Download or read book Replacing Executive Equity Compensation written by Nitzan Shilon and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I argue that executive equity pay in U.S. public firms is undesirable and should be replaced with cash awards for attaining long-term performance criteria.Paying top executives in equity (stock and stock options) is the most significant reform of executive compensation in our generation, universally welcomed not only by firms but also by academics, investors, and policy makers. Yet I argue that equity compensation is undesirable. It provides perverse incentives for managers to destroy shareholder value and behave manipulatively and recklessly. It is also economically wasteful, and its wastefulness, which is exacerbated by agency costs and cognitive biases, significantly contributes to the immense explosion of executive compensation.Instead, I suggest a radical proposal: to replace such equity pay arrangements with carefully designed cash-for-performance schemes in which executives are rewarded in cash for attaining predetermined long-term performance measures. I further recommend that this reform be implemented systemically and that the tax and disclosure rules that are applied to cash incentive remuneration be placed on a level playing field with those that are applied to equity incentive pay. This reform is expected to eliminate the significant costs of equity compensation and make incentive pay more effective, transparent, cheap, and better tied to performance, while retaining the limited incentive benefits generated by current equity compensation arrangements.

Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Stock Options Grants written by Peter R. Wheeler and published by AdvisorPress. This book was released on 2004 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Stock Options + Grants: The Executive's Guide to Equity Compensation provides a comprehensive, easy reading treatment to the complex area of stock options and grants for the busy executive. From the boardroom to the mailroom, individuals with stock options or grants will benefit from the quick reading question and answer format of this book. If you have a question about your stock options or grants, you are likely to find it answered in Stock Options + Grants: The Executive's Guide to Equity Compensation.

Download or read book Consider Your Options written by Kaye A. Thomas and published by Fairmark Press Inc.. This book was released on 2005 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the 2005 edition of the most popular book on employee stock options. It's a major revision from the previous edition, with new design, content and organization to make it even easier for employees to learn what they need to know about their equity compensation.

Download or read book Pay without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-30 with total page 293 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Edge and published by Windsor Professional Information. This book was released on 2004 with total page 564 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing from nine of the leading compensation advisory firms in the country, Executive Compensation: The Professional's Guide to Current Issues and Practices is the first publication to bring together a number of the top practitioners and experts in the field to provide the information and insights needed to navigate within the new era of accountability and performance standards.

Download or read book Responsible Executive Compensation for a New Era of Accountability written by Peter T. Chingos and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2004-04-12 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A definitive road map to help companies assess and refine their executive reward strategies. Responsible pay has become inextricably linked with corporate governance and long-term shareholder value creation. Responsible Executive Compensation for a New Era of Accountability shows you how to revamp your executive compensation programs to drive shareholder value creation while adhering to the high standards of the new corporate governance environment. Packed with case studies, diagnostics, and contributions from world-renowned experts in executive compensation, this vital resource offers a comprehensive overview of the critical issues affecting executive compensation practice and theory during this new era. Order your copy today!

Download or read book Disappearing Stock Options written by Gala Ades-Laurent and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The question of whether senior executives are overpaid has long been a source of controversy, spurring academic debates, congressional hearings, and statutory changes. It has grown more pointed in the past twenty years due to the increased use of equity pay, which has allowed corporations to generously compensate their top executives while, at least facially, improving performance. Largely due to changes in the tax code and accounting rules in 1993, public companies have favored issuing stock options over stock grants. Yet this trend shifted in the past decade: stock grants replaced options as the dominant form of equity pay. This Note presents the first comprehensive study of the change in the equity composition of executive compensation after the financial crisis, focusing on change in trends between 2006-2014. The evidence shows that the movement away from stock options is largely a response to the panoply of federal efforts to control 'runaway' executive compensation and mitigate risk. This finding has important implications for investors and regulators who wish to offset managerial influence over executive pay at public companies, as well as offering an early glimpse into the post-financial crisis state of affairs.

Download or read book The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Options written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by Prima Lifestyles. This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Numerous private and public companies offer stock option plans every year to motivate, retain, and reward employees. But implementing the right stock option plan can be a complex and daunting undertaking, without the proper guidance.The Complete Guide to Employee Stock Optionsunravels the mystery of creating a meaningful equity compensation plan for employees that is favorable for the business. Author and attorney Frederick D. Lipman describes in complete detail the legal, operational, and motivational aspects of developing a stock option program, whether it's for the new start-up looking to attract top talent or the venerable company looking for ways to reward its best performing employees. Readers will discover how to: * Understand the pros and cons of different option plans* Implement the right plan to meet the company's future plans* Motivate key employees with equity compensation* Minimize the risk of losing equity in a volatile market* And much moreThis book also includes useful information for employees who want to understand what their stock options mean and how to maximize their profitability. Complete wi

