Download or read book Optimal Principal Agent Contracts for a Class of Incentive Schemes written by Prajit K. Dutta and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications written by R.J. Aumann and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Download or read book The Principal Agent Model written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2003 with total page 726 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field.
Download or read book Optimal Enterprise written by Mikhail V. Belov and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2021-07-28 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the modern world, most gross product is created within Enterprise firms, project programs, state agencies, transnational corporations and their divisions, as well as various associations and compositions of the above entities. Enterprises, being, on the one hand, complex, and, on the other hand, widespread systems, are the subject matter of cybernetics, system theory, operations research, management sciences and many other fields of knowledge. However, the complexity of the system obstructs the development of mathematically rigorous foundations for Enterprise control. Moreover, methods of operations research and related sciences, which are widely used in practice, provide optimization of the constituents of an Enterprise, without modeling it as a whole system. But the optimization of parts does not lead to the optimality of the whole, and, also, the absence of top-down and holistic mathematical models of Enterprise contradicts the principle of holism and the system approach. The approach in this book looks first at Enterprise Systems and their essential aspects as complex sociotechnical systems composed of integrated sets of structural and process models (Chapters 1 and 2). A uniform description of all the heterogeneous fields of the modern Enterprise (marketing, sales, manufacturing, HR, finance, etc.) is then made, and the Enterprise Control Problem is posed as a top-down and holistic mathematical optimization problem (Chapter 3). Original models and methods of contract theory (Chapter 4), technology management (Chapter 5), human behavior and human capital (Chapter 6) and complex activity and resource planning (Chapter 7) are developed to solve the problem. Structural processes and mathematical models constitute an Optimal Enterprise Control Framework (Chapter 8) that provides a practical solution to the Enterprise Control Problem. This book is a resource for postgraduate and doctoral students, postdoctoral researchers and professors with research interests in the following fields of science: Fundamental Complex Systems study, Complex Systems Engineering, Enterprise Systems Engineering Applications of Operations Research, Optimization, Probability and Stochastic processes to Management Science, Economics and Business Theory of the Firm Business and Management – general, strategy/leadership, organization management, operations management and management information systems Theory of Business Processes, Business Processes Improvement and Reengineering
Download or read book Formulating Principal Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit written by Shuo Zeng and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-07-02 with total page 134 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
Download or read book Multi Task Principal agent Analyses written by Bengt Holmstrom and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Managerial Discretion in Imperfect Markets written by T. V. S. Ramamohan Rao and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2023-05-30 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book deals with behavioral responses of management of firms that make several decisions with respect to production, marketing, finance, organization of activities within divisions, and interrelations between divisions (including synergies between them and constraints placed on each other in the attainment of overall goals of the firm). The market conditions, that constitute the basis of such decisions, may be stable, random but predictable, or uncertain. It can be expected that objectives attained by the firm, as a result of decisions of management, may be different from the maximum which can be achieved. A generic conceptualization of such managerial discretion and operationally useful methods of measurement have been presented. It is possible to develop machine learning algorithms on this basis to minimize managerial discretion and assist managers in arriving at strategic decisions thereby leaving more resources to deal with uncertain events as they arise. The volume is a great resource not only for researchers, but also decision makers in corporates.
Download or read book Organization with Incomplete Information written by Mukul Majumdar and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1998-09-13 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There have been systematic attempts over the last twenty-five years to explore the implications of decision making with incomplete information and to model an 'economic man' as an information-processing organism. These efforts are associated with the work of Roy Radner, who joins other analysts in this collection to offer accessible overviews of the existing literature on topics such as Walrasian equilibrium with incomplete markets, rational expectations equilibrium, learning, Markovian games, dynamic game-theoretic models of organization, and experimental work on mechanism selection. Some essays also take up relatively new themes related to bounded rationality, complexity of decisions, and economic survival. The collection overall introduces models that add to the toolbox of economists, expand the boundaries of economic analysis, and enrich our understanding of the inefficiencies and complexities of organizational design in the presence of uncertainty.
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save Borrow and Default written by David S. Bizer and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard Principal-Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985a) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is notpermitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest and default rates as function of the level of bankruptcy protection level.
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Download or read book Risk Sharing Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation written by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-10-22 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.
Download or read book Computational Complexity written by Robert A. Meyers and published by Springer. This book was released on 2011-10-19 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Complex systems are systems that comprise many interacting parts with the ability to generate a new quality of collective behavior through self-organization, e.g. the spontaneous formation of temporal, spatial or functional structures. These systems are often characterized by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions as well as emergent behavior that are not readily predictable or even completely deterministic. The recognition that the collective behavior of the whole system cannot be simply inferred from an understanding of the behavior of the individual components has led to the development of numerous sophisticated new computational and modeling tools with applications to a wide range of scientific, engineering, and societal phenomena. Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques and Applications presents a detailed and integrated view of the theoretical basis, computational methods, and state-of-the-art approaches to investigating and modeling of inherently difficult problems whose solution requires extensive resources approaching the practical limits of present-day computer systems. This comprehensive and authoritative reference examines key components of computational complexity, including cellular automata, graph theory, data mining, granular computing, soft computing, wavelets, and more.
Download or read book Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other written by Anjan V. Thakor and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in this setting display properties strikingly different from those associated with optimal contracts in standard principal-agent theory. We derive results that help explain some of the discrepancies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and the stylized facts about real-world contracts.
Download or read book Optimal Contracts in Continuous Time Principal agent Problems written by Hui Ou-Yang and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Zero sum two person games written by Robert J. Aumann and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Possibility of Nonrenewal of a Contract as an Incentive Device in Multiperiod Principal agent Models written by Nirvikar Singh and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk written by Borys Grochulski and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the implications of job destruction risk for optimal incentives in a long-term contract with moral hazard. We extend the dynamic principal-agent model of Sannikov (2008) by adding an exogenous Poisson shock that makes the match between the firm and the agent permanently unproductive. In modeling job destruction as an exogenous Poisson shock, we follow the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching literature. The optimal contract shows how job destruction risk is shared between the rm and the agent. Arrival of the job-destruction shock is always bad news for the rm but can be good news for the agent. In particular, under weak conditions, the optimal contract has exactly two regions. If the agent's continuation value is below a threshold, the agent's continuation value experiences a negative jump upon arrival of the job-destruction shock. If the agent's value is above this threshold, however, the jump in the agent's continuation value is positive, i.e., the agent gets rewarded when the match becomes unproductive. This pattern of adjustment of the agent's value at job destruction allows the firm to reduce the costs of effort incentives while the match is productive. In particular, it allows the firm to adjust the drift of the agent's continuation value process so as to decrease the risk of reaching either of the two inefficient agent retirement points. Further, we study the sensitivity of the optimal contract to the arrival rate of job destruction.
