Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.

Download or read book Essays on Incentives and Contracts written by Selçuk Eren Günay and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Le résumé en anglais n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur.

Download or read book Essays in Empirical Contracting and Development written by Amrita Bihari Ahuja and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation's first essay explores the design and effects of incentive contracts in contexts with multiple products and multiple parties. Using data from a multi-product manufacturer in India, I test how incentives to two parties in its distribution network--salespersons and retailers--affect product sales. While profit maximization suggests equalization of returns, sales increases from salesperson incentives are six times those for retailer incentives. I provide evidence that differences in substitutability across products for the two parties, and the consequent differential costs of incentive provision, explain this disparity. The essay also traces the mechanisms by which incentives affect sales. Shifts in the allocation of salesperson effort between products and between retailers in different geographies, complementarities in effort, and information revelation through repeated interactions are all shown to be important. Finally, the essay argues that firms take these hidden incentive costs and interactions between parties into account when designing incentive systems.

Download or read book Incentive Contracts with Strategic Agents written by Jacques Paul Lawarrée and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 418 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts Earnings Management Expectation Management and Related Issues written by Jie Gao and published by Open Dissertation Press. This book was released on 2017-01-28 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "Essays on Incentive Contracts, Earnings Management, Expectation Management and Related Issues" by Jie, Gao, 高洁, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. DOI: 10.5353/th_b4327865 Subjects: Corporate profits Disclosure of information Compensation management

Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Non verifiable Performance written by Anja Schöttner and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Production Performance and Payment written by Nadja Vanessa Kairies-Schwarz and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contracts written by Carsten Sebastian Pfeil and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Economic Incentives of Law and Contracts written by Juan Carlos Bisso and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How does the law affect the amount of information that is disclosed by a contractual relationship? This dissertation examines this question to predict the equilibrium outcomes that are influenced by different legal regimes.

Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Management Accounting and Incentive Contracts for Some New Production and Selling Strategies written by Seok-Young Lee and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 282 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Team Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Synergy written by Hong Chao and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 358 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on the Impact of Exogenous and Persistent Changes on the Provision of Incentives written by Vincent Tena and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In presence of an agency friction, incentive contracts are designed to align the manager's objectives with those of the owner of the firm. However, the contractual environment is subject to shocks beyond the scope of the manager that impact the future profitability of the firm. These shocks can be due for instance to a strengthening of regulations, changes at the market-level, or the emergence of a new alternative to the manager. Hence, it raises the question how contracts are designed when such shocks are anticipated at the contractual date. In order to understand this effect, we conduct three studies. In the first paper, we explore how an incentive contract evolves at the emergence of automation technologies that can replace the manager in the context of asset management. We study a continuous time principal-agent problem where the performance of an asset is determined by the manager's unobserved effort, and where the automation technology emerges in a uncertain future. Our model suggests that the empirically observed layoffs that accompany the emergence ofautomation technology may have a contractual foundation. For the second study, we explore how changes in the agent's ability to divert cash flow impact an optimal contract design. We build a continuous-time principal-agent model where the agent can divert cash flow out of the owner's sight. While it is straightforward that mitigating the agency friction is valuable for the firm's owner, its effect on the provision of incentives throughout the contractual relationship is unclear. First, our result suggests that the compression of the bonuses at the advent of the shock: the reduction (respectively, increase) of the expected bonus of good (respectively, poor) performers. Second, our analysis also predicts the regulation-induced retention of a poor performer, defined as maintaining an agent in place while his poor performance would have induced his dismissal in the absence of the shock on the benefitof cash-flow diversion. In the third study, we continue the previous investigation with an empirical study. We analyze the Compensation Discussion and Analysis introduced for the 2007 proxy season. We focus on how this reform has impacted the dismissal decision in S&P 500 non-financial firms. We find that the introduction of the CD&A act has significantly reduced the probability of forced CEO dismissal in S&P 500 non-financial firms. While prior literature has shown that exogenous shocks at the industry level impact the dismissal decision, we document that changes in the regulatory environment also matter.

Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts and Organizational Design in Franchising written by Anna Rohlfing and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Economic Incentive Mechanisms written by Yeon-Koo Che and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Optimization and Incentive Contracts written by Pranava Raja Goundan and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (cont.) In the second part of the thesis, we focus on the design and analysis of simple, possibly non-coordinating contracts in a single-supplier, multi-retailer supply chain where retailers make both pricing and inventory decisions. Specifically, we introduce a buy-back menu contract to improve supply chain efficiency, and compare two systems, one in which the retailers compete against each other, and another in which the retailers coordinate their decisions to maximize total expected retailer profit. In a linear additive demand setting, we show that for either retailer configuration, the proposed buy-back menu guarantees the supplier, and hence the supply chain, at least 50% of the optimal global supply chain profit. In particular, in a coordinated retailers system, the contract guarantees the supply chain at least 75% of the optimal global supply chain profit. We also analyze the impact of retail price caps on supply chain performance in this setting.

Download or read book Essays on Incentive Contracts and Organizational Design in Franchising written by Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: