Download or read book Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Maher Riyad Said and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions written by Emmanuel Lorenzon and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy.

Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Filippo Balestrieri and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (cont.) In Chapter 3 we initiate the formal analysis of the First Price-First Score Auction in a general context where the auctioneer is a seller and two bidders compete to buy one indivisible good. The auctioneer's preferences are assumed to directly depend on the identity of the buyer to whom the good is allocated. In this auction, the bidders submit monetary bids, and then the seller decides which bid to accept after comparing the bidders' scores. A particular class of auction we focus on have simple scoring functions: each bidder's score is given by the summation of his bid and a bidder-specific additional parameter. Our main goal is to obtain the specification of the problem that generates a closed-form analytical solutions for the bidding strategies. The task is complicated as there are at least two sources of asymmetries inherent to the problem that can quickly lead to intractable formulas. The main contribution of this work is to provide closed formulas for the inverse bidding functions. Our results generalize the comparison of bidding strategies in asymmetric first price auctions obtained by Maskin and Riley (2002). Even if the asymmetry between the bidders is exogenously introduced by the auctioneer, in equilibrium the disadvantaged bidder bids more aggressively. We are also able to determine the ranges of bids that can be submitted by the two bidders. They are actually different, and their extremes depend on the extra-bid parameter.

Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Luke Hu and published by . This book was released on 2014-01-28 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Electricity and Sequential Auctions written by Soohyun Yum and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2007 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the essay on electricity, we model the restructured wholesale electricity markets as oligopolies facing uncertain demand and "capacity constraints" in which each firm chooses as its strategy a "supply function" introduced by Klemperer and Meyer. To facilitate the computation of optimal strategies, we consider piecewise linear bid (or supply) functions, and we impose restrictions to allow for just a few knots. We implemented simulations to compare the performance of various market structures. The simulations consist of various combinations of firms. The simulation results show that the firms' equilibrium supply functions are steeper with fewer firms, smaller variance of demand, and more severe asymmetry between small firms and a big firm. We also performed comparisons with the Cournot equilibrium assuming storability and Cournot schedule for every demand realization. The results show that Lerner index of supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints is far smaller than that of Cournot equilibrium assuming storability and Cournot schedule. It decreases with the number of firms and it increases with the asymmetry of firm sizes. The essay on sequential auctions studies how to set the optimal starting price in online auctions. The distinctive characteristic of online auctions is that a seller can resell an item that failed to sell at earlier auctions to a new set of buyers. The existing literature on sets of future auctions of unsold items does not consider changes in the set of buyers. As a result, existing explanations for the declining dynamic path of reserve prices cannot be directly applied to online auctions. I consider auctions in which sellers are uncertain of the distributions from which valuations are drawn. Therefore, sellers update beliefs about the distribution itself instead of beliefs about the realizations of valuations through the sequence of auctions. First, considering the listing fee structure explicitly, I find the optimal reserve price for an informed seller who has knowledge about the valuation distribution and show that reserve price does not depend on the seller's salvage value. Then I consider an uninformed seller who is uncertain about the value distribution. In this case, I find, using a numerical example, a way to set a reserve price based on the belief about the distribution and show that the dynamic path of reserve prices for the relisted auctions decline. Additional empirical works support well the theoretic implication providing a reasonable description of seller behavior in real online auction markets.

Download or read book Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Péter Ernő Eső and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Kwanghyun Kim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays written by Rong Chen and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 368 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Mechanism and Information Design written by Renkun Yang (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three chapters bringing together my work in dynamic mechanism design and information design in markets. In Chapter 1 titled "The Termination Clause as a Sequential Screening Device", I investigate the role of termination fees in go-shop provisions in the mergers and acquisition markets. In an environment wherein the buyers' value uncertainty is resolved over time, I find that the seller can screen this private signal by offering a menu of termination contracts. Such a contract resembles the insight of sequential screening: the initial buyer with an optimistic estimate accepts a contract with a high floor price and high termination fee to mitigate future competition; a pessimistic early buyer, in contrast, chooses to stay flexible by accepting a low contract. Moreover, the seller collects more revenue than running a public auction until all bidders are present when the initial signal is sufficiently noisy. Chapter 2 titled "Dynamic Assignment with Limited Commitment" (joint with OSub Kwon) studies a dynamic allocation problem in which transfers are not feasible and the principal cannot commit in the long run. Specifically, an efficiency-maximizing principal (she) decides in each period whether to allocate a good at a fixed cost to the agent (he), whose private value evolves over time. The optimal mechanism in the two-period model has two main features. First, the principal elicits truthful reports in the first period by promising the low type one unit in the second period. Second, to fulfill this promise the principal strategically garbles (without observing) the agent's report. As the time horizon expands, the efficiency loss is backloaded and vanishes in the infinite horizon limit. Chapter 3 titled "Information Design in Vertical Oligopolies" studies a vertical oligopoly model in which two firms compete in quality revelation in the form of Bayesian persuasion before competing in price. I find that in the benchmark model of the covered market, both firms reveal all information in a dominant strategy equilibrium to enlarge (perceived) product differentiation and soften price competition. When a minimum quality standard (MQS) is imposed, the firms pool around the MQS to increase the pass rate and reveal all other states to soften competition in the unique symmetric equilibrium. When extending the model to the uncovered case, the endogenous market share effect renders full revelation non-dominant even without policy intervention. I characterize sufficient conditions for a full information equilibrium and show that competition in general leads to excessive information compared to the social- and consumer-optimal level.

Download or read book Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi object Auctions written by Veronika Grimm and published by . This book was released on 2003-01-01 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design and Multiple Privately Informed Principals written by Nicolás Riquelme and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This dissertation is a collection of three papers studying both theoretical and applied aspects of mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we study competing auctions where each seller has private information about the quality of his object and chooses the reserve price of a second-price auction. Buyers observe the reserve prices and decide which auction to participate in. For a class of primitives, we show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for any finite market. In any such PBE, higher quality is signaled through higher reserve price at the expense of trade opportunities. But there might be bunching regions causing inefficiencies. In fact, in the large-market limit characterized by a directed search model, the interaction of adverse selection and search frictions entail distortion at the bottom: when either the buyer-seller ratio is sufficiently large or a regularity condition is met, there is no separating PBE in which the lowest-quality seller sets reserve price equal to his opportunity cost. This finding carries over to large finite markets and is consistent with observed behavior in auctions for used cars in UK (Choi, Nesheim and Rasul, 2016). In Chapter 2, we study games where a group of privately informed principals design mechanisms to a common agent. The agent has private information (exogenous) and, after observing principals' mechanisms, may have information (endogenous) about feasible allocations and private information from each principal. Thus, each principal may be interested in designing a mechanism to screen all this information, for which a potentially complicated message space to convey this information might be needed. In this project, we provide sufficient conditions on the agent's payoff such that any equilibrium in this setup has an output-equivalent equilibrium using only mechanisms with simple message spaces (direct mechanisms). Depending on the conditions, we propose two different notions of direct mechanisms and discuss their applicability with some examples. In Chapter 3, we study the design of horizontal merger regulation in a Cournot competition setting, where firms are privately informed about production technology. More specifically, a consumer-surplus-maximizer regulator designs a mechanism which determines whether the merger is blocked or accepted, and sets structural remedies (divestitures). This problem does not have the usual quasi-linear structure commonly assumed in the mechanism design literature. We first characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms and then find the optimal one. The complete information case is also presented as a benchmark. Asymmetric information induces important distortions in regulatory decisions. First, every rejected merge would improve consumer surplus. Second, every merge that decreases consumer surplus would be approved. Lastly, every merge rightly approved would be asked fewer divestitures than the optimal one (under-fixing effect). These results seem consistent with recent empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of the merger regulation"--Pages vii-viii.

Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Anqi Li and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is composed of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study durable goods sales with a dynamic population of buyers. My contribution is to devise a Multi-round Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Generalized Reserve Price (MSAAGR) to implement the efficient allocation, and to contrast MSAAGR with the standard uniform price auction to highlight the implication of population dynamics on the design of trading platforms. In the second chapter, I estalibsh the possibility of sustaining long-term cooperation in infinitely repeated private monitoring games with scarce signals. My contribution is to construct a novel Budget Mechanism with Cross-Checking (BMCC) which, by linking players' action choices over time, virtually implements the efficient outcome with a vanishing incentive cost as the horizon of the game grows and the players become increasingly patient.

Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions written by Ilaria Cingottini and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Gregory Pavlov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.

Download or read book Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Alessandro Pavan and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Four essays in the theory of auctions and mechanism design. Chapter one introduces a Markovian revelation principle for common agency games ; chapter two derives the optimal disclosure policy ; chapter three considers a monopolist who sells a durable good, which is subsequently traded in a secondary market ; chapter four considers auctions for divisible goods, like Treasury securities.

Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Auction Theory written by BYEONGHYEON JEONG and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies market design and auction theory. Chapter 1 studies the impact of school choice on segregation. It shows that the popular school choice mechanisms lead to substantially different school and residential segregation, an important and overlooked aspect of choosing among school choice mechanisms. We show that open enrollment policy in public school choice program can decrease diversity of individual schools and increase segregation depending on which student allocation mechanism is used. Without open enrollment, we study the model of location choice and show that segregation is mainly associated with income. In comparing mechanisms, we show that Boston mechanism fosters segregation more than the deferred acceptance. With open enrollment, the difference between BM and DA becomes more drastic. We show that BM can actually intensify segregation when open enrollment policy is adopted, while DA is more resilient to segregation. The deferred acceptance with multi tie breaking creates maximally diverse schools. Chapter 2 considers conventional auctions when the seller can design bid spaces. Any symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction with bid spaces can be replicated with an equilibrium in a first price auction with bid spaces, but the converse doesn't hold. First price auctions with designed bid spaces revenue dominates second price auction with designed bid spaces, and well-designed first price auction is an optimal selling mechanism. Chapter 3 studies one-to-one matching environment without transfer in the presence of incomplete information on one-side. The existing notions of stability under incomplete information are studied and two alternatives are proposed. Weak Bayesian stability requires that the beliefs of the agents are dervided from a common prior via Bayes' rule and are internally consistent with the presumption that the given matching is stable. Strong Bayesian stability refines weak Bayesian stability by requiring the beliefs of agents are also externally consistent in the sense that the beliefs are narrowed down only when there is a valid reason.