and 1999. This analysis provides compelling support for their argument, and demonstrates that the justices' ideological goals and the role of precedent are inextricably linked. The two prevailing, yet contradictory, views of precedent--that it acts either solely as a constraint, or as a "cloak" that never actually influences the Court--are incorrect. This book shows that while precedent can operate as a constraint on the justices' decisions, it also represents an opportunity to foster preferred societal outcomes.
