Download or read book Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Implementation in Nash Equilibrium written by Graciela Chichilnisky and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present a restriction on the domain of individual preferences that is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a social choice rule that is continuous. anonymous. and respects unanimity. The restriction is that the space of preferences be contractible. Contractibility admits a straightforward intuitive explanation. and is a generalization of conditions such as single peakedness. value restrictiveness and limited agreement. which were earlier shown to be sufficient for majority voting to be an acceptable rule. The only restriction on the number of individuals, is that it be finite and at least 2.

Download or read book Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feedback Nash Equilibria for the Affine Quadratic Differential Game written by Jacob C. Engwerda and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium.

Download or read book A Necessary Condition for Robust Implementation written by Takuro Yamashita and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design theory examines which social objectives (such as efficiency, fairness, stability, and so on) can be achieved when agents have private information. In most of the papers in the mechanism design literature, it has been the standard approach to assume that the agents play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (typically with a ``common prior'') to predict the possible outcomes of mechanisms. However, this approach is often criticized due to its sensitivity of prediction to the assumptions on the agents' beliefs. Given these criticisms, some researchers have investigated robust mechanisms to uncertainty about the agents' beliefs, but the standard approach is to restrict attention to dominant-strategy mechanisms. This approach proves to be restrictive, especially in settings that require a balanced budget. In this dissertation, we consider similar robust approaches, but we do not restrict attention only to dominant-strategy mechanisms. In Chapter 2, we provide an example that illustrates a difference between the dominant strategy approach and the other robust implementation approaches. Specifically, we consider expected welfare maximization in a bilateral trading example with voluntary participation and balanced budget. Chapter 3 provides some general findings. First, we show that any social choice correspondence that is implementable in admissibility must have a ``tree dominance property'': For any profile of ``directed trees'' on each agent's type space, the social choice correspondence must have a selection that satisfies dominant-strategy incentive compatibility along all edges of these trees. Also, we discuss the relationships among different robust implementation concepts. In Chapter 4, we apply these theoretical findings to some economic examples. In general, the tree dominance property may not be a sufficient condition. In applications, we guess which tree dominance conditions are the ``binding'' conditions, and solve a relaxed problems subject to those tree dominance conditions. In some cases, the allocation rule that solves the relaxed problem is proved to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible, which means that dominant-strategy mechanisms cannot be robustly improvable. Even if the solution is not dominant-strategy incentive compatible, we can sometimes verify that this allocation rule can be used as a revelation mechanism that actually robustly implements the desired social choice correspondence. As specific applications, we study (i) bilateral trading settings with balanced budget, (ii) quasi-linear environments without balanced budget, and (iii) implementation of unique desirable allocation rules.

Download or read book The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics written by L. Corchon and published by Springer. This book was released on 1996-10-11 with total page 177 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since the early seventies, following the pioneering work by Leo Hurwicz, economists have been studying the relationship between socially optimal goals and private self-interest. The task was to reconcile the Utopian and Hobbesian traditions, using game theory to find ways to organise the society that are both socially optimal and incentive compatible. This book provides a succinct and up-to-date account of this vast literature and will be welcomed by students, lecturers and anyone wishing to update their knowledge of the field.

Download or read book The Geometry of Implementation written by Graciela Chichilnisky and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium written by Alvaro Sandroni and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Microeconomic Theory written by James Bergin and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2005-05-19 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Microeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, and in some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion. Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumption that the reader has some familiarity with the topics or issues under discussion but would value further discussion, or a second point of view . While much of the material is mainstream, a substantial portion is not available in existing textbooks. The book covers a range of topics appearing in advanced courses in microeconomic theory. Coverage includes such topics as decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, auctions, bargaining, information models, principal- agent problems, signalling and screening games, cooperative games and models of learning.

Download or read book Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feedback Nash Equilibria for the Affine Quadratic Differential written by J.C. Engwerda and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bayesian Implementation written by Thomas R. Palfrey and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2020-08-26 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.

Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robust Mechanism Design: the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs.

Download or read book Foundations in Microeconomic Theory written by Matthew O. Jackson and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-11-30 with total page 541 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume collects papers from Hugo Sonnenschein's students. It aims to demonstrate his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades and present some of the most important articles in microeconomic theory. Each paper is accompanied with a preface by the student providing background on the paper and indicating Hugo's influence on its genesis. The papers all lie in microeconomic theory, and moreover all make fundamental contributions to the foundations of the theory.

Download or read book Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare written by Kenneth J. Arrow and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2010-10-13 with total page 985 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes

Download or read book Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2014-03-13 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.

Download or read book Full Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria written by Hideki Mizukami and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism should coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We show that restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation. We also prove that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation(Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions.

Download or read book Cooperation Game Theoretic Approaches written by Sergiu Hart and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 331 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

Download or read book The Existence of Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Payoffs that are Not Quasiconcave written by Michael R. Baye and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Contemporary Economic Issues written by Murat Sertel and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-01-01 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to the experiences of economic reform since the second World War, and system reform and economic integration across the world in the past decade. The first part of the book examines why only a small number of developing countries have succeeded in their modernization attempts this century. What lessons can be learnt from the successes of the East Asian NIEs and failures of other economies to emulate them? The very different experiences of the transition to market economies in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China is the focus of the next section, with comparisons drawn with the Latin American reform experience, especially in Chile. The effects of economic integration schemes are examined in the final sector, with case-studies of Tunisia and Morocco's Free Trade Agreements with the EU, and of economic integration and the Arab-Israeli peace process.