Download or read book The Compensation Committee Handbook written by James F. Reda and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2014-03-31 with total page 752 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New and updated information on the laws and regulationsaffecting executive compensation Now in a thoroughly updated Fourth Edition, The CompensationCommittee Handbook provides a comprehensive review of thecomplex issues challenging compensation committees that facerevised executive compensation disclosure regulations issued by theSEC, as well as GAAP and IFRS rulings and trends. This new andupdated edition addresses a full range of functional issues facingcompensation committees, including organizing, planning, and bestpractices tips. Looks at the latest regulations impacting executivecompensation, including new regulations issued by the SEC, as wellas GAAP and IFRS rulings and trends Covers the selection and training of compensation committeemembers Explores how to make compensation committees a performancedriver for a company Guides documentation requirements and timing issues The Compensation Committee Handbook, Fourth Edition willhelp all compensation committee members and interestedprofessionals succeed in melding highly complex technicalinformation and concepts with both corporate governance principlesand sound business judgment.

Download or read book Non qualified Executive Compensation written by and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and published by Worldatwork. This book was released on 2007 with total page 556 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework written by Matthias Kiefer and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2015-01-01 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.

Download or read book An Introduction to Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.

Download or read book Startup Boards written by Brad Feld and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2013-12-09 with total page 237 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An essential guide to understanding the dynamics of a startup's board of directors Let's face it, as founders and entrepreneurs, you have a lot on your plate—getting to your minimum viable product, developing customer interaction, hiring team members, and managing the accounts/books. Sooner or later, you have a board of directors, three to five (or even seven) Type A personalities who seek your attention and at times will tell you what to do. While you might be hesitant to form a board, establishing an objective outside group is essential for startups, especially to keep you on track, call you out when you flail, and in some cases, save you from yourself. In Startup Boards, Brad Feld—a Boulder, Colorado-based entrepreneur turned-venture capitalist—shares his experience in this area by talking about the importance of having the right board members on your team and how to manage them well. Along the way, he shares valuable insights on various aspects of the board, including how they can support you, help you understand your startup's milestones and get to them faster, and hold you accountable. Details the process of choosing board members, including interviewing many people, checking references, and remembering that there should be no fear in rejecting a wrong fit Explores the importance of running great meetings, mixing social time with business time, and much more Recommends being a board member yourself at some other organization so you see the other side of the equation Engaging and informative, Startup Boards is a practical guide to one of the most important pieces of the startup puzzle.

Download or read book THREE STUDIES ON THE USE OF CEO EQUITY COMPENSATION written by JANG WOOK LEE and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three studies relating to executive equity compensation. In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigate whether firms adjust CEO's equity incentives in response to the firms' prior earnings management. I find that the risk-taking incentives from new equity grants are lower for firms with higher prior real earnings management (REM), but not for firms with higher accruals-based earnings management (AEM). My finding suggests that boards perceive the consequences of REM are more value-reducing than AEM and that they take stronger actions against REM by reducing the CEO's risk-taking incentives arising from equity incentives. In addition, I this result is driven by firms with higher institutional ownership, suggesting that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in structuring executive compensation contracts to limit the CEOs' value-reducing behaviors. In the second study (Chapter 3), I investigate how the firm's downside risk and upside potential differentially affect the choice between cash and equity compensation and the choice between stock options and restricted stock compensation. First, I find that, as downside risk (upside potential) increases, boards grant more cash compensation (more equity compensation) and less equity compensation (less cash compensation). This is consistent with the idea that, when downside risk increases, a CEO requires a higher risk premium for equity compensation and, thus, the board shifts compensation away from equity compensation to cash compensation. The reverse is true for the increased upside potential. When upside potential increases, the observed compensation contract will contain less cash and more equity compensation. Second, I find that the proportion of CEO option compensation increases with downside risk and decreases with upside potential. This is because, when downside risk increases, the probability of a stock option finishing out of the money (i.e., zero intrinsic value) increases but restricted stock has positive value as long as the stock price is positive. In contrast, when upside potential increases, because of stock options' leverage effect, a CEO will prefer stock options to restricted stock. In the third study (Chapter 4), I study how executive stock options differentially affect the firm's systematic and idiosyncratic risk by exploiting the passage of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R as an exogenous shock to CEO option compensation. I find that option-based compensation and the proportion of idiosyncratic risk in total risk is negatively associated. This is consistent with the idea that since, unlike risk-neutral investors, risk-averse CEOs have limited ability to eliminate firm specific idiosyncratic, idiosyncratic risk is unwanted by under-diversified CEOs. Thus, CEO option compensation creates incentives to increase the firm's systematic risk relative to the firm's idiosyncratic risk.