Download or read book Ex post realization and valuation of management earnings forecasts manager s discretion and characteristics of forecasting firms written by Sungyu Sohn and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Ex Post Bias in Management Earnings Forecasts written by Afshad J. Irani and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the effect of proprietary information, disclosure-related legal liability, earnings variability, financial distress, and external financing on bias in management earnings forecasts. Bias, specifically ex post bias (as is referred to in the management forecast literature), exists if the expected value of the observed management earnings forecasts differs from actual earnings. The effect of the test variables on ex post bias is investigated by examining whether a firm's forecast error (measure of ex post bias and defined as actual earnings minus management earnings forecast) is a function of the aforementioned variables. Proprietary information, disclosure-related legal liability, and earnings variability are hypothesized to be positively associated with ex post bias, while external financing and financial distress are expected to be negatively correlated. All the independent variables are measured using public information available at the time that the financial statements are released.Using a sample of 267 management earnings forecasts released during the period 1990-95 in the first three quarters of the fiscal year, I find that these forecasts are on average optimistic. Results from the multivariate regression analysis find that three of the five factors, proprietary information, financial distress and earnings variability, are significant in explaining ex post bias. For the most part, these findings are robust across various sub-samples.

Download or read book Management Earnings Forecasts written by Hwa Deuk Yi and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts and Future Returns written by Norio Kitagawa and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the effect of managerial discretion over their initial earnings forecasts on future performance. First, by estimating the discretionary portion of initial management earnings forecasts (defined as discretionary forecasts) based on the findings of fundamental analysis research, we find that firms with higher discretionary forecasts are more likely to miss their earnings forecast at the end of the fiscal year and revise their forecasts downward to meet their earnings forecasts for the period, suggesting that forecast management through discretionary forecasting produces less credible management forecasts in terms of ex-post realization. Second, by using the hedge-portfolio test and regression analysis, we find that firms with higher discretionary forecasts earn consistently negative abnormal returns, suggesting that investors do not fully understand the implication of discretionary forecasts for the credibility of management earnings forecasts and thus overprice them at the forecast announcement.

Download or read book Management Earnings Forecasts written by D. Eric Hirst and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we provide a framework in which to view management earnings forecasts. Specifically, we categorize earnings forecasts as having three components - antecedents, characteristics, and consequences that roughly correspond to the timeline associated with an earnings forecast. By evaluating management earnings forecast research within the context of this framework, we render three conclusions. First, forecast characteristics appear to be the least well-understood component of earnings forecasts - both in terms of theory and empirical research - even though it is the component over which managers have the most control. Second, much of the prior research focuses on how one forecast antecedent or characteristic influences forecast consequences and does not study potential interactions among the three components. Third, much of the prior research ignores the iterative nature of management earnings forecasts - that is, forecast consequences of the current period influence antecedents and chosen characteristics in subsequent periods. Implications for researchers as well as educators, managers, investors, and regulators are provided.

Download or read book Management Earnings Forecasts written by Shankar Venkataraman and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we provide a framework in which to view management earnings forecasts. Specifically, we categorize earnings forecasts as having three components - antecedents, characteristics, and consequences - that roughly correspond to the timeline associated with an earnings forecast. By evaluating management earnings forecast research within the context of this framework, we render three conclusions. First, forecast characteristics appear to be the least well-understood component of earnings forecasts - both in terms of theory and empirical research - even though it is the component over which managers have the most control. Second, much of the prior research focuses on how one forecast antecedent or characteristic influences forecast consequences and does not study potential interactions among the three components. Third, much of the prior research ignores the iterative nature of management earnings forecasts - that is, forecast consequences of the current period influence antecedents and chosen characteristics in subsequent periods. Implications for researchers as well as educators, managers, investors, and regulators are provided.

Download or read book The Effect of Litigation Risk on Management Earnings Forecasts written by Zhiyan Cao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the effect of litigation risk on management's decision to issue earnings forecasts. We use a new ex ante measure of litigation risk, namely, the Directors and Officers liability insurance premium. This measure bypasses significant problems associated with the estimation of ex ante litigation risk in prior studies. By using this measure of litigation risk, our results are more intuitive. We find that, when faced with ex ante litigation risk, managers with bad news are more likely to issue an earnings warning. For good news firms, we do not see this effect. We also examine three forecast characteristics: forecast horizon, extent of news revealed, and forecast precision. Firms with higher litigation risk tend to issue earnings forecasts earlier if they have bad news, but this is not so when they have good news. They also reveal less news in the forecasts if they have good news. As litigation risk increases, bad news earnings forecasts tend to become more precise while good news earnings forecasts tend to become less precise. This differential effect of litigation risk on management earnings forecasts, based on the direction of the news, has not been documented by previous studies.

Download or read book Management Forecasts and Discretionary Accruals written by Alastair Murdoch and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Positive accounting theory suggests a number of reasons why management might decide to manage earnings. This paper examines the extent to which such a decision may be a result of management having previously issued a forecast of earnings. Based on a sample of 117 firms, each of which issued one management forecast of earnings during the period 1986 to 1992, we find that discretionary accruals are adjusted to bring reported earnings more in line with management s forecast. We find that the accruals are larger (in absolute value) when the forecast was too low than when it was too high, and when the forecast was later in the fiscal year than when it was earlier. We conclude that, although management has incentives to avoid appearing to have made an inaccurate forecast, it is constrained in its use of discretionary accruals, particularly those which are income increasing, presumably by the materiality and conservatism of generally accepted accounting principles as enforced by professional ethics and the external auditors.

Download or read book The Consistency of Mandatory and Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts and Implications for Analyst and Investor Information Processing written by Richard A. Cazier and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this study we examine whether managers' voluntary forecasts of future earnings are consistent with the implicit forecasts of future earnings that underlie a specific mandatory accrual, the valuation allowance. This accrual relies heavily on managerial estimation and is also based, in part, on managers' private, forward-looking information. Thus, it provides an ideal setting to investigate the interplay between voluntary and mandatory financial disclosures. By examining the consistency between the voluntary and mandatory forecasts, we are also able to provide insight into whether the predictable accrual-related bias in voluntary earnings forecasts carries over into the mandatory forecast embedded in the valuation allowance. We then investigate whether the biased voluntary earnings guidance helps analysts and investors more accurately interpret the information in valuation allowance changes about future earnings expectations. To increase the power of our tests we utilize a sample of loss firms, which frequently record valuation allowances to fully or partially offset deferred tax assets.We first document that more than 62 percent of our sample of loss firms report valuation allowance changes and management earnings guidance that convey the same basic information about future earnings (i.e., either both forecast profit or both forecast loss). Thus, these voluntary and mandatory forecasts are largely consistent with each other. We then provide evidence that managers provide overly pessimistic forecasts for observations whose valuation allowance changes signal bad news about future earnings, but overly optimistic forecasts for observations whose valuation allowance changes signal strong good news about future earnings. Finally, our results suggest that managers' biased earnings forecasts actually help analysts and investors more accurately interpret the information about future earnings in valuation allowance changes. Our findings provide new insights into actions managers can take to improve investor and analyst processing of financial statement-based tax information.

Download or read book Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts written by Stephen P. Baginski and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm- and forecast-specific variables that are often associated with security prices.

Download or read book Determinants of Management Forecast Precision written by Stephen P. Baginski and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pownall, et. al. (1993) document that nearly 80% of their sample of voluntary management earnings forecasts are not precise point forecasts. Imprecise forecast forms include closed-interval forecasts (i.e., ranges), open-interval forecasts (i.e., minimums and maximums), and general impressions about firms' earnings prospects. Given analytical predictions that a signal's precision is important in belief development (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991; Morse, et al., 1991) and the empirical evidence that management forecast precision affects the beliefs of traders and financial analysts (Baginski, et al., 1993), the question arises as to what factors motivate a manager's choice of forecast precision. We perform cross-sectional logistic regressions to document determinants of forecast precision. Our sample consists of 1,212 annual and interim management forecasts. After controlling for firm-specific and horizon-specific earnings uncertainty, we find that managers produce more precise forecasts of annual earnings for firms with greater analyst following (our proxy for private information) and for smaller firms (our proxy for public information). The results are robust across subsamples. The majority of the results do not, however, hold for interim forecasts.

Download or read book Do Managers Use Meeting Analyst Forecasts to Signal Private Information Evidence from Patent Citations written by Katherine Gunny and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal superior future performance. Prior research finds that firms use earnings management to just meet analyst forecasts and that these firms have a positive association with future performance (Bartov et al., 2002). There are two potential explanations for the positive association -- signaling and attaining benefits that allow for better future performance (i.e., the real benefits explanation). Prior studies cannot provide evidence of signaling because they do not control for the real benefits explanation. Our research design enables us to control for the real benefits explanation because we can identify potential signaling firms within the sample of firms that just meet analyst forecasts. We use a unique database from the National Bureau of Economic Research to construct a proxy for the manager's belief about future firm value due to patents. We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the analyst forecast and manage earnings to achieve this goal. We also find firms that just meet analyst forecasts with more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms with fewer patent citations, which is consistent with signaling and not the real benefits explanation.

