Download or read book Renegotiation in Agency Contracts and Information Acquisition Before Renegotiation written by Shinsuke Kambe and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation what it Is how it Works written by Renegotiation Board and published by . This book was released on 1960 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation what it Is how it Works written by United States. Renegotiation Board and published by . This book was released on 1960 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Military Renegotiation Regulations Under the Renegotiation Act of 1948 written by United States. Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board and published by . This book was released on 1949 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce
Download or read book Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts written by Ching-to Albert Ma and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation Before Contract Execution written by Achim Wambach and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts written by Drew Fudenberg and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Military Renegotiation Regulations Under the Renegotiation Act of 1948 written by United States. Renegotiation Board and published by . This book was released on 1952 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Military Renegotiation Regulations Under the Renegotiation Act of 1948 written by United States. Military Renegotiation Policy and Review Board and published by . This book was released on 1953 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation Rulings written by Renegotiation Board and published by . This book was released on with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Oversight Hearing on Profits on Defense Contracts written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information written by Bruno Strulovici and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those always causes immiserization. Reducing the agent's cost of effort can harm the principal by increasing the tension between moral hazard and reporting problems. Truthfulness of the constructed contracts is obtained by allowing jumps in cash flow reports and turning the agent's reporting problem into an impulse control problem. This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal of the equilibrium path. The paper also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the agent, illustrating the interaction between cash-flow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard, and information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory ; Principal Agent ; Limited Commitment ; Renegotiation ; Recursive Contracts
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems written by Aaron S. Edlin and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can holdup the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible.
Download or read book The Defense Program and Contract Renegotiation written by Machinery and Allied Products Institute and published by . This book was released on 1951 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation of Contracts written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance and published by . This book was released on 1942 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Renegotiation written by United States and published by . This book was released on 1944 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
