Download or read book Identification Estimation and Testing in Empirical Models of Auctions Within the Independent Private Values Paradigm written by Donald, Stephen G and published by London, Ont. : Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario. This book was released on 1993 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Empirical Auctions and Related Econometrics written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first chapter studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design. The second chapter proposes a procedure to test restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters (partially) identified by unconditional or conditional moment equalities. Our new method allows us to test restrictions involving a continuum of inequalities. Examples of such restrictions include weakly increasing, concavity and first-order stochastic dominance. We show that our testing procedure controls size uniformly and has power approaching 1 against fixed alternatives. We conduct Monte Carlo Experiments to study the finite sample properties of our procedure. The third chapter studies the inference problem of bidders' risk attitudes in Independent Private Value (IPV) first-price auctions with multiplicative auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. Bidders are assumed to have Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Under the exclusion restriction that bidders randomly select themselves into auctions given the auction-level unobserved heterogeneity, bidders' CRRA coefficient is point-identified from bid data of auctions with at least two different number of active bidders. Our exclusion restriction is consistent with a variety of models with endogenous entry. Empirical application to USFS timber auctions shows that we will conclude that timber firms are risk averse if we ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. But once we take the unobserved heterogeneity into account, risk neutrality is consistent with the data.
Download or read book Deciding Between the Common and Private Value Paradigms in Empirical Models of Auctions written by Harry J. Paarsch and published by Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. This book was released on 1989 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of All Pay Auctions and Contests written by Ksenia Shakhgildyan and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes to the structural nonparametric econometrics of auctions and contests with incomplete information. It consists of three chapters. The first chapter investigates the identification and estimation of an all-pay auction where the object is allocated to the player with the highest bid, and every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. As a baseline model, I consider the setting, where one object is allocated among several risk-neutral participants with independent private values (IPV); however, I also show how the model can be extended to the multiunit case. Moreover, the model is not confined to the IPV paradigm, and I further consider the case where the bidders' private values are affiliated (APV). In both IPV and APV settings, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimators of the distribution of the bidders' valuations using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000). Finally, I consider the model with risk-averse bidders. I prove that in general the model in this set-up is not identified even in the semi-parametric case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to the class of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The second chapter proves the identification and derives the asymptotically normal estimator of a nonparametric contest of incomplete information with uncertainty. By uncertainty, I mean that the contest success function is not only determined by the bids of the players, but also by the variable, which I call uncertainty, with a nonparametric distribution, unknown to the researcher, but known to the bidders. This work is the first to consider the incomplete information contest with a nonparametric contest success function. The limiting case of the model when there is no uncertainty is an all-pay auction considered in the first chapter. The model with two asymmetric players is examined. First, I recover the distribution of uncertainty using the information on win outcomes and bids. Next, I adopt the structural approach of Guerre et al. (2000) to obtain the distribution of the bidders' valuations (or types). As an empirical application, I study the U.S. House of Representatives elections. The model provides a method to disentangle two sources of incumbency advantage: a better reputation, and better campaign financing. The former is characterized by the distribution of uncertainty and the latter by the difference in the distributions of candidates' types. Besides, two counterfactual analyses are performed: I show that the limiting expenditure dominates public campaign financing in terms of lowering total campaign spending as well as the incumbent's winning probability. The third chapter is a semiparametric version of the second chapter. In the case when the data is sparse, some restrictions on the nonparametric structure need to be put. In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimator of a contest of incomplete information, in which an object is allocated according to the serial contest success function. As in previous chapters, I recover the distribution of the bidders' valuations from the data on observed bids using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang (2018). As a baseline model, I consider the symmetric contest. Further, the model is extended to account for the bidders' asymmetry.
Download or read book Handbook of Econometrics written by Zvi Griliches and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1983 with total page 1013 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook is a definitive reference source and teaching aid for econometricians. It examines models, estimation theory, data analysis and field applications in econometrics.
Download or read book Handbook of Econometrics written by James J. Heckman and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2007-12-13 with total page 1013 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As conceived by the founders of the Econometric Society, econometrics is a field that uses economic theory and statistical methods to address empirical problems in economics. It is a tool for empirical discovery and policy analysis. The chapters in this volume embody this vision and either implement it directly or provide the tools for doing so. This vision is not shared by those who view econometrics as a branch of statistics rather than as a distinct field of knowledge that designs methods of inference from data based on models of human choice behavior and social interactions. All of the essays in this volume and its companion volume 6B offer guidance to the practitioner on how to apply the methods they discuss to interpret economic data. The authors of the chapters are all leading scholars in the fields they survey and extend. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics Series*Updates and expands the exisiting Handbook of Econometrics volumes*An invaluable reference written by some of the world's leading econometricians.
