Download or read book Essays on Estimating Third degree Price Discrimination written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These three essays study third-degree price discrimination in the U.S. movie theater industry. The first chapter describes datasets used in this study and presents the reduced-form evidence that movie theater chains price-discriminate households without children and households with children. The results are consistent with a model of a simple third-degree price discrimination where movie theater chains choose a regular ticket price and a family ticket price (that is, the sum of the regular ticket price and a child ticket price) separately by each movie theater so that they maximize profits from households with children and households with children. In the second chapter, I estimate demand and supply of a movie theater in a structural model under the price discrimination and the one under no price discrimination, using the unique dataset of ticket prices and theater characteristics including location of movie theaters operating in the U.S. The results show that the model with price discrimination is sharply and statistically well-determined while the model without price discrimination is not, which supports that movie theaters conduct the price discrimination and incorporating it to the structural model significantly improves the estimates. In the third chapter, I conduct counterfactual experiments to study two central topics in the literature of price discrimination. First, I evaluate the price effect of price discrimination by decomposing observed child discounts into cost difference and price discrimination. Then, I evaluate the welfare effect of banning a child discount to see the welfare effect of limiting firm's ability of price discrimination. The result shows that the ban deteriorates the social welfare because of the decrease in demand by households with children while consumers might be better off.

Download or read book Essays in Nonlinear Pricing written by Garrett Patrick Hagemann and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation addresses several open issues in the economics surrounding the use of nonlinear pricing. The first chapter empirically examines the impact of the use of nonlinear pricing by wholesalers. The second chapter evaluates how firm profit depends on the number of prices offered in a nonlinear price schedule. Finally, the third chapter investigates the use of all-unit discounts as a price discrimination instrument. The first chapter exploits a unique data set of price schedules to provide the first empirical estimate of the welfare impact of second degree price discrimination in a market with double marginalization. Theoretical predictions in such a context are ambiguous. Quantity discounts at the wholesale level reduce costs for larger retailers, increasing efficiency. However, quantity discounts raise input costs for smaller retailers, increasing prices consumers may pay. The combined welfare effects on consumers umers depends on how much of input cost discounts are passed through to consumers and the distribution of retailer size. I develop and estimate a model of the New York State retail liquor market where wholesalers offer a multi-part nonlinear tariff for each product. The structural model is then used to estimate the welfare impact of restricting wholesale pricing to be linear. I find that banning quantity discounts reduces total welfare by approximately 14% on average. Consumer surplus and wholesaler profit decline by approximately 26% on average. Average retailer profit increases by a similar magnitude, though effects for a particular retailer are heterogeneous across retailer size. The second chapter examines the shape of observed price schedules more directly. Sellers often offer price schedules with relatively few segments rather than completely nonlinear price schedules which offer a unique price for each unit sold. By not offering a completely nonlinear, sellers are foregoing some additional profit in favor of a simpler pricing strategy. I find that the scale of these foregone profits is relatively small and only loosely related to product characteristics. When considered in percentage terms, foregone profits are very similar across a large number of products. This suggests that simple pricing strategies obtain almost all the profits available and this is a common property of nonlinear pricing strategies. The final chapter compares price discrimination through two different quantity discount mechanisms: all-unit discounts and incremental discounts. All-unit-discounts give consumers a lower marginal price on all units purchased once total purchase size crosses a threshold. Incremental discounts only provide discounts on units above the threshold. Relative to incremental discounts, all-unit-discounts imply higher marginal prices and bunching of purchase sizes in equilibrium. The equilibrium bunching may present a challenge for estimating the model empirically.

