Download or read book Nonproliferation Programs of the Department of State written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Department of State nonproliferation antiterrorism demining and related programs follow legal authority but some activities need reassessment report to the Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations U S Senate written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Nonproliferation Programs of the Department of State written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Nuclear nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists in Russia and other countries, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO assessed (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes. GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE assess the continuing need for the IPP program with input from other federal agencies, including State and the intelligence community. DOE and State generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, although DOE disagreed with the need to reassess the IPP program. However, the nature, scope, and volume of problems GAO identified during the course of its review necessitates such a reassessment to ensure that limited IPP program funds are directed to the scientists and institutes of highest proliferation risk.
Download or read book Department of State written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Department of State written by United States Government Accountability Office and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2017-10-19 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Department of State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities Need Reassessment
Download or read book Nuclear nonproliferation written by Gary Jones and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This testimony discusses GAO's recent work on U.S. nonproliferation programs and comments on S. 673--a bill to establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate such programs. GAO found that the U.S. programs have achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. Furthermore, questions exist about how to sustain the security improvements being made. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State programs to employ weapons scientists face difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that they are preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise. With respect to S. 673, there is some debate among officials about the need for more coordination of U.S. nonproliferation programs. On the basis of the findings of two independent commissions that recently examined these programs, GAO believes that more coordination would be helpful and that the legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing problems GAO identified. S. 673 could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources to address U.S. nonproliferation concerns.
Download or read book Gao 04 521 Department of State written by United States Government Accountability Office and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-01-30 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: GAO-04-521 Department of State: Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Follow Legal Authority, but Some Activities Need Reassessment
Download or read book Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For decades, the United States has tried to impede nuclear proliferation networks that provide equipment to nuclear weapons development programs in countries such as Pakistan and Iran. GAO was asked to examine U.S. efforts to counter nuclear proliferation networks, specifically the (1) status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls, (2) impact of U.S. assistance to help other countries improve their legal and regulatory controls, and (3) impact of U.S. efforts to strengthen its enforcement activities. GAO's findings focused on seven countries where network activities reportedly occurred. The United States has advocated several multilateral actions to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral bodies have adopted some U.S. proposals, they have not adopted others. For example, the United States negotiated passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also led the development of watch lists of nuclear technologies that are not formally controlled by states and formation of a multilateral unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade activities. However, one multilateral body has not adopted two key U.S. proposals made in 2004 to commit its members to add new restrictions on exporting sensitive nuclear technologies. Also, one multilateral organization has not adopted a recommendation for member states to provide it with more export data that would allow it to better detect covert nuclear activities. The impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to strengthen countries' abilities to counter nuclear networks is uncertain because U.S. agencies do not consistently assess the results of this assistance. The impact of this assistance is difficult to determine because the Department of State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. Between 2003 and 2006, State and the Department of Energy provided about $9 million to improve the export controls of seven countries in which nuclear proliferation network activities reportedly occurred. State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. State did not perform risk analyses for 11 of the 56 countries in its program for those years and did not document the basis for each country's proliferation threat level or explain how the risk analyses were done. Of the six countries in our study to which State provided assistance, State performed risk analyses for five. Also, State did not conduct program assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries and for two of the six countries in our study that received assistance. Moreover, while State's program assessments characterize a country's export control system and its weaknesses, they do not assess how U.S. training efforts contributed to correcting weaknesses. Relevant U.S. agencies are impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government identified the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a high priority. U.S. agencies collect information, maintain lists of companies and individuals that they sanction, and maintain case files on investigations of suspected violations of U.S. law. However, most of these agencies cannot readily identify which enforcement activities involve nuclear proliferation as they cannot ensure that searching their case file databases for words, such as nuclear, would reveal all relevant cases.
Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC & A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.
Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: GAO has issued numerous reports on the effectiveness of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs. For this report GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, or unexpended, balances; (2) the level of financial support from foreign donor and recipient governments to the DNN programs; (3) the effectiveness of DNN program performance measures; and (4) the coordination of DNN and other agency nonproliferation programs.
Download or read book Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For decades, the United States has tried to impede nuclear proliferation networks that provide equipment to nuclear weapons development programs in countries such as Pakistan and Iran. GAO was asked to examine U.S. efforts to counter nuclear proliferation networks, specifically the (1) status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls, (2) impact of U.S. assistance to help other countries improve their legal and regulatory controls, and (3) impact of U.S. efforts to strengthen its enforcement activities. GAO's findings focused on seven countries where network activities reportedly occurred. The United States has advocated several multilateral actions to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral bodies have adopted some U.S. proposals, they have not adopted others. For example, the United States negotiated passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also led the development of watch lists of nuclear technologies that are not formally controlled by states and formation of a multilateral unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade activities. However, one multilateral body has not adopted two key U.S. proposals made in 2004 to commit its members to add new restrictions on exporting sensitive nuclear technologies. Also, one multilateral organization has not adopted a recommendation for member states to provide it with more export data that would allow it to better detect covert nuclear activities. The impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to strengthen countries' abilities to counter nuclear networks is uncertain because U.S. agencies do not consistently assess the results of this assistance. The impact of this assistance is difficult to determine because the Department of State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. Between 2003 and 2006, State and the Department of Energy provided about $9 million to improve the export controls of seven countries in which nuclear proliferation network activities reportedly occurred. State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. State did not perform risk analyses for 11 of the 56 countries in its program for those years and did not document the basis for each country's proliferation threat level or explain how the risk analyses were done. Of the six countries in our study to which State provided assistance, State performed risk analyses for five. Also, State did not conduct program assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries and for two of the six countries in our study that received assistance. Moreover, while State's program assessments characterize a country's export control system and its weaknesses, they do not assess how U.S. training efforts contributed to correcting weaknesses. Relevant U.S. agencies are impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government identified the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a high priority. U.S. agencies collect information, maintain lists of companies and individuals that they sanction, and maintain case files on investigations of suspected violations of U.S. law. However, most of these agencies cannot readily identify which enforcement activities involve nuclear proliferation as they cannot ensure that searching their case file databases for words, such as nuclear, would reveal all relevant cases.
Download or read book Nuclear nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: IAEA plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals through its safeguards and nuclear security programs. The Department of State coordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA's safeguards program is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, while the agency's nuclear security program assists countries in improving the physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities. IAEA plans to create an international fuel bank to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs. GAO was asked to examine (1) any challenges that IAEA faces in carrying out its safeguards program, (2) any limitations regarding the nuclear security program, and (3) the status of IAEA's planned nuclear fuel bank. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from IAEA and U.S. federal agencies, 15 nuclear nonproliferation experts, and representatives from 16 countries. GAO recommends, among other things, that State work with IAEA to (1) clearly define and communicate how IAEA will implement the state-level concept, (2) evaluate the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs, and (3) prepare a plan for the long-term operation and funding of IAEA's fuel bank. State agreed with several of the recommendations and disagreed with two, including the one on the nuclear security program's long-term resource needs. GAO continues to believe that implementing all of these recommendations would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA's programs.
Download or read book The State Department s Rewards Programs written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU. GAO is making recommendations to help NNSA improve security procedures and encourage the development of national security laws and regulations in countries with HEU-fueled research reactors.
Download or read book State Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations for 2015 written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 676 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
