Download or read book On Informational Decentralization and Efficiency in Resource Allocation Mechanisms written by University of Minnesota. Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On Informational Decentralization and Efficiency in Resourse Allocation Mechanism written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Decentralized Resources Allocation Mechanisms in Networks written by Tudor Mihai Stoenescu and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 428 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Alternative concepts of informational efficiency in resource allocation mechanisms written by Antonio Camacho and published by . This book was released on 1967 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Information Incentives and Economics Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 408 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Information, Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms was first published in 1987.In 1960, economist Leonid Hurwicz formulated a theoretical model that initiated a field of research on the design and analysis of economic mechanisms (the institutional rules and structures by which economic activity is coordinated). By treating mechanisms as a "variable," this research provided a methodology for their comparison. The inefficiency of mechanisms arises from 1) the dispersion of information among agents, and 2) agents' incentives to seek private advantage from this dispersion. Exploration of these limits to efficiency was pioneered by Hurwicz in 1972, and has become a major area of active research. In part, this research enables economic theory to be a more effective instrument for the study of how a society can and should organize its economic activity.The fourteen new papers in this volume -- by a group of distinguished economists, all former students, colleagues, and collaborators of Hurwicz -- address major themes in the study of information and incentives for implementing desired economic allocations. Two comprehensive survey essays provide introductions to the topics of incentive in decentralized organizations generally and, more specifically, in classical models of private goods and public goods economies. The following sections deal with informational aspects of mechanism theory, information and the stability of general resource allocation mechanisms, market mechanisms, and nonmarket and general mechanisms.In addition to the editors, the contributors are: Masahiko Aoki, Kenneth J. Arrow, Xavier Calsamiglia, Jerry R. Green, James S. Jordan, Jean-Jacques Laffont, John Ledyard, Thomas Marschak, Eric Maskin, Andreu Mas-Coleli, Kenneth R. Mount, Andrew Postlewaite, Jean-Charles Rochet, John Roberts, David Schmeidler, and William Thomson.
Download or read book Communication in Mechanism Design written by Steven R. Williams and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2008-06-02 with total page 5 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design is the field of economics that treats institutions and procedures as variables that can be selected in order to achieve desired objectives. An important aspect of a mechanism is the communication among its participants that it requires, which complements other design features such as incentives and complexity. A calculus-based theory of communication in mechanisms is developed in this book. The value of a calculus-based approach lies in its familiarity as well as the insight into mechanisms that it provides. Results are developed concerning (i) a first order approach to the construction of mechanisms, (ii) the range of mechanisms that can be used to achieve a given objective, as well as (iii) lower bounds on the required communication.
Download or read book Informational Aspects of Decentralized Resource Allocation written by Takashi Ishikida and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Decentralization Resource Allocation and Demand Theory written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by . This book was released on 1968 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The project had dealt with a number of problems in the general area of mathematical economics and econometrics. The main effort was devoted to problems of structure of resource allocation mechanisms. In particular the question of decentralizability of such systems was studied in relation to the characteristics of the economic environment. Among results obtained are proofs on the workability (convergence, etc.) of certain stochastic adjustment processes under rather broad environmental circumstances. On the other hand, 'impossibility theorems' have been established for certain situations involving externalities. A considerable amount of effort was devoted to the study of the relationship between market demand functions and the possibility of explaining such functions by some maximization process. This was done from both the 'revealed preference' point of view and in terms of integrability conditions. (Author).
Download or read book Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by . This book was released on 1960 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Economics of Informational Decentralization Complexity Efficiency and Stability written by John O. Ledyard and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 448 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this volume are papers written by students and co-authors of Stanley Reiter. The collection reflects to some extent the range of his interests and intellectual curiosity. He has published papers in statistics, manage ment science, international trade, and welfare economics. He co-authored early papers in economic history and is reported to be largely responsible for giving the field its name of Cliometrics. He helped initiate, nurture and establish the area of economics now known as mechanism design which studies information decentralization, incentives, computational complexity and the dynamics of decentralized interactions. The quality, craft, depth, and innovative nature of his work has always been at an exceptionally high level. Stan has had a strong and important direct effect on many students at Purdue University and Northwestern University. He created and taught a course which all of his students have both dreaded and respected. Using the Socratic method in remarkably effective ways to teach theory skills, he has guided, prodded, and encouraged us to levels we did not think we were capable of. Some of his students are represented in this volume. But even those whose careers took directions other than mathematical economics still consider that training to be an important component of their success. Stan's students include department chairmen, business executives, Deans, a Secretary of the Air Force, and a College President. His guidance has been necessary and fundamental to whatever successes we have had.
Download or read book The Informational Requirements of Local Stability in Decentralized Allocation Mechanisms written by J. S. Jordan and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-05-22 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Download or read book Studies in Resource Allocation Processes written by Kenneth J. Arrow and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2007-02-15 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the central questions of economics relates to the coordination of individual units within a large organization to achieve the central objectives of that organization. This book examines the problems involved in allocating resources in an economic system where decision-making is decentralized into the hands of individuals and individual enterprises. The decisions made by these economic agents must be coordinated because the input decisions of some must eventually equal the output decisions of others. Coordination arises naturally out of the mathematical theory of optimization but there is still the question of how it can be achieved in practice with dispersed knowledge. The essays here explore the many facets of this problem. Nine papers are grouped under the title 'Economies with a single maximand'. They include papers on static and dynamic optimization, decentralization within firms, and nonconvexities in optimizing problems. Fourteen papers are concerned with 'Economies with multiple objectives'. Among the topics covered here are stability of competitive equilibrium, stability in oligopology, and dynamic shortages. The final part of the book includes three papers on informational efficiency and informationally decentralized systems. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the effectiveness of markets.
Download or read book Decentralization In Infinite Horizon Economies written by Mukul Majumdar and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2019-03-07 with total page 205 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book summarizes some issues involved in developing a theory of decentralized resource allocation mechanism in infinite horizon economies. It constitutes a definitive account of cutting-edge research on a topic of continuing importance in price theory. .
Download or read book A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes written by Xavier Calsamiglia and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Collected Papers of Leonid Hurwicz written by Samiran Banerjee and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2022 with total page 407 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Funded in part by The Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute, University of Minnesota"--Title page.
Download or read book The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information written by Philip Mirowski and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2017 with total page 313 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An enlightening examination of the role of information in modern economics and how it influences policy and politics.
