Download or read book Infinite Dimensional Analysis written by Charalambos D. Aliprantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 623 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text was born out of an advanced mathematical economics seminar at Caltech in 1989-90. We realized that the typical graduate student in mathematical economics has to be familiar with a vast amount of material that spans several traditional fields in mathematics. Much of the mate rial appears only in esoteric research monographs that are designed for specialists, not for the sort of generalist that our students need be. We hope that in a small way this text will make the material here accessible to a much broader audience. While our motivation is to present and orga nize the analytical foundations underlying modern economics and finance, this is a book of mathematics, not of economics. We mention applications to economics but present very few of them. They are there to convince economists that the material has so me relevance and to let mathematicians know that there are areas of application for these results. We feel that this text could be used for a course in analysis that would benefit math ematicians, engineers, and scientists. Most of the material we present is available elsewhere, but is scattered throughout a variety of sources and occasionally buried in obscurity. Some of our results are original (or more likely, independent rediscoveries). We have included some material that we cannot honestly say is neces sary to understand modern economic theory, but may yet prove useful in future research.

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks written by Zhu Han and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012 with total page 555 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unified 2001 treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies and a wide range of techniques for modeling, design and analysis.

Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Download or read book Conjugate Duality and Optimization written by R. Tyrrell Rockafellar and published by SIAM. This book was released on 1974-01-01 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Provides a relatively brief introduction to conjugate duality in both finite- and infinite-dimensional problems. An emphasis is placed on the fundamental importance of the concepts of Lagrangian function, saddle-point, and saddle-value. General examples are drawn from nonlinear programming, approximation, stochastic programming, the calculus of variations, and optimal control.

Download or read book Pareto Optimality Game Theory and Equilibria written by Panos M. Pardalos and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-07-02 with total page 872 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This comprehensive work examines important recent developments and modern applications in the fields of optimization, control, game theory and equilibrium programming. In particular, the concepts of equilibrium and optimality are of immense practical importance affecting decision-making problems regarding policy and strategies, and in understanding and predicting systems in different application domains, ranging from economics and engineering to military applications. The book consists of 29 survey chapters written by distinguished researchers in the above areas.

Download or read book Dynamic Allocation and Pricing written by Alex Gershkov and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-12 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods. Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings. Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.

Download or read book Auction Theory for Computer Networks written by Dusit Niyato and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2020-06-11 with total page 291 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Acquire the tools to address emerging challenges in modern computer networks with this multidisciplinary review of the fundamentals.

Download or read book Mechanism Design written by Rakesh V. Vohra and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-05-09 with total page 185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.

Download or read book The Future of Economic Design written by Jean-François Laslier and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-11-15 with total page 507 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.

Download or read book Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory written by Tim Roughgarden and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-30 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Download or read book Market Design written by Guillaume Haeringer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 393 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. - Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions - New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications - New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Download or read book Automata Languages and Programming written by Fedor V. Fomin and published by Springer. This book was released on 2013-07-03 with total page 722 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This two-volume set of LNCS 7965 and LNCS 7966 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 40th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2013, held in Riga, Latvia, in July 2013. The total of 124 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 422 submissions. They are organized in three tracks focussing on algorithms, complexity and games; logic, semantics, automata and theory of programming; and foundations of networked computation.

Download or read book Internet and Network Economics written by Amin Saberi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2011-01-04 with total page 590 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010, held in Stanford, USA, in December 2010. The 52 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 95 submissions. The papers are organized in 33 regular papers and 19 short papers.

Download or read book Sourcing Strategy written by Sudhi Seshadri and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-04-07 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sourcing Strategy is about sourcing as a long term strategic activity. Myopic purchasing management stops short with describing functional procedures and procedural innovations such as online order processing. The goal of this book is not merely to document sourcing strategy, but to provide the tools to determine it. Therefore, rather than merely describe common sourcing processes, the book takes a normative approach to sourcing strategy. It argues for a rational, complete and integrated process view. It supports its recommendations with logical arguments from an interdisciplinary and analytical approach grounded in microeconomics, law and business strategy. Part 1 of the book explains the economic and business principles that underlie sourcing strategies. It derives policies that guide viable strategies to meet sourcing goals. Part 2 applies these to creative designs for standard sourcing scenarios.