Download or read book Essays on Economics and Economists written by R. H. Coase and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 1994 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How do economists tackle the problems of the economic system and give advice on public policy? Nobel laureate R.H. Coase reflects on some of the most fundamental concerns of economists over the past two centuries. In 15 essays, Coase explore the history and philosophy of economics and evaluates the contributions of a number of outstanding figures.
Download or read book Essays in Information Economics written by Xiao Lin and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation comprises three papers in information economics that try to understand, respectively, how information is credibly disclosed, how information is robustly acquired, as well as how hard information is sold in the market by a third-party intermediary. The first chapter "Credible Persuasion," joint with Ce Liu, develops a new framework for understanding credibility considerations in Bayesian persuasion problems. We call a disclosure policy credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on its induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the Sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state-independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons, and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller, even though a seller who can commit to her disclosure policy would perfectly reveal her private information to maximize profit. The second chapter "Robust Merging of Information," joint with Henrique de Oliveira and Yuhta Ishii, asks how people robustly combine different sources of information when the underlying correlation is unknown. Our main results characterize the strategies that are robust to possible hidden correlations. In particular, with two states and two actions, the robustly optimal strategy pays attention to a single information source, ignoring all others. More generally, the robustly optimal strategy may need to combine multiple information sources, but can be constructed quite simply by using a decomposition of the original problem into separate decision problems, each requiring attention to only one information source. An implication is that an information source generates value to the agent if and only if it is best for at least one of these decomposed problems. The third chapter "How to Sell Hard Information," joint with S. Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, and Ron Siegel, studies a setting where the seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary designs and sells hard information to robustly maximize her revenue across all equilibria. Even though the intermediary could use an accurate test that reveals the asset's value, we show that robust revenue maximization leads to a noisy test with a continuum of possible scores. In addition, the intermediary always charges the seller for disclosing the test score to the market, but not necessarily for running the test. This enables the intermediary to robustly appropriate a significant share of the surplus resulting from the asset sale.
Download or read book Essays in Positive Economics written by Milton Friedman and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 1953 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper is concerned primarily with certain methodological problems that arise in constructing the "distinct positive science" that John Neville Keynes called for, in particular, the problem how to decide whether a suggested hypothesis or theory should be tentatively accepted as part of the "body of systematized knowledge concerning what is."
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Information written by Richard Timothy Holden and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 324 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in the Economics of Information written by Hee-Su Kim and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Communication And The Transformation Of Economics written by Robert E Babe and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-10-08 with total page 496 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book proposes that infusing mainline economics with more expansive and realistic conceptions of information/communication transforms static neoclassicism into evolutionary political economy. It results in modes of analysis that, when applied through policy, can lead to a sustainable future.
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Information Technology and Media written by Christian Peukert and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 117 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Markets Information and Uncertainty written by Kenneth Joseph Arrow and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1999-01-28 with total page 412 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Leading theorists offer insights on the role of uncertainty and information in the market.
Download or read book Three Essays in the Economics of Information written by Zvika Neeman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Information Economics written by Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Economics of Information Technology written by Shin-Kyu Yang and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 99 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Economics of Information Technology written by Terrence William August and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Finally, we demonstrate that although unrestricted patching can maximize welfare when the piracy enforcement level is low, contrary to what one might expect, when the piracy enforcement level is high, restricting security patches only to licensed users can be socially optimal.
