Download or read book Essays on Behavioral Economics and Social Networks written by David Benjamin Zuckerman and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays relating to behavioral economics and social networks. In the first chapter, I experimentally investigate third-party preferences for compensation and punishment after one party financially harms another for their own benefit. I find that demand for both compensation and punishment extends beyond pure distributional concerns, reflecting preferences for (what I term) compensatory and retributive justice, respectively. In the second chapter, I develop a simple model of friendship formation that provides insight into three key empirical patterns regarding homophily, our tendency to form connections with those most similar to us. In the model, agents have homophilic preferences along two dimensions, but homophily is only measured along a single dimension. Via simulations, I show that introducing this second dimension (qualitatively) generates all three noted patterns. In the final chapter, I and co-authors develop a dynamic theory of endogenous preference formation in which people adopt worldviews that shape their judgments about their experiences. The theory generates rich behavioral dynamics, illuminating a wide range of applications and providing potential explanations for a variety of observed phenomena.

Download or read book Essays on Social Networks and Behavioral Economics written by Isabel Melguizo López and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Los individuos a menudo exhiben robustos patrones de comportamiento al relacionarse con otros y cuando toman decisiones económicas. Por ejemplo, tienden a interactuar de manera desproporcionada con otros similares a ellos. Además, las dimensiones no-cognitivas de la personalidad, como la confianza o la perseverancia afectan a la dilación de las tareas. Esta tesis incorpora estos patrones de comportamiento en modelos económicos de aprendizaje social y de decisiones sobre el momento en el que desarrollar tareas. En el primer capítulo argumentamos cómo los desacuerdos se pueden perpetuar en la sociedad cuando los individuos forman sus opiniones comunicándose de manera desproporcionada con sus similares. Para ello consideramos un modelo dinámico de formación de opinión en el que los individuos desarrollan sus opiniones mediante la incorporación de las de otros en su red social. Nuestros individuos exhiben homofilia, esto es, la atención que prestan a otros se basa en la posesión de atributos similares. La característica clave de este marco es que la atención co-evoluciona con las opiniones, regida por cuán sobresalientes son los atributos. Esta prominencia viene dada por la diferencia de opiniones entre los grupos que poseen y que carecen de estos atributos. Al asumir que los atributos con mayores diferencias en opiniones merecen más atención, mostramos si hay, inicialmente, un único atributo sobresaliente, éste recibe una atención creciente en el tiempo y la sociedad queda escindida en dos grupos de pensamiento. Esta situación se presenta porque los individuos reorientan sus interacciones con otros similares en el rasgo más saliente de tal manera que las opiniones no se mezclan. En el segundo capítulo complementamos el estudio del primero explorando cómo modificaciones en el comportamiento de los individuos afectan a la formación de opiniones. Incorporamos el caso en el cual las opiniones están sujetas a las perturbaciones y demostramos que el desacuerdo es robusto a la aleatoriedad. También discutimos el caso en que los individuos se influencian entre sí con diferentes intensidades, como McPherson et al. (2001) documenta, los jóvenes exhiben mayor homofilia de género que los mayores. Encontramos que cuando algunos individuos agravan la atención que prestan al rasgo más sobresaliente inicialmente, el desacuerdo persiste a través de él, siendo las diferencias en opiniones más mayores que en el caso simétrico. Finalmente exploramos condiciones generales sobre la evolución de la homofilia para que el desacuerdo persista. En el primer capítulo discutimos un proceso particular en el que la evolución de homofilia promueve el desacuerdo, por el contrario, la homofilia constante en Golub y Jackson (2012) afecta a la velocidad de convergencia al consenso, un resultado que siempre surgía. La conciliación de ambos resultado descansa en afirmar que el desacuerdo persiste siempre que que los individuos intensifiquen sus relaciones con otros similares, suficientemente rápido. Específicamente, hay dos fuerzas en juego: primero, las personas prestan cada vez más atención a los demás sobre la base de un atributo específico. Segundo, siempre prestan atención a todos los demás. El desacuerdo persiste cuando la primera domina. En el último capítulo, discutimos la relevancia de las habilidades no-cognitivas en la decisión de cuándo hacer frente a tareas difíciles, pero valiosas. Para ello consideramos un marco dinámico con un individuo caracterizado por el potencial con el que ejecuta sus habilidades. Mostramos que cuando este individuo presenta bajo potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas fáciles de bajo valor mientras que cuando presenta alto potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas difíciles. Cuando este potencial es sensible a la consecución de resultados, el individuo puede encontrar óptimo pasar de tareas fáciles a difíciles en algún momento. Intuitivamente, los éxitos en tareas fáciles lo motivan a enfrentarse a tareas difíciles.

Download or read book Essays in Behavioral Economics written by Bernard Richter and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Behavioral Economics written by George Katona and published by Ann Arbor, Mich. : Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. This book was released on 1980 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Non Equilibrium Social Science and Policy written by Jeffrey Johnson and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-01-20 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The overall aim of this book, an outcome of the European FP7 FET Open NESS project, is to contribute to the ongoing effort to put the quantitative social sciences on a proper footing for the 21st century. A key focus is economics, and its implications on policy making, where the still dominant traditional approach increasingly struggles to capture the economic realities we observe in the world today - with vested interests getting too often in the way of real advances. Insights into behavioral economics and modern computing techniques have made possible both the integration of larger information sets and the exploration of disequilibrium behavior. The domain-based chapters of this work illustrate how economic theory is the only branch of social sciences which still holds to its old paradigm of an equilibrium science - an assumption that has already been relaxed in all related fields of research in the light of recent advances in complex and dynamical systems theory and related data mining. The other chapters give various takes on policy and decision making in this context. Written in nontechnical style throughout, with a mix of tutorial and essay-like contributions, this book will benefit all researchers, scientists, professionals and practitioners interested in learning about the 'thinking in complexity' to understand how socio-economic systems really work.

Download or read book Cooperation Networks and Emotions written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis contains three essays that study how people behave in a social context. The first two essays are on cooperation and networks. Chapter 2 investigates a mechanism to facilitate public good provision in networks. It relies on the idea that people compete for attractive network positions (or status) and that they do so by creating public goods. Chapter 3 studies how power asymmetries affect cooperation in groups. Two types of power are studied: power from being central in a network and power from having the authority to distribute the group surplus. The third essay, chapter 4, studies a possible explanation why people experience social emotions such as anger towards others."--Samenvatting auteur.

Download or read book Essays on the Role of Social Influence in Behavioral Economics written by Jakina Rian Debnam and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 402 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation emphasizes the social components of economic behavior, informed by behavioral economics. This dissertation includes three independent research papers. The first of these papers addresses consumer responses to anti-sugar-sweetened beverage legislation and campaigns. Consistent with standard economic theory, others have found that sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes lead to decreased soda consumption once implemented. This paper, however, establishes an additional behavioral response to anti-SSB campaigns and legislation - the tendency of some consumers to increase their consumption of a sanctioned good in the face of excise taxation, or psychological reactance. In support of this tendency I present lab experimental evidence from undergraduates which finds that on average, students drink about two more ounces of soda in the lab after being shown an anti-soda advertisement. I also use Nielsen data from households around New York City and find that following the passage of legislation restricting soda purchases in 2012, but before the implementation of the tax, households increased their weekly purchases of soda. The second paper concerns the interpersonal comparability of subjective well-being (SWB) measures. Popular welfare calculations rely on the assumption that SWB measures capture the same information across persons. This paper uses data collected from an online survey to interrogate this assumption and to examine the relationship between SWB measures and standard notions of utility. The final paper in this dissertation concerns learning and peer effects in social networks. This paper uses a unique set of text and network data from a social network to measure the persuasiveness of peers' communications among college undergraduates. I use idiosyncratic shocks to students' information sets to create an instrumental variable and find that while in general, the effect of receiving an additional piece of information about a course is a decrease in the likelihood that a student enrolls in the course, if the message-giver is a peer, the effect of this additional message is up to a 7.4% increase in the likelihood that a student enrolls in that course. This finding is consistent with theories of information aggregation where individuals 'tag' information with sources as they incorporate these sources into their final decisions.

Download or read book Renaissance in Behavioral Economics written by Roger Frantz and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2007-06-14 with total page 249 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists working on behavioral economics have been awarded the Nobel Prize four times in recent years. This book explores this innovative area and in particular focuses on the work of Harvey Leibenstein, one of the pioneers of the discipline. The topics covered in the book include agency theory; dynamic efficiency; evolutionary economics; X-efficiency; the effect of emotions, specifically affect on decision-making; market pricing; experimental economics; human resource management; the Carnegie School, and intra-industry efficiency in less developed countries.