Download or read book Essays on Empirical Analysis of Price Discrimination written by Congnan Zhan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 103 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Price Discrimination written by Qihong Liu and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 91 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Competitive Spatial Price Discrimination written by Barnali Gupta and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book A Note on Pricing With Market Power written by Charles Adams and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those distinctions in underlying cost and demand structures can result in only partial and possibly misleading conclusions about the nature and consequences of price discrimination. Building on earlier work in the derivation of quality-differentiated demand (see SSRN 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576773 and 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107103), the paper compares the standard analysis of price discrimination with one that explicitly accounts for monopoly power in manipulating quality choices. The example provided illustrates the potential for substantially greater profits and greater efficiency losses by forcing some groups of consumers into suboptimal quality choices once quality variations are explicitly accounted for.

Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination and Price Dispersion written by Yeonjei Jung and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Essay on Price Discrimination written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Third Degree Price Discrimination in Two sided Markets written by Alexandre de Cornière and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers' type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm's ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation.

Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination written by Jie Shuai and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Third degree Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Third Degree Price Discrimination written by Edward J. Lopez and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on the method by which demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare relative to uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.

Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-04 with total page 564 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Evolutionary Economics v 2 written by Marc R. Tool and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2019-07-12 with total page 517 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is part of a two-volume work intended to map the theoretical heartland of the institutionalist perspective on political economy. Volume II considers basic economic processes, institutions for stabilizing and planning economic activities, the role of power and accountability, and emerging global interdependence. Marc R. Tool is the editor of "Journal of Economic Issues".

Download or read book Essays on Price Discrimination in Search Markets HCarl Christian Groh written by Carl-Christian Groh and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Routledge Dictionary of Economics written by Donald Rutherford and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 1995 with total page 499 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compiled to meet the needs of students and professionals in economics, finance, accountancy and business, this wide-ranging, international Dictionary is for everyone who wants an up-to-date resource to the world of economics. Key Features over 4200 comprehensive A to Z entries, from after-hours to z-score, provide clear, definitive explanations of the key terms, issues, theories and concepts in economics today - as well as describing the contributions of key figures in the field each entry is headed by a short definition for quick reference, and where relevant, followed by an annotated bibliography to lead the reader to further sources cross-referenced for ease of access the full range of subjects is covered, from classical economics and the study of value and growth, to contemporary concerns such as European Union and Green conditionality detailed coverage of vital econometric terms and statistics including entries such as eigenprices and M0 includes specialised commercial and financial jargon illustrated with 94 line diagrams unique subject index for ease of access

Download or read book Essays on Monopoly and Monopsony Under Imperfect Information written by Matthew Philip- Makofske and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first essay estimates the degree of monopsony power in the college football labor market. Previous literature suggests that the marginal revenue product of top performing college football players significantly exceeds their compensation. Such estimates overstate rents on labor because they estimate the marginal revenue product as a function of ex-post realized labor quality, which is more information than is available ex-ante . For 114 Football Bowl Subdivision participant schools from 2004-2011, I estimate the marginal revenue product for players grouped into three ex-post quality tiers. Using talent ratings prospective players spanning 2002-2008, I then estimate the probability of each ex-post quality outcome given a prospect's rating. Together these yield estimates of expected marginal revenue product as a function of ex-ante promise, which are more appropriate for inference regarding monopsony power. The second essay builds on a multi-market approach to second-degree price discrimination which treats each successive unit sold by the monopolist as a separate good sold in an independent market. For each unit of the good, the monopolist chooses a marginal type (lowest type served) subject to a constraint: the schedule of marginal types must be monotonically non-decreasing in the amount of the good being sold. I show that the monopolist's problem can be treated like a finite horizon multi-stage decision problem, and solved by backward induction using Bellman's equation. This approach identifies the optimal nonlinear price schedule whether or not the monotonicity constraint binds, and highlights the economic intuition behind the construction of an optimally ironed marginal type schedule an the corresponding marginal price schedule. The third essay looks at the optimal pricing behavior of a monopolist screening consumers on a single type parameter, when the single crossing condition is violated. I show that under standard assumptions of one-dimensional screening problems, violation of the single crossing condition can allow for positive and globally incentive compatible assignments through which the monopolist extracts all equilibrium surplus. This sharply contrasts with the case of second-degree price discrimination when the single crossing condition is satisfied.