Download or read book Expectation Management Through Management Forecast a Life of Tail Asymmetry Under Consecutive Adjustment written by Kazuo Kato and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines whether firm managers engage in the expectation management of their current performances through their own forecasts and consecutive adjustments. Expectation management in order to achieve positive surprises by lowering analyst forecast levels has been documented (Bernhardt and Campello 2002, for example). However, those studies are based on an implicit assumption that managers effectively communicate with analysts to induce analysts' revisions, which is plausible but difficult to directly observe by researchers. We construct a study on the management own forecasts which the Japanese Stock Exchanges ask for the listed companies; thus, we base our results on explicit and quantitative data.Our major findings are followings: (1) at the onset of fiscal year, the distribution of changes in expected earnings from prior years is skewed positively (better prospects, positive tail asymmetry). (2) But these optimistic forecasts are not necessarily materialized; surprise of earnings (earnings realization minus initial forecasts) is reversely skewed (negative tail asymmetry). (3) This phenomenon is more remarkable among firms with initial forecasts of the highest earnings changes. (4) Further, a closer examination shows that, through interim revisions, the distribution of surprises in earnings from latest forecasts prior to earnings announcement date has a little positive tail asymmetry, regardless of consecutive adjustment made until then. This cycle (optimistic forecasts - negative revisions - positive surprises) suggests the discretionary management of earnings forecasts by managers. Consistent with prior research, we also find that tendency to avoid decreases in earnings from prior year level is pervasive.

Download or read book Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts Earnings Forecasts written by Amy P. Hutton and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) some management spent considerable time and effort guiding analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews implicitly or explicitly guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private managerial earnings guidance. Then, I document the characteristics of 'guided' versus 'unguided' analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market-to-book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation (high Industry-ERC R2), but hard to predict because its business is complex (high # of Segments). A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no guidance firms; both experience a quot;walk downquot; in annual estimates. To distinguishing between guidance and no guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative, guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.

Download or read book The Effect of Macro Information Environment Change on the Quality of Management Earnings Forecasts written by Stephen P. Baginski and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors' expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied.Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers' tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.

Download or read book The Effect of Analysts Disaggregated Forecasts on Investors and Managers written by Landon M. Mauler and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine whether analysts' tax forecasts are informative to investors and whether analysts' tax forecasts impact firm behavior. Using I/B/E/S data from 2002-2014, I find that investors utilize both analysts' pre- and after-tax earnings forecasts in evaluating firm performance, indicating analysts' tax forecasts are value-relevant. Furthermore, evidence that investors discount earnings management through the income tax expense is limited to firms with tax forecast coverage. In examining the impact of analysts' tax forecasts on firm behavior, I find analysts' tax forecast coverage is positively associated with quantitative and qualitative tax footnote disclosure. The results suggest that analysts' tax forecasts are value-relevant and that analysts' tax coverage impacts firm decisions related to the income tax expense account. This evidence informs academics and practitioners as to the role of analysts' tax forecasts.

Download or read book Earnings Forecasts Disclosure Regulation and Earnings Management by IPO Firms written by Bikki Jaggi and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether a regulation on mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts encourages managers to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts, and whether the optimistic forecasts are revised downward or the reported earnings are managed upward using discretionary accruals to reduce the forecast error. Additionally, it evaluates how investors react to earnings management and forecast revisions. The study is based on 760 forecasts issued by Taiwan IPO firms from 1991 to 2000 after the regulation to issue the earnings forecasts was imposed by the Taiwan Securities and Futures Exchange Commission (TSFEC) and it also uses a sample of 86 IPO firms prior to the issue of regulation. The results show that the IPO firms issue more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts. They adjust their reported earnings of optimistic forecasts upward with discretionary accruals more than revising the earnings forecasts downward, whereas they revise conservative forecasts upward more than adjusting the reported earnings downward. The results on the comparative analysis of earnings management by IPO firms before and after issuance of the TSFEC regulation provide additional support to the findings that earnings management by IPO firms increased significantly after the regulation was imposed. The results on investors' reaction to reported earnings show that investors reacted positively to higher reported earnings compared to the last revision of forecasts and they ignored the upward adjustment of reported earnings. Their reaction has been negative to downward revisions and positive to upward revisions.