Download or read book Essays on Epistemology and Evolutionary Game Theory written by Elias Tsakas and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Yao-Chye Chiang and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jonas Björnerstedt and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Joerg Oechssler and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ge Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applications written by Shota Fujishima and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 95 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on evolutionary game theory and its applications. The first essay considers mechanism design in the evolutionary game-theoretic framework. The second essay studies equilibrium selection of coordination games by using an evolutionary game-theoretic concept. The third essay formulates a multi-regional economic growth model as an evolutionary game and characterizes the stability of its equilibria under an evolutionary dynamic. The summaries of each essay are provided below. In the first essay, I consider an implementation problem in a class of congestion games with players that have heterogeneous costs of taking actions. One application is to traffic congestion with drivers having heterogeneous time costs. The planner would like to design a price scheme under which the economy converges to an epsilon-optimum from any initial state when he does not have full knowledge of the cost functions, and he can observe only the aggregate strategy distribution. Although the planner would like to internalize the externalities, the informational constraints compel him to estimate their values. Using the optimality and equilibrium conditions, I construct a practical estimation procedure that yields the true values of externalities in the long-run. Moreover, I show that our scheme makes the epsilon-optimum globally stable under the best response dynamic if the externalities among players taking the same action are sufficiently large relative to those among players taking different actions. In the second essay, I study the long-run outcomes of noisy asynchronous repeated games with players that are heterogeneous in in terms of their patience. The players repeatedly play a 2-by-2 coordination game with random pair-wise matching. The games are noisy because the players may make mistakes when choosing their actions and are asynchronous because only one player can move in each period. I characterize the long-run outcomes of Markov perfect equilibrium that are robust to the mistakes and show that if there is a sufficiently patient player, the efficient state can be the unique robust outcome even if it is risk-dominated. Because I need heterogeneity for the result, I argue that it enables the most patient player in effect to be the leader. In the third essay, I consider a microfounded urban growth model with two regions and a mass of mobile workers to study interactions among growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion. Unlike previous research in the urban growth literature, I formulate the model as a one-shot game and take an evolutionary game-theoretic approach for stability analysis. My approach enables us to analyze the stability of nonstationary equilibria in which populations of each region are not constant over time. I show that if both the expenditure share for housing and inter-regional transport cost are small, a stable stationary equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, in such a case, I show that there can exist a stable nonstationary equilibrium in which mobile workers agglomerate in one region at first but some of them migrate to the other region later. I argue that such a nonstationary location pattern is related to return migration.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jack Robles and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Theory written by J. McKenzie Alexander and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2023-03-31 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sciences. For example, theorists have developed a number of dynamical models which can be used to study how populations of interacting individuals change their behaviours over time. In this introduction, this Element covers the two main approaches to evolutionary game theory: the static analysis of evolutionary stability concepts, and the study of dynamical models, their convergence behaviour and rest points. This Element also explores the many fascinating, and complex, connections between the two approaches.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Srinivas Arigapudi and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule. The second chapter studies a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use resultsfrom optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games. The third chapter (joint work with Yuval Heller and Igal Milchtaich) studies the population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma.By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature.
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ratul Lahkar and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Evolution Cognition and Realism written by Nicholas Rescher and published by University Press of America. This book was released on 1990 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays originated from an interdisciplinary conference on 'Evolutionary Epistemology' held in Pittsburgh in December of 1988 under the sponsorship of the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Philosophy of Science. Contents: Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory, by Donald T. Campbell; Evolutionary Models of Science, by Ronald N. Giere; Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriously? by Michael Bradie; Natural Selection, Justification, and Inference to the Best Explanation, by Alan H. Goldman; Interspecific Competition, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Ecology, by Kristin Shrader-Frechette; Toward Making Evolutionary Epistemology into a Truly Naturalized Epistemology, by William Bechtel; Confessions of a Creationist, by C. Kenneth Waters. Co-published with the Center for Philosophy of Science.
Download or read book Information Interaction and Agency written by Wiebe van der Hoek and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-12-06 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contemporary epistemological and cognitive studies, as well as recent trends in computer science and game theory have revealed an increasingly important and intimate relationship between Information, Interaction, and Agency. Agents perform actions based on the available information and in the presence of other interacting agents. From this perspective Information, Interaction, and Agency neatly ties together classical themes like rationality, decision-making and belief revision with games, strategies and learning in a multi-agent setting. Unified by the central notions Information, Interaction, and Agency, the essays in this volume provide refreshing methodological perspectives on belief revision, dynamic epistemic logic, von Neumann games, and evolutionary game theory; all of which in turn are central approaches to understanding our own rationality and that of other agents.
Download or read book Essays in Epistemic Game Theory written by Akira Yokotani and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In this thesis, we make three achievements in the field of epistemic game theory: First, we show the existence of a universal type space where redundant types can be embedded. Type spaces with redundant types cannot be represented in the standard universal type space (Mertens and Zamir [39]). In Chapter 1, we extend the universal type space of Mertens-Zamir by introducing a payoff irrelevant parameter space C as a missing source of uncertainty on the lines of Liu [33] so that redundant types also can be represented there. In contrast to Liu, we show that the parameter space C can always be an exogenous space, and moreover C = {0, 1} is always enough. In Chapter 2, we apply this idea of extended universal type spaces in order to generalize the existing results in robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris [7]). Adopting knowledge-belief spaces (Aumann [5] and [6]), we show that robust implementation is equivalent to Bayesian implementation on one particular belief structure. This result allows us to directly apply the results about Bayesian implementation, such as Jackson [29], to obtain a characterization result of robust implementation in a more general class of environments. In Chapter 3, we show the impossibility of robust implementation. We apply the idea of Saijo [49], which is about the impossibility of Nash implementation, and show that only constant social choice functions are robustly implementable in large domains of interdependent preferences"--Leaf iv.
Download or read book Learning Development and Culture written by H C Plotkin and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 505 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Exploring Individual Preferences in Economic Contexts written by Niko Noeske and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory written by Ken Binmore and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