Download or read book Nonparametric identification and estimation of multi unit sequential oral ascending price auctions with asymmetric bidders written by Bjarne Brendstrup and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Semiparametric Estimation in Models of First price Sealed bid Auctions with Affiliation written by Timothy P. Hubbard and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members--the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure road-resurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and finding significant (and high) affiliation in cost signals
Download or read book Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Microeconomics written by Hashimzade, Nigar and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2021-11-18 with total page 672 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Written in a comprehensive yet accessible style, this Handbook introduces readers to a range of modern empirical methods with applications in microeconomics, illustrating how to use two of the most popular software packages, Stata and R, in microeconometric applications.
Download or read book Handbook of Econometrics written by J.J. Heckman and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2001-11-22 with total page 737 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook is a definitive reference source and teaching aid for econometricians. It examines models, estimation theory, data analysis and field applications in econometrics. Comprehensive surveys, written by experts, discuss recent developments at a level suitable for professional use by economists, econometricians, statisticians, and in advanced graduate econometrics courses. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Download or read book An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data written by Harry J. Paarsch and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2006 with total page 454 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Accompanying CD-ROM contains data and sample computer code for empirical problems.
Download or read book Nonparametric Econometrics written by Qi Li and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2007 with total page 768 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a graduate textbook for econometricians and statisticians containing developments in the field. It emphasises nonparametric methods for real world problems containing the mix of discrete and continuous data found in many applications.
Download or read book Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data written by Jeffrey M. Wooldridge and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2002 with total page 784 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive state-of-the-art text on microeconometric methods.
Download or read book Empirical Inference for Online Auctions written by Guojie Wang and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 69 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay adopts the survival analysis to empirically analyze a new auction format, pay-per-bid auction, in which a fee occurs to the bidder when a new bid is submitted. This auction mechanism attracted many theoretical studies and empirical testing in recent years. However, analyzing the pay-per-bid auction under the survival framework provides a novel path to reflect this new auction format as well as involved bidder and seller behaviors. By considering the arrival of bids as a necessary condition for a pay-per-bid auction to survive, survival analysis tools such as Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimate and Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models are applied to the data set collected from a leading pay-per-bid auction site Swoopo. Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) model is also discussed. Some equilibrium behaviors are confirmed but also some equilibrium deviated behaviors are detected. The second essay models the last-minute bidding behaviors in eBay's hard close auction design using non-parametric analysis. For comparison purpose, the auctions in Amazon with soft close auction design are combined to carry out analysis. The data is selected from eBay and Amazon and a large difference in bid timing is found between auction sites. Density estimation of bid timing confirms the existence of such difference. Mixed additive model is applied to explore the nonparametric relationship between bid timing and parameters of bidding environment. And generalized response model with logistic link function is used to model the probability of a late bidding occurs conditioned on interested covariates. The third essay proposes, from a non-parametric Bayesian aspect, using Dirichlet Processes (DP) with normal mixtures to estimate underlying valuations in second-price ascending auctions under the independent-private-values paradigm. I illustrate how a second-price ascending auction is similar in mechanism to its sealed counterpart and consequently bidders' valuations can be extracted if bidders are identifiable. Compared to classical methods, to provide more flexible and reliable inferences, DP density estimation is strongly motivated and represents an advance. As a non-parametric Bayesian method, DP can accommodate non-nomality through normal mixtures and develop Bayesian inference on model parameters. Due to the complex nature of posteriors, MCMC simulation is used to approximate posteriors as well as density predictions. To test the validity of this method, a Monte Carlo experiment is conducted with similar sample size to our eBay data. In the last section, I reanalyze a data set from eBay auctions and apply our method to estimate the valuations.
Download or read book Identification Estimation and Testing of Auction Models written by Jie Wei and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 73 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The third chapter shows nonparametric identification and estimation of private value distribution and density functions in first-price auctions with endogenous entry. In the model, symmetric bidders face a nontrivial entry cost and a binding reserve price. We identify latent structures by solving a two stage game, and estimate density functions (point-wisely) by using and comparing two different methods. Monte Carlo experiments show good performance of our estimators.
Download or read book Economic Sciences 1996 2000 written by Torsten Persson and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2003 with total page 382 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1996 ? 2000 with a description of the works which won them their prizes: (1996) J A MIRRLEES & W S VICKREY ? for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information; (1997) R C MERTON & M A SCHOLES ? for a new method to determine the value of derivatives; (1998) A K SEN ? for his contributions to welfare economics; (1999) R A MUNDELL ? for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas; (2000) J J HECKMAN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples & D L McFADDEN ? for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice.
Download or read book Beyond Beta written by Samuel Kotz and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Statistical distributions are fundamental to Statistical Science and are a prime indispensable tool for its applications. This monograph is the first to examine an important but somewhat neglected field — univariate continuous distribution on a bounded domain, excluding the beta distribution. It provides an elementary but thorough discussion of “novel” contributions developed in recent years, such as the two-sided power, generalized trapezoidal and generalized Topp and Leone distributions, among others. It discusses a general framework for constructing two-sided distributions and some of its properties. It contains a comprehensive chapter on the triangular distribution as well as a chapter on earlier extensions not emphasized in existing literature. Special attention is given to estimation, in particular, non-standard maximum likelihood procedures. The applications are drawn mainly from the econometric and engineering domains.