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Information and Competition written by Silvia Martínez Gorricho and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The focus of this thesis is on issues of information and competition related to the fields of industrial organization and economics of the family. In Chapter 1 and 2, I theoretically analyze the effect of the accuracy of the buyer's private information and the effect of competition on consumer fraud. In general, informational asymmetries create obvious incentives for opportunistic behavior by the sellers: a seller with a low quality good could attempt to defraud the buyer by demanding a price higher than her willingness to pay for the low quality good. I demonstrate that in equilibrium, a more precise customers' private information leads to higher levels of fraud and incidence of fraud for some parameter values. Furthermore, I show that the level of fraud is weakly increasing in the level of market competition in equilibrium. The aim of Chapter 3 is to analyze whether training-according-to-sex can be supported in equilibrium in a transferable utility environment in which individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their aptitudes to perform one task (I call it task A) and in which matching is done according to economic criteria. If a task can be executed perfectly by an individual who receives complete training in that task, then this task is mechanical. I show that if the task at which individuals have a homogenous aptitude (I call it task B) is mechanical, then training-according-to-sex is a Nash equilibrium independently of the size of the market and the sex ratio. Instead, if task B is nonmechanical, then the existence of training-according-to-sex Nash equilibria in large marriage markets requires either a sufficiently high sex ratio or that the average individual has a high aptitude for some task. Finally, the training-according-to-sex can help coordinate people efficiently in the choice of premarital investments in small markets, which are characterized by a high risk associated to mismatches in the population. In general, as the marriage market expands and/or the sex ratio approaches unity, training-according-to-aptitude eventually replaces training-according-to-sex as the optimal strategy.
Download or read book Three Essays on the Economics of Information written by Parimal Kanti Bag and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Information written by Matthew Robertson and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In three distinct, yet interrelated, essays I examine the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect information on economic decision makers' incentives and behaviour. To do so I employ, and modify, the methodology of Bayesian games.In chapter one, I analyse an unconventional contest inspired by the real world.In this contest, players are ranked by a scoring rule based on both their realised performance and how close this performance is to a target set before the contest,which is private information. I elucidate and analyse the incentive properties of these rules then characterise the equilibrium behaviour of the players.In chapter two, I integrate aspects from adverse selection and moral hazard models to provide a unied theory of securitisation under asymmetric information.I show that introducing skin in the game increases signalling costs for originators who performed sufficient due-diligence yet still improves incentives by making high effort relatively more likely. I relax the conventional assumption of risk neutrality and show that risk-sharing concerns are sufficient for the aforementioned qualitative properties of equilibrium to hold. Finally, I demonstrate that, depending on the severity of the originator's preference for liquidity or need to share risk, each setting may be more conducive for signalling.In chapter three, I propose a simple and intuitive way to transform canonical signalling games with exogenous types into games in which the informed agent endogenously generates her private information through an unobservable costly effort decision. I provide portable results on the differentiability of action functions and existence of equilibrium. I then apply these results to classic models of security design and the job market to demonstrate the practical usefulness of endogenous effort. In particular, my approach in these applications lends theoretical support to stylised facts that cannot be derived from the standard signalling framework.
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Information Policy and Information Acquisition written by Erik John Lillethun and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 181 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Information acquisition and transmission are regular parts of many economic interactions, from product purchases to games of persuasion and markets for information itself. In my dissertation, I use game-theoretic techniques to analyze models in which information passes between agents. In several distinct settings, I show how policies which directly inhibit the transmission or usefulness of information can counterintuitively lead to better information acquisition and higher social welfare.
Download or read book Economic Information Decision and Prediction written by M. Marschak and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 407 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The papers of Jacob Marschak which follow in these volumes are an extraordinary combination of original and fruitful departures in economic and social thought, superb clarity of exposition, and sensitivity to the values of earlier work and even competing traditions. They make us marvel alike at their variety, their quantity, and their quality. But they do not, even so, fully reflect Marschak's contributions to the development of social science. He has had an unusual influence as one who exercises leadership. In a formal, organizational sense, this role has been manifest in his capacity as Director of the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, then at the University of Chicago, in that organization's most productive and influential period, and later in his central role in the Western Management Science Institute, at the University of California at Los Angeles. I can speak from first-hand knowledge about the first. His special capacities are, first, the recognition of promising new concepts and of promising young scholars, and, second, getting his colleagues to join him in developing the ideas and involving them fully in the necessary tasks. There was an unusual combination of strength and humility in his methods; a display of force in pushing the work along but a willingness, almost an insistence, on treating even the most junior associate as a fully equal colleague in intellectual develop ment, whose criticism of himself was to be encouraged. His leadership has been exercised in the absence of formal positions.
