Download or read book Essays on Prior Free Mechanism Design written by Pavel Andreyanov and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 169 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities. According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distributions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality. In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (``weighted bid'') and log-linear (``adjusted bid''), when the designer's preferences for quality and money are unknown. Motivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying distribution of firms' types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule, there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear. In the second chapter (Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA) I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisible ones. For any prior belief, I show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design literature. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, we show that the expected welfare loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1/2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight for the special case of two agents. In the third chapter (Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA) I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.
Download or read book Essays on Market Design and Experimental Economics written by Eric Samuel Mayefsky and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Download or read book Prize Essay and Lectures Delivered Before the American Institute of Instruction Including the Journal of Proceedings written by American Institute of Instruction and published by . This book was released on 1889 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: List of members included in each volume, beginning with 1891.
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design and the Informed Principal Problem written by Nicholas C. Bedard and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Three models of a privately informed contract designer (a principal) are examined. In the first, I study how much private information the principal wants to acquire before offering a contract to an agent. Despite allowing her to acquire all information for free, I prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for which it is strictly suboptimal for the principal to be completely informed, regardless of the continuation equilibrium following any information acquisition choice. This result holds even when the principal is able to employ the most general mechanisms available and, in particular, when she can choose her most favourable full-information continuation equilibria. Further, in a specialized environment I characterize the principal's optimal information choice. The second is a two-state principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the principal knows the state but the agent does not. This model is relevant to situations where an employer has private information about the productivity of a worker in a particular task while the worker has private information about the effort she exerts on the job. Much of the literature on this subject restricts the employer to offer contracts that leave her no discretion once a contract is accepted, while more general contracts may allow the employer to exercise discretion after acceptance; such contracts are called menu-contracts. I show when the employer can obtain strictly higher expected payoffs by offering menu-contracts than by offering the restricted contracts used in the literature. The final model studies the ability of a bidder in an auction to organize collusion among her rival bidders and the resulting impact of this collusion on the seller. Bidders valuations are private information. I show that in a two bidder, discrete, independent private-value auction, the seller earns less when a bidder can offer her rival a collusion proposal than in the absence of collusion. This contrasts with a cele- brated result by Che and Kim ("Robustly collusion-proof implementation". Econometrica, 74(4):1063-1107, July 2006) stating that for such auctions there is a mechanism that eliminates all the effects of collusion. Che and Kim and much of the literature assume an uninformed third-party organizes collusion.
Download or read book An Essay on China s Development After the Demographic Golden Age written by Xueyuan Tian and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2023-03-17 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book mainly addresses China’s current demographic situation and social people-related policies. It aims to solve the issues of demographic transition, population aging, population flow, urbanization, population quality, etc. China is the first large population country, with the vast territory and the huge economic system. It has many issues such as productivity and production relations, superstructure and economic base, and domestic and international relations in various fields and at all levels. Hence, China needs to come up with a set of overall strategies. The author sorts out all of his works in recent years and performs his new academic achievements on demographic issues and social governing strategies. This timely book offers new methods that impact advanced social development with real data.
Download or read book Essays on Public and International Economics written by Yong Yang and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays and Thoughts written by Lorin C Saunders and published by AuthorHouse. This book was released on 2021-01-26 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book has been written to my posterity so that they can learn of my thoughts and philosophy. It is not written with any order in mind, it's just a collection of some of the thoughts that are important to me and will give the reader a glimpse of how I think and express my feelings. The reader will even find three of my stories I made up while I was traveling around Switzerland sitting in the back seat with my Grandchildren. I included them in this book because my granddaughter Brooke ask me to. She was one of those who originally heard the stories. Besides I liked them and when I remember or re-read them It reminds me of a joyful time in my life.
Download or read book Free Software Free Society written by Richard Stallman and published by Lulu.com. This book was released on 2002 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay Collection covering the point where software, law and social justice meet.
Download or read book Mechanism Design and Its Application in Management Science written by Yu Wang and published by VDM Publishing. This book was released on 2008 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I utilize a mechanism design framework to show that the current most popular practice in the timeshare exchange industry can be greatly improved without a tremendous change in their fundamental systems. By focusing on the ten-billion dollar timeshare industry and proposing a superior mechanism to improve its operation, the research has signi-ficant substantive implications. At the same time, from the theoretical perspective, the research extends the literature on one-sided matching to cases where supply of resources is dynamic and resources can be stored. I also study the theoretical relationship between two impor-tant matching mechanisms: Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and Top Trading Cycles and Chains (TTCC) mechanism. I show that given a specific chain selection rule of TTCC, it can be reduced to TTC. How-ever, this applies to only one special case and do not generalize to cases where other types of chain selection rules are used. Given the obvious link between the mechanism design work and the business systems that we observe in the marketplace, one of the potential contributions of my research is to encourage mechanism design study in management science.
Download or read book Egalitarian Perspectives written by John E. Roemer and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1996-09-28 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Fifteen essays, written over the past dozen years, explore contemporary philosophical debates on egalitarianism, using the tools of modern economic theory, general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the theory of mechanism design.
Download or read book Three Essays on Learning and Information in Games written by Robert Stuart Gazzale and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Essay on the First Principles of Natural Philosophy etc written by William Jones and published by . This book was released on 1763 with total page 296 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Proceedings of the ASME Design Engineering Technical Conferences written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 668 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Who Gets What and why written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. This book was released on 2015 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role. If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what. Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Download or read book Encyclopedia of the Essay written by Tracy Chevalier and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2012-10-12 with total page 1032 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This groundbreaking new source of international scope defines the essay as nonfictional prose texts of between one and 50 pages in length. The more than 500 entries by 275 contributors include entries on nationalities, various categories of essays such as generic (such as sermons, aphorisms), individual major works, notable writers, and periodicals that created a market for essays, and particularly famous or significant essays. The preface details the historical development of the essay, and the alphabetically arranged entries usually include biographical sketch, nationality, era, selected writings list, additional readings, and anthologies
Download or read book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding written by John Locke and published by . This book was released on 1844 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton and published by Read Books Ltd. This book was released on 2018-08-20 with total page 455 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.
