Download or read book High Return High Risk Does Stock Option Based CEO Compensation Encourage Risk Taking written by Harry Xia and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study, through empirical evidence of 3,081 US firms during the period of 1992-2009, shows a strong causal relation between different CEO compensation components and firms' investment policy and firm risk. Specifically, the proportion of CEO option-based compensation is positively and significantly associated with firm's R&D expenditures and firm focus, while the proportion of cash-based and restricted stock compensation are negatively and significantly related. Such results are robust across alternative measures and statistical methodology. Furthermore, there is a non-linear relation between CEO option pay level and R&D investment discovered with practical implications. Finally, following the implementation of FAS 123R in 2005, new evidence indicates that option-based compensation remains as an effective motivation and even becomes a more efficient incentive for CEO to take risk on R&D investment and firm focus.

Download or read book High Return High Risk written by Hui Harry Xia and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

Download or read book Executive Stock Options and Risk taking written by Wenli Huang and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Large Sample Evidence on the Relation between Stock Option Compensation and Risk Taking written by Shivaram Rajgopal and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A distinctive feature of stock options is that they create incentives for managers to take risks. For a sample of 6,439 CEO-year observations over 1992-1999, we find that risk-taking incentives offered by CEO's stock options (the sensitivity of ESO values to stock return volatility) are statistically associated with greater risk-taking behavior as proxied by one-year ahead stock return volatility. However, the economic magnitude of such option-induced risk taking on the CEO's wealth is relatively modest. Our tests of the performance consequences of option-induced risk taking incentives are specification-dependent and do not exhibit consistent results. Hence, we cannot unambiguously conclude that the increased risk taking results in improved future operating performance.

Download or read book Empirical Evidence on the Relation between Stock Option Compensation and Risk Taking written by Shivaram Rajgopal and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine whether executive stock options (ESO) encourage managers to make risky investments on behalf of shareholders. For a sample of oil and gas producers, we find, as predicted, that the variance of cash flows from exploration activity and the extent of price risk exposure hedged are positively associated with the sensitivity of CEO's options to equity risk. Thus, ESOs appear to motivate managers to take on exploration risk. Moreover, ESOs appear to induce CEOs to hedge oil price risk to avoid under-investment in exploration projects.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U S Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with standard measures of vega and delta, to risk-increasing business policy choices. Moreover, these linkages became stronger after 1999, when financial industry deregulation created new growth opportunities for commercial banks. Our results suggest that compensation committees provided new incentives for bank CEOs to exploit these growth opportunities, and also to shift from traditional on-balance sheet portfolio lending to less traditional investments (e.g., private-issue mortgage-backed securities) and nontraditional fee-generating activities. Apart from these strategic reallocations, our results also suggest that bank boards designed CEO compensation contracts to limit excessive risk taking, especially after deregulation.

Download or read book Can Employee Stock Options Contribute to Less Risk Taking written by Bruce K. Billings and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk-averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option-based compensation for generally under-diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion. We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega”, which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of manager and shareholders.

Download or read book Compensation Duration and Risk Taking written by Igor Salitskiy and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Short-termism'' of executives has recently attracted a lot of public attention. This paper develops a novel measure of CEO compensation duration and studies how it affects corporate risk taking. This measure is constructed using grant-level data of CEO compensation and reflects vesting schedules for stock grants and expiration dates for option grants. I use grants awarded many years before the measurement period as an exogenous component of compensation duration. The results show that longer pay duration is associated with higher firm risk, measured by stock return volatility, idiosyncratic stock return volatility, and analyst forecast dispersion. Additional tests show that higher risk is not associated with higher level of investment or with higher financial leverage. At the same time, higher pay duration increases the amount of equity financing and reduces earnings manipulation.

Download or read book Risk Taking and CEO Compensation written by Fan Ye and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper aims to analyze the impacts of compensation incentives and CEO power on firm's risk-taking by using stock return volatility (Srisk) and earnings volatility (Erisk) as the proxies of firm's risk-taking level, and by using pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) and CEO-pay slice (CPS) as the proxies of compensation incentives and CEO power, respectively. By applying ordinary least square (OLS) regression and two-stage least square (2SLS) regression on obtained data, this paper provides strong empirical evidence that PVS and CPS have negative impact on earnings volatility and stock return volatility. In addition, the negative impact of PVS on managerial risk-taking is greater for CEOs with lower CPS than that for CEOs with higher CPS. That is, EBC discourages CEOs from taking more risks, and more powerful CEOs are less risk-averse than less powerful CEOs when granted EBC.

Download or read book How Do Quasi Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk Taking written by Kelly Shue and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at-the-money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10 percent increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8-4.2 percent increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.

Download or read book Economics Organization and Management written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 1992 with total page 650 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A systematic treatment of the economics of the modern firm, this text draws on the insights of various areas in modern economics and other disciplines and presents the central problems in organizations of motivating people and co-ordinating their activities.

Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

Download or read book CEO Option Pay Risk Taking and Firm Performance written by Hussam A. Al-Shammari and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ever-increasing levels of executive compensation in North America have attracted the growing attention of researchers, policy makers, and the general public. This dissertation reviews the literature on executive compensation and proposes two theoretical models that seek to explain the relationship between CEO option pay, firm risk and performance. Prior empirical research has failed to produce consistent relationships between executive compensation and firm performance. This dissertation opens the "black box" between executive compensation and firm performance and empirically tests the intervening effect of risk-taking behavior on this relationship. It also examines the moderating effects of firm governance systems, strategy and the environment on the relationship between CEO option pay and risk taking. The population for this study is U.S. publicly-traded manufacturing companies. A sample of 204 companies were drawn from the Fortune 1000 for testing the hypothesized relationships. Data were retrieved from various archival sources including Compustat, ExecuComp, Mergent Online, Census for Manufacturing, Thompson Financial, and Value line databases. The dissertation uses both mediated hierarchical regression analyses and moderated hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypothesized relationships suggested in the first and second models, respectively. Results reveal a strong, positive relationship between CEO option pay and a firm's strategic risk, stock returns risk, and income stream risk. Results also showed that firm strategic risk, measured by R & D expenditure, mediates the CEO option pay-firm performance relationship, either fully or partially, depending on which type of performance is being examined. Further, a moderating effect is unveiled for CEO duality, insider ownership, and firm strategy. However, empirical analyses fail to provide adequate evidence to support the expected moderating effect of board independence, institutional and blockholder ownership, and environment.

Download or read book Shared Capitalism at Work written by Douglas L. Kruse and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2010-06-15 with total page 433 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The historical relationship between capital and labor has evolved in the past few decades. One particularly noteworthy development is the rise of shared capitalism, a system in which workers have become partial owners of their firms and thus, in effect, both employees and stockholders. Profit sharing arrangements and gain-sharing bonuses, which tie compensation directly to a firm’s performance, also reflect this new attitude toward labor. Shared Capitalism at Work analyzes the effects of this trend on workers and firms. The contributors focus on four main areas: the fraction of firms that participate in shared capitalism programs in the United States and abroad, the factors that enable these firms to overcome classic free rider and risk problems, the effect of shared capitalism on firm performance, and the impact of shared capitalism on worker well-being. This volume provides essential studies for understanding the increasingly important role of shared capitalism in the modern workplace.

Download or read book Managerial Risk Taking and CEO Excess Compensation written by Rahat Jafri and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, we provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When we also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, we find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, we find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, we find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation.