Download or read book Essays on the Theory of Auctions written by Anne Elizabeth Lacey and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which addresses a different aspect of reputation in independent private values auctions. Each essay presents a model where a single long-run player faces short-run opponents in a sequence of auctions. Bidding is costly, and each auction has a reserve price.
Download or read book Essays on the Theory of Auctions and Economic Rents written by Ilgaz T. Arikan and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions written by Jörg Nikutta and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 99 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Partnerships Signaling and Contests written by Cédric Wasser and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Multi unit Auction Theory written by David Lloyd McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in the Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding written by Keith Waehrer and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on the Theory and Estimation of Auction Models written by Leonardo Rezende and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Auction Theory written by Justin Ellis Burkett and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bidding Behaviour in Multi Unit Auctions written by Rebecca Catherine Elskamp and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals.
Download or read book Essays on auction theory written by Hadi Yektas and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Auction Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays In Auction Theory written by Gustavo Eduardo Rodriguez and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 223 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Information Disclosure and Auction Theory written by Shota Ichihashi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on information economics and auction theory. The first chapter studies the question of what information consumers should disclose to firms. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product firm, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. While the consumer benefits from disclosure as it enables the firm to make accurate recommendations, the firm may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the firm prefers to commit to not price discriminate, which encourages the consumer to provide information that is useful for product recommendations. However, nondiscriminatory pricing hurts the consumer, who would be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, equilibrium is typically inefficient even if the consumer can disclose any information about his preferences. The second chapter studies the problem of restricting the information available to the sender in a game of strategic communication. Assuming that the receiver has a binary choice, I characterize the "optimal information restriction, " which maximizes the equilibrium payoff of the receiver among all the information restrictions for the sender. The final chapter studies the optimal timing of an auction in a setting where bidders arrive and depart stochastically over time. First, we compare the revenue-maximizing timing and welfare-maximizing timing. We show that sellers hold auctions too late or too early whenever (censored at 0) virtual values are more or less right-skewed than values. In particular, we show that sellers typically hold auctions inefficiently late. Second, we prove that the use of simple timing rules (i.e., a fixed deadline chosen in advance) can lose an arbitrarily large fraction of the revenue from the optimal stopping rule.
Download or read book Essays on Auction Theory written by Hongjun Zhong and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Matching and Auction Theory written by Terence Robert Johnson and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
