Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance written by Ran Guo and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance written by Nava Ramezanian Bajgiran and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most corporate governance research focusses on prescriptive measures of governance quality (e.g., board composition, attributes) and their association with measures of firm performance but neglects the dynamic nature of governance choices that impinge on firm value. In Chapter 1, I introduce a top-down approach for evaluating board effectiveness in a dynamic context focusing on the empirical outcomes of the decisions they make. A Principal Component Analysis is employed to construct an index of governance quality capturing six key aspects of board responsibilities. In Chapter 2, I turn to examine whether firms’ corporate governance quality can positively influence their stock returns and operating performance using the newly developed index that accounts for the dynamic nature of internal governance choices. By constructing decile portfolios of firms based on this measure of governance quality, I show that portfolios of firms with better governance quality outperform firms within the lower governance quality portfolios. Specifically, zero-investment strategies that buy HQ portfolios (highest governance quality) and short LQ portfolios (weakest governance quality) generate 3.9% and 3.2% returns for equally- and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. Finally, in Chapter 3, I follow a similar approach to that developed in the first two chapters to construct a dynamic governance quality index for a sample of public companies from 16 European countries. Comparing the returns of the portfolios based on this index reveals that European companies with higher governance quality (HQ portfolio) generally outperform their peers which possess a lower quality of governance (LQ portfolio). The findings also show that firm level governance can be affected by country-level elements such as legal and institutional structures.

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance Outside Directors and Firm Performance written by Sorasart Sukcharoensin and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 316 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Essays on Firm Performance written by Shih-chang Hung (Finance) and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Essays on Firm Performance written by Shih-chang Hung and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Voting Power Corporate Governance and Capital Structure written by Yinghong Chen and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 204 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance written by Mihai Badescu and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 147 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on corporate governance. The first study investigates the relationships among corporate governance, firm characteristics and firm performance by focusing on the dynamic interactions between those variables. The main result is that corporate governance (as measured by the G-index) can be treated as an exogenous variable, as it leads to changes into the other variables, but is not affected by them.

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance written by Vasileios Katsoulis and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Essays on Firm Performance Evidence from Corporate Governance and Intangible Assets written by and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance written by Tih Koon Tan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 83 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S & P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S & P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.

Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Lixiong Guo and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Corporate Illegality written by Dendi Ramdani and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Syed Walid Reza and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Firm Performance written by Mark Hirschey and published by Emerald Group Publishing. This book was released on 2009-04-16 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Focuses on corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps corporations and other organizations effectively manage, administer, and direct economic resources. This book focuses on: the impact of deregulation and corporate structure on productive efficiency; and the effectiveness of the fraud triangle and SAS.

Download or read book Three Essays in Corporate Finance written by Jérôme Philippe Alain Taillard and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: In my dissertation, I first contribute to the capital structure literature by estimating the potential impact of financial distress on a firm's real business operations. Secondly, I contribute to the ownership structure literature, and more broadly to the field of corporate governance, by revisiting the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. In my first essay, I analyze a comprehensive sample of defendant firms that found themselves exposed to an unexpected wave of asbestos litigation in the wake of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Since these legal liabilities are unrelated to current operations, firms that are in financial distress due to their legal woes provide a natural experiment to study the impact of financial distress on a firm's operational performance. When analyzing firms suffering from this exogenous shock to their finances, I find little evidence of negative spillover effects ("indirect" costs) of financial distress. That is, the competitive position of the distressed firms is not adversely impacted by their weakened financial situation. Furthermore, I find empirical support for a significant disciplinary effect of financial distress as these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations. In my second and third essays, I focus on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance using a large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004. In the second essay, I reconcile some of the extant literature by showing that the relationship is sensitive to the firm size characteristics of the sample being used. In particular, I recover the classic hump-shaped relationship when focusing only on the largest firms (e.g. Fortune 500 firms), while the relationship turns negative when the sample is comprised of smaller firms. The negative relationship among smaller firms is consistent with entrenchment arguments given that managerial ownership is on average much higher for small firms. Second, I find that for lower levels of managerial ownership, the negative relationship is driven by older firms that have on average less liquid stocks. This finding is consistent with firms that do not perform well enough to create a liquid market for their stock, and hence have to keep high levels of insider ownership in order to avoid a negative price impact that would result from a reduction of their stake. Lastly, these results could also be suggestive of endogeneity concerns. I investigate this issue further in my third essay. Principal-agent models predict that managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous changes in a firm's contracting environment. Changes in the contracting environment are, however, only partially observed, and the standard statistical techniques used to address endogeneity may be ineffective in this corporate setting. In my third essay, together with my coauthor Phil Davies, we develop a novel econometric approach to control for the influence of time-varying unobserved variables related to a firm's contracting environment. Using the same large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004, we find no evidence of a systematic relation between managerial ownership and performance.

