Download or read book Price Dispersion in Duopolies with Heterogeneous Consumers written by Eleanore Brickell and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Discrimination and Price Dispersion in a Duopoly written by Tommaso M. Valletti and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e., the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market. The findings are discussed with reference to the U.K. mobile telecommunications market.

Download or read book The Effect of Ambiguity on Price Dispersion in Duopoly Markets written by Zachary Dorobiala and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Price dispersion remains a persistent feature of markets for many consumer goods. Theoretically, tension between competing for informed consumers and exploiting captive consumers yields mixed strategy pricing equilibria. This paper considers the implications on pricing levels and dispersion when there is ambiguity about a firm's share of the captive consumers. Said ambiguity forces firms to make pricing decisions without specific probabilities attached to consumer buying habits. The model reveals that ambiguity aversion forces relatively small firms to price higher on average while it causes relatively large firms to price more competitively on average. An experiment provides empirical support for this result, while also showing that individual ambiguity attitudes do not matter when in a market without ambiguity. Additionally, ambiguity significantly lowers price dispersion in markets with a high fraction of informed consumers, while also increasing competition between firms. This effect is primarily driven by the firm with a larger share of captive consumers.

Download or read book Multiproduct Price Competition with Heterogeneous Consumers and Nonconvex Costs written by Luis H.B. Braido and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper extends the oligopolistic model of price competition to environments with multiple goods, heterogeneous consumers, and arbitrary continuous cost functions. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an endogenous sharing rule is proven to exist. It is also shown that, in environments with fixed costs and constant marginal costs, all (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibria exhibit price dispersion across stores. Furthermore, the paper identifies scenarios in which prices will be necessarily random. In these markets, stores keep each other guessing because, given the fixed costs, they would incur a loss if their price strategies were anticipated and beaten by competitors. This is interpreted as an important economic feature that is possibly behind random price promotions such as weekly specials.

Download or read book Essays on Price Dispersion and Dynamic Pricing written by Ching-jen Sun and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: This dissertation develops three essays on dynamic pricing to investigate two important topics in industrial organization: price dispersion and price discrimination. The first essay considers a stylized model of dynamic price competition in which each seller sells one unit of a homogeneous commodity by posting prices in every period to maximize the expected profits with discounting. A random number of buyers come to the market in each period. Each buyer demands at most one unit of the good, and they all have a common reservation price. They know all prices posted by all firms in the market; hence search is costless. I show that when there is a positive probability of excess demand, the model has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each seller posts a price in every period according to a non-degenerate distribution, which is determined by the number of sellers remaining in the market in that period. Sellers play mixed strategies as they are indifferent between selling sooner at a lower price and waiting to sell at a higher price later. Thus, price dispersion not only exists in every period among firms, but also persists over time. In the second essay, I consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Consumers each demand one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, consumers are sorted into different segments according to their first-period choice, and the monopolist can offer different menus of contracts to different segments. In this way, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers not only by product quality, but also by purchase history. I fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when the type space is discrete and a simple condition is given to determine whether the monopolist should price discriminate consumers by product quality in the first period. When the consumers' type space is a continuum, I show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal menu of contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partition PBE (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). The monopolist will offer only one quality in the first period when the social surplus function is log submodular or the firm and consumers are patient. If it is optimal for the firm to offer only one quality in the first period, the optimal market coverage in the first period is smaller than that in the static model. Furthermore, in equilibrium there are some high-type consumers choosing to downgrade the product in the second period, a phenomenon that has never been addressed in the literature. In the second essay, when the consumers' type space is a continuum, the analysis of the optimal menu of contracts is restricted within the class of partition PBE. The third essay provides a justification for this qualification. I ask whether an optimal menu of contracts can induce a non-partition continuation equilibrium by scrutinizing the example constructed by Laffont and Tirole (1988). They construct a non-partition continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of incentive contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. I construct two first-period incentive schemes leading to a partition continuation equilibrium and show that, regardless of the extent of uncertainty, their non-partition continuation equilibrium generates a smaller payoff than one of two partition continuation equilibria for the principal. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal. I provide an intuition behind this result, hoping to shed light on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.

Download or read book Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic Differentiated goods Duopoly written by Godfrey Keller and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Consumer Heterogeneity and Pricing in a Duopoly with Switching Costs written by Tommy S. Gabrielsen and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Price Dispersion and Competition with Differentiated Sellers written by Matthew S. Lewis and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I measure price dispersion among differentiated retail gasoline sellers and study the relationship between dispersion and the local competitive environment. Significant price dispersion exists even after controlling for differences in station characteristics, and price differences between sellers change frequently. The extent of price dispersion is related to the density of local competition, but this relationship varies significantly depending on the type of seller and the composition of its competitors. These findings are consistent with interactions between seller and consumer heterogeneity that are not well understood in the existing price dispersion literature.

