Download or read book Low bid Auction Versus High bid Auction for Siting Noxious Facilities in a Two city Region written by Alain Jean-Marie and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Low bid Auction Versus High bid Auction for Siting Noxious Facilities in a Two city Region an Exact Approach written by Jean-Marie, Alain and published by Montréal : CIRANO. This book was released on 2004 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On Auctions for Siting Noxious Facilities in a Multiple City Region written by Nicolas Marchetti and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The siting of noxious facilities is most of the time a reason for conflict. Kunreuther et al. [1986] and O'Sullivan [1993] suggest two auctions to facilitate the siting of such facilities: the low-bid and high-bid auctions. O'Sullivan shows that, in a two-city region, the high-bid auction is far superior to the low-bid auction. This paper proposes to extend the analysis and to consider a multiple-city region. In that case we show that the previous result does not hold. So, we describe an new auction mechanism, named total-bid auction, and we show that it has theoretical properties superior to previous auctions.
Download or read book On Auction for Siting Noxious Facilities in a Multiple City Region written by Nicolas Marchetti and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The siting of noxious facilities is most of the time a reason for conflict. Kunreuther et al. [1986] and O'Sullivan [1993] suggest two auctions to facilitate the siting of such facilities: the low-bid and high-bid auctions. O'Sullivan shows that, in a two-city region, the high-bid auction is far superior to the low-bid auction. This paper proposes to extend the analysis and to consider a multiple-city region. In that case we show that the previous result does not hold. So, we describe an new auction mechanism, named total-bid auction, and we show that it has theoretical properties superior to previous auctions.
Download or read book Siting Environmentally Unwanted Facilities written by Euston Quah and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2002 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Analyzing not-in-my-backyard siting problems from an economic perspective Quah (economics, National U. of Singapore) and Tan (business, Nanyang Technological U., Singapore) suggest economic methods for successful siting of non-hazardous facilities, including the compensation auction method. They discuss strategic bidding possibilities within the compensation auction method. They suggest that for hazardous facilities, more attention should be paid to mitigation efforts and other in-kind compensation methods. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Download or read book On a Bidding Mechanism for Siting a Noxious Facility written by Anand Desai and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Siting and Sizing of a Noxious Facility written by Eduardo Ferraz and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Providing a noxious facility poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, and determines the compensation for hosting the project and how to split it among the non-hosts. To prevent size distortions, the host pays the second-highest bid and receives the market benefits. Truthful bidding is an equilibrium and leads to the globally optimal allocation, is globally optimal, even if communities' preferences are private information.
Download or read book Construction Bidding written by William R. Park and published by Wiley-Interscience. This book was released on 1992-10-23 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Construction contractors and engineers involved in competitive bidding situations confront a seemingly irreconcilable challenge. On the one hand, you can only win the job by bidding less than your cheapest competitor. Yet you still need to bid high enough to ensure the greatest profit margin possible under existing conditions. In this important addition to the Wiley Series of Practical Construction Guides, strategic bidding experts William Park and Wayne Chapin deliver a field-tested methodology for achieving consistent bidding success. In clear, easy-to-follow language, they update their explanations of proven techniques for using strategic bidding to dramatically improve any firm's profitability. At the same time, they show how to use DATABID, a powerful new construction estimating program, to apply these methods to your next bid. You'll also get a free ready-to-use disk that applies all of the techniques described in the book. This extensively revised and updated edition of Construction Bidding for Profit supplies step-by-step guidance for creating and implementing a workable, realistic competitive bidding strategy. From estimating costs and performing break-even analyses, to factoring in risk and uncertainty and setting realistic bidding goals, you'll discover how to achieve your specific profit objectives through an optimum combination of price, cost, and volume. And you'll learn to easily gather the full range of available competitive data and organize it in a manner that reveals profitable strategic insights into your competitor's bidding behavior. The Second Edition features a simple, nonthreatening approach to statistics and probability that boosts the chances of a successfulbidding outcome against any number of competitors. It is also brimming with updated illustrations, charts, checklists, and sample output for the DATABID estimating program. Throughout, examples drawn from the actual experiences of successful contractors in many different fields of construction illustrate the competitive bidding principles and techniques in action. Whether your specialty is heavy construction projects or subcontract work - whether your annual volume is $200,000 or $200 million - you'll confidently turn to Construction Bidding for the practical strategy and techniques you need to double your bidding efficiency and obtain the best margin for every job you win.
Download or read book Voluntary Procedures for Siting Noxious Facilities written by Howard Kunreuther and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Facility Siting and Public Opposition written by Michael O'Hare and published by Van Nostrand Reinhold Company. This book was released on 1983 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Facility Siting written by Asa Boholm and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2013-06-17 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Annotation * Examines the social, political and environmental issues at stake and the acute conflicts over the siting of industrial facilities and infrastructure * Essential reading for all involved in land use planning and facility siting at all levels and in all situations * New in the Risk, Society and Policy Series From dams to landfill sites and power plants to radioactive waste repositories, the siting of facilities is a veritable minefield of conflicting data, politics, perception and controversy for industry, planners and authorities and citizens. This penetrating new edited collection examines risk, power and identity in contests over the siting of infrastructure and industrial facilities. Going beyond nimby-ism, experts in a variety of fields bring a multi-perspective analysis to case studies from the UK, US and Europe and expose the political and cultural dimensions of siting conflicts. In the process they show how place attachment and notions of landscape and local identity play a prominent role in resistance to 'development'.
Download or read book Siting of Major Facilities written by Edward A. Williams and published by McGraw-Hill Companies. This book was released on 1983 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Simple Auction Mechanism for Locating Noxious Facilities written by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this note, we analyze a simple auction mechanism for locating noxious facilities such as hazardous waste dumps, prisons, and trash disposal plants. Specifically, we first delineate the details of our auction mechanism. Next, we solve for the symmetric equilibrium of this auction. Finally, we argue that the auction under study is an efficient allocation mechanism.
Download or read book Bidding for Development written by Ngiste Abebe and published by Springer. This book was released on 2013-11-14 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 2012, over four billion people tuned in to watch the London Summer Olympics. As the single largest mega-event in the world, the Olympics has the power to captivate the global imagination. Long before athletes vie for a gold medal, however, competition between cities eager to host the Games kicks off with a rigorous bid process. The lengthy and expensive endeavor to host the Olympics is as high-stakes as any sporting event. Rather than encouraging cities to refrain from bidding, Bidding for Development takes a policy approach that challenges stakeholders to bid responsibly and strategically in pursuit of concrete outcomes. Every bid city has the potential to accelerate long-term transportation development through a strategic and robust planning process. This book concentrates on the phenomenon of repeat Olympic bids and the opportunities that may come from bidding, particularly for those cities that never win the Games. In this context, Bidding for Development explores the intersection between transportation infrastructure development, the Olympic bid process, and the resulting legacies experienced by bid losers. The findings address the central question: how can participating in the Olympic bid process accelerate transportation development regardless of the bid result? In response, this book presents a Bid Framework outlining how and when cities may use the bid to unite resources, align transportation priorities, and empower leaders to achieve urban development objectives in preparation for the Olympic bid. The Bid Framework is then applied to two case studies, Manchester and Istanbul, to examine each bid loser's effectiveness in using the bid process to catalyze transportation development. Concurrently, the book takes into consideration how the International Olympic Committee’s evolving bid regulations and requirements relate to urban development and positive social legacy. Bidding for Development delivers actionable recommendations for all Olympic stakeholders to improve the value of the bid process and transportation benefits beyond the Games.
Download or read book Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions with Discrete Bidding written by Timothy Mathews and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A single item is sold to two bidders by way of a sealed bid second price auction in which bids are restricted to a set of discrete values. Restricting attention to symmetric pure strategy behavior on the part of bidders, a unique equilibrium exists. When following these equilibrium strategies bidders may bid strictly above or below their valuation, implying that the item may be awarded to a bidder other than the high valuation bidder. In an auction with two acceptable bids, the expected revenue of the seller may be maximized by a high bid level not equal to the highest possible bidder valuation and may exceed the expected revenue from an analogous second price auction with continuous bidding (and no reserve price). With three acceptable bids, a revenue maximizing seller may choose unevenly spaced bids. With an arbitrary number of evenly spaced bids, as the number of acceptable bids is increased, the expected revenue of the seller and the probability of ex post inefficiency both may either increase or decrease.
Download or read book Unique Bid Auctions written by Amnon Rapoport and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two types of auction were introduced on the Internet a few years ago and have rapidly been gaining widespread popularity. In both auctions, players compete for an exogenously determined prize by independently choosing an integer in some finite and common strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid, provided that it is unique. We construct the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solutions to the two auctions, and then test them in a sequence of experiments that vary the number of bidders and size of the strategy space. Our results show that the aggregate bids, but only a minority of the individual bidders, are accounted for quite accurately by the equilibrium solutions.
Download or read book Auctions for Private Congestible Infrastructures written by Vincent A.C van den Berg and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market structures: a monopoly and 3 duopolies that differ in how firms interact. The effects of an auction depend on what the bidders compete. With a bid auction, the bidders compete on how much money they transfer to the government. This auction leads to the same outcome as the unregulated game (for a given market structure), since this gives the maximum profit to transfer. An auction on the capacity of a facility leads to an even lower welfare than no regulation, because firms set very high capacities and usage fees. Conversely, an auction on generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome. Moreover, these two auctions are robust: they attain the first-best regardless of whether the facilities are auctioned off to a single firm or to two firms, and for all market and network structures. On the contrary, the performances (relative to the first-best) of the bid and capacity auctions strongly depend on these considerations.
