Download or read book Field Application of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Katherine S. Carson and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Threat based Implementation of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Liang Zou and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentive Compatible Mechanisms are Not Individually Rational in Public Good Economies written by Tatsuyoshi Saijō and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by U of Minnesota Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session

Download or read book Social Goals and Social Organization written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1985-12-27 with total page 398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms.

Download or read book Strength of Incentives for Individually Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Jerry R. Green and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.

Download or read book Classification in the Information Age written by Wolfgang A. Gaul and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 605 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The volume presents contributions to the analysis of data in the information age - a challenge of growing importance. Scientists and professionals interested in classification, data analysis, and statistics will find in this book latest research results as well as applications to economics (especially finance and marketing), archeology, bioinformatics, environment, and health.

Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Ioannis Caragiannis and published by Springer. This book was released on 2021-08-28 with total page 414 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.* The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games. * The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

Download or read book Ex post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design written by Kim-sau Chung and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Incentive Compatible Conjoint Ranking Mechanism written by Jayson L. Lusk and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A simple method for making ranking-based conjoint analysis incentive compatible is proposed. The incentive compatible mechanism involves people purchasing a product profile with a probability proportional to its assigned rank. In an empirical application related to consumer preferences for beef attributes, we find that the forecasted market share for a new pasture-raised steak obtained using incentive-compatible rankings was significantly greater than that implied from traditional hypothetical conjoint rankings. People's rankings of ground beef products were not affected by the mechanism or by information about pasture-raised beef.

Download or read book On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Takuro Yamashita and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentive Compatible Mechanisms are Not Individually Rational in Public Good Economies written by Hsih-chia Hsieh and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Operationalizing Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Katherine S. Carson and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 418 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms in General Quasi linear Environments written by Yu Chen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.