Download or read book Federalism and Public Choice written by Hills, Jr. (Roderick M.) and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper is a draft chapter for an edited collection on Law and Public Choice being published by Edward Elgar and edited by Dan Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell. The chapter provides an overview of public choice literature regarding three aspects of federalism - exit-based normative justifications for federal regimes, voice-based normative justifications for federal regimes, and positive theories for how federal regimes are sustained through the political process. In general, I suggest that the most promising trend in public choice theory is the effort of economists, political scientists, and lawyers to tackle the thorny question of "voice" in federal regimes - that is, how subnational politics differs in federal regimes from the politics of unitary states. Moreover, the case for federalism based on exit critically depends on the argument for federalism based on improvement of "voice." Otherwise, migration from one city or state to another to escape predatory regimes would simply be pointless movement out of a "Leviathan" frying pan into a "Leviathan" fire. Public choice theorists seem to have an inveterate suspicion of claims that subnational government facilitates political participation, perhaps because the entire tradition of public choice is based on the theoretical impossibility that collective action can accurately represent individuals' preferences and values. Yet nothing in the conventional account of how decentralization improves political "voice" is inconsistent with the abstract principles of public choice theory.
Download or read book Public Choice in America written by William C. Mitchell and published by . This book was released on 1971 with total page 428 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Public Finance and Public Choice written by James M. Buchanan and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1999-10-12 with total page 283 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.
Download or read book The Public Choice Approach to Politics written by Dennis C. Mueller and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1993 with total page 560 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Reproduces 26 articles on public choice and public economics by Mueller, written over 20 years. Employing the contractarian-constitutional methodology of public choice, he examines the properties of several voting methods, representational systems and questions of equity and justice.
Download or read book Public Choice III written by Dennis C. Mueller and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2003-02-17 with total page 796 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.
Download or read book The Law and Economics of Federalism written by Jonathan Klick and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2017-01-27 with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique volume takes a primarily empirical perspective on the law and economics of federalism. Using cross jurisdiction variation, the specially commissioned chapters examine the effects of various state experiments in areas such as crime, welfare, consumer protection, and a host of other areas. Although legal scholars have talked about states as laboratories for decades, rarely has the law and economics literature treated the topic of federalism empirically in such a systematic and useful way.
Download or read book Federalist Government in Principle and Practice written by Donald P. Racheter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends on importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in Federalist Government in Principle and Practice examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives.
Download or read book The New Federalism Can the States Be Trusted written by and published by Hoover Press. This book was released on with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The New Federalism investigates whether returning a variety of regulatory and police powers back to the states will yield better government. It poses the provocative question, Can the states be trusted? and emerges with a qualified yes. This book should be an invaluable resource to federal and state policymakers alike.
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice written by Roger D. Congleton and published by Oxford Handbooks. This book was released on 2019-01-08 with total page 1017 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This two-volume collection provides a comprehensive overview of the past seventy years of public choice research, written by experts in the fields surveyed. The individual chapters are more than simple surveys, but provide readers with both a sense of the progress made and puzzles that remain. Most are written with upper level undergraduate and graduate students in economics and political science in mind, but many are completely accessible to non-expert readers who are interested in Public Choice research. The two-volume set will be of broad interest to social scientists, policy analysts, and historians"--
Download or read book The New Federalist written by Gordon Tullock and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How can government become more efficient? The answer, world-renowned economist Gordon Tullock explains, is to let governments compete with each other. This means allowing small communities to decide how much to tax and spend. Citizens can then "vote with their feet" and settle in the community that gives the best mix of services for tax dollars. Governments that remain inefficient will lose their tax base and be forced to mend their ways. Tullock masterfully explains how Canada could move toward such a system and the benefits Canadians would receive.
Download or read book The Price of Federalism written by Paul E. Peterson and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the price of federalism? Does it result in governmental interconnections that are too complex? Does it create overlapping responsibilities? Does it perpetuate social inequalities? Does it stifle economic growth? To answer these questions, Paul Peterson sets forth two theories of federalism: functional and legislative. Functional theory is optimistic. It says that each level of the federal system is well designed to carry out the tasks for which it is mainly responsible. State and local governments assume responsibility for their area's physical and social development; the national government cares for the needy and reduces economic inequities. Legislative theory, in contrast, is pessimistic: it says that national political leaders, responding to electoral pressures, misuse their power. They shift unpopular burdens to lower levels of government while spending national dollars on popular government programs for which they can claim credit. Both theories are used to explain different aspects of American federalism. Legislative theory explains why federal grants have never been used to equalize public services. Elected officials cannot easily justify to their constituents a vote to shift funds away from the geographic area they represent. The overall direction that American federalism has taken in recent years is better explained by functional theory. As the costs of transportation and communication have declined, labor and capital have become increasingly mobile, placing states and localities in greater competition with one another. State and local governments are responding to these changes by overlooking the needs of the poor, focusing instead on economic development. As a further consequence, older, big cities of the Rust Belt, inefficient in their operations and burdened by social responsibilities, are losing jobs and population to the suburban communities that surround them. Peterson recommends that the national government adopt p
Download or read book Public Choice and Federalism in Australia and Canada written by Mark Sproule-Jones and published by Canberra : Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University. This book was released on 1975 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Perspectives on Public Choice written by Dennis C. Mueller and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 692 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.
Download or read book Fiscal Federalism written by Harvey S. Rosen and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2008-04-15 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We often think of fiscal decisions as being made by a single government, but in the United States the reality is that an astounding number of entities have the power to tax and spend. State, local, and federal governments all play crucial roles in the U.S. fiscal system, and the interrelation has been the source of continuing controversy. This fact is the focus of the seven papers and commentaries presented in this volume, the result of a conference sponsored by the NBER. The contributors use various quantitative tools to study policy issues, obtaining results that will interest policymakers and researchers working in the areas of taxation and public finance. The first three papers study the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates look at the extend and evolution of decentralization in the state and local sector; Robert P. Inman examines the growth of federal grants and the structure of congressional decision making; and Jeffrey S. Zax investigates the effects of the number of government jurisdictions on aggregate local public debt and expenditures. The next three papers look at the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal tax returns. Using an econometric analysis, Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Harvey S. Rosen examine the effects of deductibility on revenue sources and level of expenditures. Lawrence B. Lindsey looks at how deductibility affects the level and type of taxation. George R. Zodrow uses a two-sector general equilibrium model to investigate revenue effects of deductibility. Finally, Charles R. Hulten and Robert M. Schwab analyze the problem of developing an accurate estimate of income for the state and local sector, finding that conventional accounting procedures have underestimated the income generated by a startling $100 billion.
Download or read book The Political Theory of a Compound Republic written by Vincent Ostrom and published by Lexington Books. This book was released on 2007-11-29 with total page 315 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Political Theory of a Compound Republic examines the foundation of American constitutional design expressed in theFederalist. Through meticulous textual analysis, the logical principles of federalism_the extended and compound republic envisioned by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton_are revealed as thirteen propositions broadly applicable to any effort to design the institutions of a self-governing polity. The final chapters, expanded and revised by Vincent Ostrom and Barbara Allen, turn to the American experiment in constitutional choice at the threshold of the twenty-first century. In this revised edition, Ostrom and Allen consider the continuing story of federal institutional development by focusing on two current concerns: the 'imperial presidency' and the ideal of universal human rights. This third, revised and expanded edition of The Political Theory of a Compound Republic continues to be of interest to scholars of federalism, institutional analysis and development, political economy and public choice, and students of the American founding. It is also useful in undergraduate and graduate courses on American government and political thought.
Download or read book Public Economics and Public Choice written by Pio Baake and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-06-30 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains essays in honor of Charles B. Blankart on the occasion of his 65th birthday. The contributors include prominent scholars from the discipline of public finance and public choice. The essays include such topics as taxation, public choice, and regulation, and thus give testimony of Blankart's very broad ranging interests in economics.
Download or read book Fiscal Federalism Decentralisation and the size of government written by Ina Walcherberger and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2016-02-23 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Master's Thesis from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: -, , language: English, abstract: A large number of countries are trying to improve their ability to serve their inhabitants more efficiently and more effectively. To accomplish this ambition, a reawakening of interest in the practices and in the principles and of fiscal federalism is mandatory. Questions arise such as: - How many taxes are necessary to provide an efficient amount of local public goods? - How should the taxes be allocated most reasonable between the different levels of governments? - Which level of government should have how much freedom of choice concerning tax revenues and tax expenditures, or differently, which degree of decentralisation is most constructive? Generally, two conflicting possibilities to provide an efficient level of local public goods are existing: The first one proposes a high degree of centralisation of the tax system which would lead, if the government is totally benevolent, to an efficient output of local public goods. An argument against centralisation is that a centralised system cannot serve the different needs and preferences of the inhabitants of unequal regions. The second perception states that an efficient level of local public can be provided if the system is decentralised. A possible disadvantage of decentralisation is the appearance of tax competition which may lead to an inefficient low level of local public goods. The discrepancy between these two conflictive systems is going to be discussed in this thesis. Furthermore, politico-economic mechanisms, which are supposed to explain the correlation between degree of centralisation and size of government are introduced which leads to the research question of this thesis: Does a decentralised tax system lead to a smaller size of government compared to a centralised tax system? Which politico-economic mechanisms are responsible for this correlation? In relation to these questions, different approaches are discussed, underlined by theoretical and empirical models. The first one, a public choice approach, states that central governments operate like monopolists, or leviathans, extracting as much tax revenues from the citizens as possible. The aim is not to maximise social welfare, but to increase their control over the resources of the economy. This approach was formulated by Brennan’s and Buchnan’s Leviathan hypothesis (1980), stating, subject to the above mentioned conditions, that a higher degree of decentralisation leads to a smaller size of government. [...]
