Download or read book Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions written by Hanno Sauer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-03-10 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Download or read book Moral Thinking Fast and Slow written by Hanno Sauer and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-09-05 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking – the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.

Download or read book Educated Intuitions written by Pauline Kleingeld and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions written by Hanno Sauer and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-11-01 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Download or read book Moral Judgments and Social Education written by Hans A. Hartmann and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-09-14 with total page 344 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The study of morality is an empirical as well as conceptual task, one that involves data collection, statistical analysis, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses. This volume is about moral judgment, especially its exercise in selected social settings. The contributors are psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers of morality, most of whom have collaborated on long-ranged research projects in Europe involving socialization. These essays make it clear that moral judgment is a complex phenomena. The book fuses developmental psychology, sociology, and social psychology. It relates this directly to the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, who wrote the introduction to the book. Whether moral reasoning has a content-specific domain, or whether its structures transcend specific issues of justice, obedience, and rights, these and similar questions suggest that moral philosophers and ethical theorists have much to say about the human condition. The contributors represent diverse disciplines; but they have as their common concern the topic of the interaction of individual or group-specific moral development and social milieu. Although deeply involved in empirical research, they maintain that research on moral development can be pursued properly only in conjunction with a well-formulated theory of the relationship between society, cognition, and behavior. Moral development is an institutional as well as individual concern for schools, universities, and the military. It is rooted in the ability to formulate genuine and coherent moral judgments that reflect social conditions at two levels: individual socialization and historical development of the social system. This classic volume, now available in paperback, not only exemplifies that framework, but also makes an important contribution to it.

Download or read book Moral Responsibility Intuitions and Their Explanations written by Jay Spitzley and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical research suggests that our moral behaviors, judgments, and intuitions have been evolutionarily selected for because they provide strategic solutions to the problems we face as social animals. Nonetheless, a great deal of moral philosophy relies on employing our moral judgments and intuitive moral concepts to guide our understanding of morality and justifications for moral actions. Moral argumentation is commonly guided by thought experiments, counterexamples, attractive principles, as well as concepts like justice and desert. While our moral intuitions and judgments might be helpful in pursuing moral understanding, using these judgments without also appreciating the natural facts about morality will inevitably lead to failures. In this dissertation, I focus on a subset of morality, moral responsibility, and show that certain intuitive views regarding moral responsibility are inherently problematic in light of the empirical explanation of our moral judgments and behaviors. I start by discussing punishment. Punishment has been a topic of great interest to biologists and behavioral economists because of how difficult it is to explain. If morality and moral behavior are adaptive, punishment seems to provide a counterexample; it is not obvious how punishment could straightforwardly benefit the punisher and it certainly does not seem to benefit the one who is punished. I argue that the logic of punishment constrains what sorts of punishment behavior can be adaptive and that our current punishment behaviors and judgments conform to this logic. Thus, I offer an explanation for many of our prevalent and firmly held intuitive judgments and behaviors about punishment. I argue that this explanation illuminates problematic aspects for certain philosophical views and arguments surrounding punishment, as well as moral responsibility more generally. For instance, I argue that this evolutionary explanation poses a problem for anyone who attempts to justify treating people in ways they deserve to be treated because they deserve to be treated that way. More specifically, I argue that desert-based justifications for treatment face a dilemma. Either there is some relationship between justifications for our practices of treating people in ways they deserve to be treated and the evolutionary selective forces that determine what sorts of desert judgments we make or there is no such relationship. If there is no relationship, then we cannot rely on desert judgments to inform us about justifiably deserved treatment. If there is a relationship, then desert-based justifications are at odds with the scientific understanding of our moral judgments. Desert-based justifications for treatment face this dilemma because they both appeal to intuitive judgments about deserved treatment and also require an assumption that is at odds with the evolutionary explanation of our desert intuitions. The problematic assumption stems from the backward-looking nature of desert justifications for treatment. Desert-based justifications do not take any future or forward-looking considerations to be relevant to the justification for such treatment. The concept of desert itself is also thought to be backward-looking, in that the basis of desert is independent of forward-looking considerations. That is, it is normally assumed that if we judge that a person deserves something, it is in virtue of something that person did or some character trait they have that they deserve this, and never because of some fact about the future. Given that desert is central to most understandings of moral responsibility, I investigated whether our everyday concepts of desert and moral responsibility are in fact entirely backward-looking. My results suggest that this is not the case. Therefore, if appealing to intuitions is a valid method of discovering the nature of moral responsibility and desert, it seems either desert is not entirely backward-looking or moral responsibility is not exclusively desert-based. These experimental results also suggest that consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility, which have largely been abandoned due to their counterintuitive nature, are perhaps not so counterintuitive after all. In sum, I argue that progress in understanding morality, and moral responsibility specifically, requires empirical clarity.

Download or read book The Psychological Basis of Moral Judgments written by John J. Park and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2021-07-19 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states. In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals’ moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups. This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume.

Download or read book Moralistics and Psychomoralistics written by Graham Wood and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2022-10-24 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together three distinct research programmes in moral psychology – Moral Foundations Theory, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, and the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology – and shows that they can be combined to create a unified cognitive science of moral intuition. The book assumes evolution has furnished the human mind with two types of judgement: intuitive and deliberative. Focusing on moral intuitions (understood as moral judgments that were not arrived at via a process of conscious deliberation), the book explores the origins of these intuitions, examines how they are produced, and explains why the moral intuitions of different humans differ. Providing a unique synthesis of three separate established fields, this book presents a new research program that will further our understanding of the various different intuitive moral judgements at the heart of some of the moral tensions within human society.

Download or read book Psychology of Learning and Motivation written by and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-02-09 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning written by Keith J. Holyoak and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2013-05-23 with total page 865 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning brings together the contributions of many of the leading researchers in thinking and reasoning to create the most comprehensive overview of research on thinking and reasoning that has ever been available.

Download or read book Motivational Internalism written by Gunnar Björnsson and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2015 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In thirteen new essays and an introduction, Motivational Internalism collects a structured overview of current debates about motivational internalism and examines the nature of and evidence for forms of internalism, internalism's relevance for moral psychology and moral semantics, and ways of bridging the gap between internalist and externalist positions.

Download or read book Re Reasoning Ethics written by Barry Hoffmaster and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2018-05-04 with total page 317 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How developing a more expansive, non-formal conception of reason produces richer ethical understandings of human situations, explored and illustrated with many real examples. In Re-Reasoning Ethics, Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker enhance and empower ethics by adopting a non-formal paradigm of rational deliberation as intelligent problem-solving and a complementary non-formal paradigm of ethical deliberation as problem-solving design to promote human flourishing. The non-formal conception of reason produces broader and richer ethical understandings of human situations, not the simple, constrained depictions provided by moral theories and their logical applications in medical ethics and bioethics. Instead, it delivers and vindicates the moral judgment that complex, contextual, and dynamic situations require. Hoffmaster and Hooker demonstrate how this more expansive rationality operates with examples, first in science and then in ethics. Non-formal reason brings rationality not just to the empirical world of science but also to the empirical realities of human lives. Among the many real cases they present is that of how women at risk of having children with genetic conditions decide whether to try to become pregnant. These women do not apply the formal principle of maximizing expected utility (as advised by genetic counselors) and instead imagine scenarios of what their lives could be like with an affected child and assess whether they could accept the worst of these scenarios. Hoffmaster and Hooker explain how moral compromise and a liberated, extended, and enriched reflective equilibrium expand and augment rational ethical deliberation and how that deliberation can rationally design ethical practices, institutions, and policies.

Download or read book Debunking Arguments in Ethics written by Hanno Sauer and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-07-26 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.

Download or read book A Defense of Evidentialism about Moral Intuitions written by Johnnie R. R. Pedersen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation offers a defense of the evidential view according to which, under favorable circumstances, moral intuitions are evidence of what the moral facts are. For short, the evidential view holds that moral intuitions are evidential. In the first part of the dissertation (chs. 1-4), I give reasons for accepting this view, and in the second part (chs. 5-7), I give responses to arguments that purport to show that moral intuitions are not evidential. In chapter 1 I argue that moral philosophers use wide reflective equilibrium (RE) as a method of discovery. I also argue that they are right to do so since any alternative method would either recommend irrational revisions in the beliefs of moral philosophers, or beg substantive moral issues. Moreover, since, as I point out, moral intuitions play an important role in RE, intuitions play an important role in moral inquiry. In chapter 2 I discuss the nature of evidence. I develop and defend what I call framework relative accounts of objective and of prima facie evidence. Roughly, framework relative accounts hold that the fact that someone, S, [phi]s that p (where [phi]-ing is a kind of mental state) is evidence that q (where, possibly, p=q) if and only if there is a background framework of facts relative to which q explains the fact that S [phi]s that p. More precisely, the fact that S [phi]s that p is objective evidence that q if and only if the explanation, q, is the best one relative a framework of facts and there is no alternative framework of facts relative to which there would be a better explanation of the fact that S [phi]s that p. And the fact that S [phi]s that p is prima facie evidence if and only if there is some explanation of this fact relative to a framework of facts, that S is justified in believing. Having motivated these accounts of evidence, I proceed to discuss whether the fact that someone has a moral intuition that p, is the kind of fact that can be evidence for a moral proposition. I argue that moral intuitions can be evidence because the fact that someone has a moral intuition can stand in the right kind of explanatory relation to a moral proposition relative to a background framework of facts. In chapter 3 I propose a causal account of intuitions that explains how intuitions can be evidence of the moral facts. I suggest that moral intuitions are spontaneous moral judgments that reflect the characteristic moral norms, values and beliefs of the moral code of one's moral culture. I argue that we acquire this code through upbringing, socialization and education, and that a person's moral intuitions typically reflect the content of this code. In chapter 3 I make use of a conclusion I argue for in chapter 4, namely that moral cultures have made moral progress. On this basis I argue that to the extent that onebelongs to a moral culture that has made moral progress, one's intuitions are likely to reflect the moral facts. Therefore, the causal account suggests that moral intuitions can be evidence of the moral facts. In chapter 4 I offer an argument for the evidential status of intuitions that I call the argument from progress. On the account of evidence I have proposed in chapter 2, if the fact that that person has the intuition is to be evidence for the truth of that moral proposition, then there must be a factual background framework relative to which the fact that a person has the intuition that p is best explained by some moral proposition, q. The argument from progress is an argument from inference to the best explanation. The fact there has been moral progress in a culture implies that the moral intuitions of those whose beliefs reflect the culture are more likely to be correct than otherwise would have been the case. Hence to the extent that a theorist's intuitions line up with the local moral culture, that theorist's intuitions are more likely to be true than otherwise would have been the case. This argument relies onthe idea that the methodology which ethicists use to discover new knowledge and insights is more likely to generate such knowledge and insights if the background beliefs and norms on the basis of which thisprocess of discovery takes place are approximately correct. I argue that progress has indeed been made in, and that the hypothesis that the background beliefs and norms of ethicists are approximately correct is the best explanation of this progress. Therefore, plausibly, the background moral views of ethicists are approximately correct under favorable circumstances. On my account of evidence, it follows that intuitions are evidence, since the background framework that is used to explain why someone has an intuition that p is indeed approximately correct under favorable circumstances. The second part of the dissertation consists of an investigation of three major objections to the evidential status of intuitions in ethics. Thus, in chapter 5 I discuss one reason to view intuitions with suspicion, namely that they are subject to manipulation such as framing-effects. A second group of arguments, discussed in chapter 6, argue from a variety of assumptions about the origins of intuitions to the conclusion that they don't have an evidential status. Finally, in chapter 7, I discuss a third group of arguments that uses disagreements - the fact that different people have different, incompatible intuitions - to argue that intuitions don't have an evidential status. I explain how the different versions of these three types of objections do not undermine the plausibility of the evidential view. In two appendices to the dissertation I discuss two papers that contain arguments that are relevant to the evidential view. I have argued that moral philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux have argued against this view. In Appendix A I discuss and reject their arguments. In Appendix B I discuss and rebut Robert Cummins's view that intuitions are epistemologically useless in philosophical inquiries.

Download or read book Judgment Misguided written by Jonathan Baron and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1998 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: People often follow intuitive principles of decision making, ranging from group loyalty to the belief that nature is benign. But instead of using these principles as rules of thumb, we often treat them as absolutes and ignore the consequences of following them blindly. In Judgment Misguided, Jonathan Baron explores our well-meant and deeply felt personal intuitions about what is right and wrong, and how they affect the public domain. Baron argues that when these intuitions are valued in their own right, rather than as a means to another end, they often prevent us from achieving the results we want. Focusing on cases where our intuitive principles take over public decision making, the book examines some of our most common intuitions and the ways they can be misused. According to Baron, we can avoid these problems by paying more attention to the effects of our decisions. Written in a accessible style, the book is filled with compelling case studies, such as abortion, nuclear power, immigration, and the decline of the Atlantic fishery, among others, which illustrate a range of intuitions and how they impede the public's best interests. Judgment Misguided will be important reading for those involved in public decision making, and researchers and students in psychology and the social sciences, as well as everyone looking for insight into the decisions that affect us all.

Download or read book Sentimental Rules written by Shaun Nichols and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2004-11-04 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work, which proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such 'sentimental rules' enjoy an advantage in cultural evolution, which partly explains the success of certain moral norms. This has sweeping and exciting implications for philosophical ethics. Nichols builds on an explosion of recent intriguing experimental work in psychology on our capacity for moral judgment and shows how this empirical work has broad import for enduring philosophical problems. The result is an account that illuminates fundamental questions about the character of moral emotions and the role of sentiment and reason in how we make our moral judgments. This work should appeal widely across philosophy and the other disciplines that comprise cognitive science.

Download or read book Media and the Moral Mind written by Ronald C. Tamborini and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2013 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral psychology and media theory: historical and emerging viewpoints / by Allison Eden, Matthew Grizzard, and Robert J. Lewis -- Universal morality, mediated narratives, and neural synchrony / by Rene Weber, Lucy Popova, and J. Michael Mangus -- A model of intuitive morality and exemplars / by Ron Tamborini -- Morality subcultures and media production: how Hollywood minds the morals of its audience / by Dana Mastro ... [et al.] -- The experience of elevation: responses to media portrayals of moral beauty / by Mary Beth Oliver, Erin Ash, and Julia K. Woolley -- Moral disengagement during exposure to media violence: would it feel right to shoot an innocent civilian in a video game? / by Tilo Hartmann -- Moral monitoring and emotionality in responding to fiction, sports, and the news / by Dolf Zillmann -- How we enjoy and why we seek out morally complex characters in media entertainment / by Arthur A. Raney and Sophie H. Janicke -- The psychological functions of justice in mass media / by Tobias Rothmund ... [et al.] -- The effect of media on children's moral reasoning / by Marina Krcmar