Download or read book Repetitive Play of an Unknown Game Against Nature written by Stanford University. Stanford Electronics Laboratories and published by . This book was released on 1967 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A repetitive play of a game against Nature is considered under the assumption that the player knows nothing about the game except his own set of strategies. After each play, he is told the value of the random loss incurred by him. A strategic rule for the player is defined with the property that the average loss achieves asymptotically the minimum functional of the game in probability and uniformly in all sequences of Nature's strategies. The rate of convergence of expected average losses is shown as well. (Author).
Download or read book Methodologies of Pattern Recognition written by Satosi Watanabe and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-12 with total page 591 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Methodologies of Pattern Recognition is a collection of papers that deals with the two approaches to pattern recognition (geometrical and structural), the Robbins-Monro procedures, and the implications of interactive graphic computers for pattern recognition methodology. Some papers describe non-supervised learning in statistical pattern recognition, parallel computation in pattern recognition, and statistical analysis as a tool to make patterns emerge from data. One paper points out the importance of cluster processing in visual perception in which proximate points of similar brightness values form clusters. At higher levels of mental activity humans are efficient in clumping complex items into clusters. Another paper suggests a recognition method which combines versatility and an efficient noise-proofness in dealing with the two main problems in the field of recognition. These difficulties are the presence of a large variety of observed signals and the presence of interference. One paper reports on a possible feature selection for pattern recognition systems employing the minimization of population entropy. Electronic engineers, physicists, physiologists, psychologists, logicians, mathematicians, and philosophers will find great rewards in reading the above collection.
Download or read book Technical Abstract Bulletin written by and published by . This book was released on with total page 850 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Annals of Mathematical Statistics written by and published by . This book was released on 1969 with total page 1138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Learning with a Lack of Prior Data written by Stanford University. Stanford Electronics Laboratories and published by . This book was released on 1967 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A convenient model for learning is provided by the sequential compound decision problem of mathematical statistics. The decision-maker observes a sequence of independent random variables, the distribution of which varies arbitrarily along the sequence. Since the decision-maker does not know the distribution beforehand, he tries to learn during the sequence how to minimize his losses.
Download or read book Quarterly Status Report No 109 January Through March 1968 written by Stanford University. Stanford Electronics Laboratories and published by . This book was released on 1968 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Quarterly Status Report No 108 October Through December 1967 written by Stanford University. Stanford Electronics Laboratories and published by . This book was released on 1968 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Download or read book Kybernetika written by and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 648 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Stanford University Electronics Research Review written by and published by . This book was released on 1968 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Includes brief descriptions of projects, listings of contracts and grant support, and listings of publications.
Download or read book Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports written by and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 922 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Games and Decisions written by R. Duncan Luce and published by Courier Corporation. This book was released on 2012-09-20 with total page 548 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Superb non-technical introduction to game theory, primarily applied to social sciences. Clear, comprehensive coverage of utility theory, 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero-sum games, n-person games, individual and group decision-making, more. Bibliography.
Download or read book Repeated Games written by Jean-François Mertens and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-02-02 with total page 597 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts written by and published by . This book was released on 1968 with total page 1044 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 946 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A First Course on Zero Sum Repeated Games written by Sylvain Sorin and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2002-03-07 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