Download or read book Price Competition in Two Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers and Network Effects written by Lapo Filistrucchi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We model a two-sided market with heterogeneous customers and two heterogeneous network effects. In our model, customers on each market side care differently about both the number and the type of customers on the other side. Examples of two-sided markets are online platforms or daily newspapers. In the latter case, for instance, readership demand depends on the amount and the type of advertisements. Also, advertising demand depends on the number of readers and the distribution of readers across demographic groups. There are feedback loops because advertising demand depends on the numbers of readers, which again depends on the amount of advertising, and so on. Due to the difficulty in dealing with such feedback loops when publishers set prices on both sides of the market, most of the literature has avoided models with Bertrand competition on both sides or has resorted to simplifying assumptions such as linear demands or the presence of only one network effect. We address this issue by first presenting intuitive sufficient conditions for demand on each side to be unique given prices on both sides. We then derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in prices. For merger analysis, or any other policy simulation in the context of competition policy, it is important that equilibria exist and are unique. Otherwise, one cannot predict prices or welfare effects after a merger or a policy change. The conditions are related to the own- and cross-price effects, as well as the strength of the own and cross network effects. We show that most functional forms used in empirical work, such as logit type demand functions, tend to satisfy these conditions for realistic values of the respective parameters. Finally, using data on the Dutch daily newspaper industry, we estimate a flexible model of demand which satisfies the above conditions and evaluate the effects of a hypothetical merger and study the effects of a shrinking market for offline newspapers.

Download or read book Existence and Persistence of Price Dispersion written by Saul Lach and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using a unique data set on store-level monthly prices of four homogenous products sold in Israel, I study the existence and characteristics of the dispersion of prices across stores, as well as its persistence over time. I find that price dispersion prevails even after controlling for observed and unobserved product heterogeneity. Moreover, intra-distribution mobility is significant: stores move up and down the cross-sectional price distribution. Thus, consumers cannot learn about stores that consistently post low prices. As a consequence, price dispersion does not disappear and persists over time as predicted by Varian's (1980) model of sales

Download or read book Oligopoly Pricing written by Xavier Vives and published by MIT Press (MA). This book was released on 1999 with total page 446 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

Download or read book Economics and Information Systems written by Terrence Hendershott and published by Elsevier Science Limited. This book was released on 2006-12-28 with total page 692 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contains chapters that focus on the individual interrelated subjects regarding the economics of information systems: the adoption and diffusion of information technologies; the pricing of data communications; the means and tactics firms us to compete with each other; and the manner in which firms interact with and distribute goods to customers.

Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications written by R.J. Aumann and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Download or read book Handbook of Monetary Economics written by Benjamin M. Friedman and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization written by Ran Spiegler and published by OUP USA. This book was released on 2011-02-18 with total page 235 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ît then rigorously analyses each model in the tradition of microeconomic theory, leading to a richer, more realistic picture of consumer behavior. Ran Spiegler analyses phenomena such as exploitative price plans in the credit market, complexity of financial products and other obfuscation practices, consumer antagonism to unexpected price increases, and the role of default options in consumer decision making. Spiegler unifies the relevant literature into three main strands: limited ability to anticipate and control future choices, limited ability to understand complex market environments, and sensitivity to reference points. Although the challenge of enriching the psychology of decision makers in economic models has been at the frontier of theoretical research in the last decade, there has been no graduate-level, theory-oriented textbook to cover developments in the last 10-15 years.

Download or read book Existence and Stability of Nash Equilibrium written by Guilherme Carmona and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2013 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field. Book jacket.

Download or read book Handbook of Media Economics vol 1A written by Simon P. Anderson and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2016-01-29 with total page 563 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Media Economics provides valuable information on a unique field that has its own theories, evidence, and policies. Understanding the media is important for society, and while new technologies are altering the media, they are also affecting our understanding of their economics. The book spans the large scope of media economics, simultaneously offering in-depth analysis of particular topics, including the economics of why media are important, how media work (including financing sources, institutional settings, and regulation), what determines media content (including media bias), and the effects of new technologies. The book provides a powerful introduction for those interested in starting research in media economics. - Helps academic and non-academic economists understand recent rapid changes in theoretical and empirical advances, in structural empirical methods, and in the media industry's connection with the democratic process - Presents the only detailed summary of media economics that emphasizes political economy, merger policy, and competition policy - Pays special attention to the economic influences of the Internet, including developments in social media, user-generated content, and advertising, as well as the Internet's effects on newspapers, radio, and television