Download or read book Essays on Social Networks in Development Economics written by Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (cont.) substitutes for commitment. On net, savings allows individuals to smooth risk that cannot be shared interpersonally, with the largest benefits for those who are weakly connected in the network. The final chapter (co-authored with my classmates Horacio Larreguy and Juan Pablo Xandri) attempts to determine which models of social learning on networks best describe empirical behavior. Theory has focused on two leading models of social learning on networks: Bayesian and DeGroot rules of thumb learning. These models can yield greatly divergent behavior; individuals employing rules of thumb often double-count information and may not exhibit convergent behavior in the long run. By conducting a unique lab experiment in rural Karnataka, India, set up to exactly differentiate between these two models, we test which model best describes social learning processes on networks. We study experiments in which seven individuals are placed into a network, each with full knowledge of its structure. The participants attempt to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world. Individuals receive independent, identically distributed signals about the state in the first period only; thereafter, individuals make guesses about the underlying state of the world and these guesses are transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We consider various environments including incomplete information Bayesian models and provide evidence that individuals are best described by DeGroot models wherein they either take simple majority of opinions in their neighborhood.

Download or read book Essays in Behavioral Economics written by Irina Weissbrot and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first chapter of the dissertation, entitled "Revisiting Regret Theory", suggests a more generalized version of the regret theories proposed by economists so far. Outcome regret is experienced when one compares a realized outcome to the outcome one could have received, if one had chosen a different action. In this paper I argue that the existing theories are flawed in that they make very restrictive assumptions about how people think with respect to foregone opportunities in the face of uncertainty. In light of some evidence as to how people actually think about past choice and realized outcomes, I propose to extend and generalize the existent theories of regret. I then apply my theory to existing experimental data, hitherto unexplained by the current theories. I find that my theory is capable of accounting for these data. The second chapter, entitled "Do Responses to Hypothetical and Subjective Questions Reveal Preferences?" and co-authored with Doug Bernheim, Daniel Bjorkegren, Jeffrey Naecker and Antonio Rangel, investigates the feasibility of inferring the choices people would make (if given the opportunity) based on their responses to hypothetical and subjective questions when they are not engaged in actual decision making. The ability to make such inferences is of potential value when choice data are unavailable or limited in ways that potentially impair standard methods of estimating choice mappings. We formulate prediction models relating choice distributions to these "non-choice" reactions, estimate them with data for a given set of items, and use them to predict out-of-sample choice distributions for new items at various prices. Our analysis shows that this method performs well relative to the conventional approaches that require more extensive choice data. The third chapter, entitled "Social and Economic Networks with Unknown Utilities", deals with social and economic networks in an historical perspective. The theoretical part of the paper is concerned with situations in which a utility from forming a certain link might be unknown to the agent prior to forming the link. This is in contrast with the standard networks literature that assumes that agents are fully aware of the utilities they will have from forming any possible link to any other agent. When this is not the case, agents might benefit from a "social planner", who will either force them to form certain links they wouldn't otherwise form, or change the benefits structure of the network in a way that will result in a voluntary formation of a more efficient network. Later, the paper looks at some situations in history where networks might have been formed with agents either underestimating or overestimating the benefits resulting from those networks.

Download or read book Essays on Behavioral Economics written by George Katona and published by . This book was released on with total page 107 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays in Behavioral Economics written by Robert Jean Oxoby and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 276 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Essays on Economic Psychology written by Hermann Brandstätter and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 246 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic behavior is explored from a psychological perspective by both, prominent economic psychologists with a long tradition in studying economic problems as well as economists who are open and interested in the psychological aspects of economic behavior. The contributions discuss the prospects and difficulties of this dialogue between psychology and economics and survey some important areas of research where such an interdisciplinary approach has proved to be successful. The text can also be used to introduce psychology to economists in order to give them an idea how to analyze economic problems from a psychological perspective. It also indicates many urgent and exciting research topics awaiting eager scholars to carry on the dialogue.

Download or read book Essays on the Behavioral Economics of Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality written by Job August Harms and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Four Essays on Behavioral Economics written by Pleßner, Marco and published by kassel university press GmbH. This book was released on 2017 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Key Terms: Behavioral Economics, Behavioral Finance, Experimental Economics

Download or read book Essays on Signaling and Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.

Download or read book Essays in Behavioral Economics written by Adam Eric Greenberg and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines when and why individuals behave prosocially and antisocially in economic environments. The first chapter uses a natural experiment to investigate how people respond simultaneously to two prosocial norms--restaurant tipping and generosity during the holiday season. The second chapter examines the interplay between strong social norms and their fragility by employing a laboratory experiment to see whether strong social norms for honest conduct cause victims of dishonesty to pay forward dishonesty to third parties. Finally, the third chapter investigates the role of shame in honest reporting by asking whether individuals are more truthful when they know their statements will be subject to ex-post disclosure. Taken together, we gain insights into the motives for altruistic and ethical behavior as well as the roles social norms play in promoting or deterring such behavior. This research both draws from and extends to existing research in psychology and organizational behavior as well as economics.