Download or read book Essays on Top Management and Corporate Behavior written by Hui-Ting Wu and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2010 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance of Financial and Non Financial Firms written by Ling Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 141 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance of financial and non-financial firms is critical in modern corporations with diffuse stock ownership, which deals with the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Corporate governance has a profound impact on various corporate policy, and firm value in the end. This study examines the importance of corporate governance and its influences on various corporate policy and firm value and risks for both financial and non-financial firms. Chapter 1 investigates the association between the firm's liquidity level and liquidity mix on the one hand and CEO entrenchment on the other. CEO entrenchment may distort the firms' liquidity policy because managers and shareholders may have conflicting preferences between cash and lines of credit. Using lines of credit data from 1996 to 2008, we find five main results. First, entrenched CEOs hold more liquidity as measured by the sum of cash and lines of credit. Second, entrenched managers have a preference for cash over lines of credit because while cash gives them flexibility, lines of credit are accompanied with bank restrictions and monitoring. Third, entrenched CEOs also use more lines of credit because of the extra liquidity it provides, despite the associated bank monitoring. Fourth, entrenched CEOs in smaller and opaque firms tend to hold more liquidity. Five, entrenched CEO's preference for cash versus lines of credit is stronger for large and transparent firms, compared to small and opaque firms. These findings imply that firms should better align the interests of the entrenched managers with those of the shareholders in order to limit the excessive liquidity holding of firms when CEOs are entrenched and to thereby increase firms' profitability. Chapter 2 examines the relationship between bank holding company (BHC) performance, risk and "busy" board of directors, an overlooked dimension of corporate governance in the banking literature. Busy directors are defined as directors with three or more directorships. The sample covers the 2001-2010 period. We employ a simultaneous equation framework and estimate the models employing the three stage least square (3SLS) technique in order to account for endogeneity. Several interesting results are obtained. First, BHC performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), Tobin's Q and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets is positively associated with busy directors. Second, BHC total risk (standard deviation of stock returns), market risk (market beta), idiosyncratic risk (standard errors of the CAPM model) credit risk (percentage of non-performing assets over total assets) and default risk (HigherZ-Score) are inversely related to it. Third, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors, in the sense of failing the meeting-attendance-criterion (75% attendance). Fourth, the benefits of having busy directors in terms of performance improvement strengthened but the benefits of risk reduction declined during the recent financial crisis These findings partially alleviate concerns that when directors become too busy with multiple directorships, they shirk their responsibilities. Major implications for investors, regulators, and firm managers are drawn. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of CEO entrenchment on the loan syndication structure. Over the past decade, syndicated loans have played an increasingly important role in corporate financing. Unlike a traditional bank loan with only a single creditor, a syndicated loan involves a group of lenders: a lead arranger and a number of participant lenders. The syndication process, therefore, generates an additional dimension of agency problem between the lead arranger and the participant lenders, besides the traditional agency cost of debt between the borrowing firm and the lender (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Several results are obtained about syndicated loans made to firms with more entrenched CEOs. First, in these loans the number of participant lenders and their share in the loan are smaller; the lead arranger retains a larger loan share. Second, these loans are more closely held resulting in a higher Herfindahl index of loan concentration. Third, foreign lenders are less involved in these loans. Specifically, the number of foreign lenders and the percentage of loans held by foreign lenders are both smaller. Our findings shed light on the two types of agency problems associated with the syndicated loans, and have great implication for the firms' shareholders, creditors and regulators.