Download or read book Essays in Monotone Comparative Statics and the Theory of Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Federico Manuel Echenique and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Theory of Games with General Complementarities written by Filippo L. Calciano and published by Presses univ. de Louvain. This book was released on 2010-09 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the current theory of games, the formal notion of complementarity that is employed is unsatisfactory because it bears too few connections with our intuitive idea of complementarity. This is the starting point of the present work.
Download or read book Monotone Comparative Statics in Games with Both Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes written by Andrew J. Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Monotone Comparative Statics in Games with Both Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. In such games, equilibria do not decrease as the parameter increases. Moreover, natural conditions are presented to guarantee that an increase in the parameter leads to an increase in the equilibrium: in other words, conditions to guarantee monotone comparative statics. These conditions are based on intuitive tradeoffs between direct parameter effects and indirect strategic effects. These conditions are needed only for players with strategic substitutes; no conditions are imposed on players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.
Download or read book Game Theoretic Analysis written by Leon A Petrosyan and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2019-10-14 with total page 621 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.
Download or read book A Qualitative Theory of Large Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Lukasz Balbus and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators (in stochastic dominance orders) defined on the space of distributions, we first prove existence of the greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium in the sense of Mas-Colell (1984) under different set of assumptions than those in the existing literature. In addition, we provide results on computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics relative to ordered perturbations of the parameters of our games. We then provide similar results for Nash/Schmeidler (1973) equilibria (defined by strategies) in our large games. We conclude by discussing the question of equilibrium uniqueness, as well as presenting applications of our results to models of Bertrand competition, "beauty contests," and existence of equilibrium in large economies.
Download or read book Differential Information in Large Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Lukasz Balbus and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with a differential information and continuum of players. For our game, we define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the sense of Mas-Colell (1984), and prove its existence. Further, we characterize the order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics results for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibrium. Our results make extensive use of the recent results on aggregating single crossing properties in Quah, Strulovici (2012). We complement these with new results on the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder, Rustichini (1994) or Kim, Yannelis (1997) for large GSC, and provide analogous results for this notion of equilibrium. To obtain our results, we prove an new fixed point theorem on monotone operators in countably complete partially ordered sets. Applications of the results include riot games, "beauty contests" and common value auctions.
Download or read book Monotone Comparative Statics for Games with Strategic Substitutes written by Sunanda Roy and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Under some conditions, parameterized games with strategic substitutes exhibit monotone comparative statics of equilibria. These conditions relate to a tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an opposing, indirect strategic substitute effect. If the indirect effect does not dominate the direct effect, monotone comparative statics of equilibria are guaranteed. These conditions are available for best-response functions, differentiable payoff functions, and general payoff functions. Results are extended to correspondences, the analysis applies to asymmetric equilibria, and several examples are provided.
Download or read book Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games written by Pierre von Mouche and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-04-22 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 544 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Fixed Point Theory in Ordered Sets and Applications written by Siegfried Carl and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2010-11-17 with total page 482 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This monograph provides a unified and comprehensive treatment of an order-theoretic fixed point theory in partially ordered sets and its various useful interactions with topological structures. The material progresses systematically, by presenting the preliminaries before moving to more advanced topics. In the treatment of the applications a wide range of mathematical theories and methods from nonlinear analysis and integration theory are applied; an outline of which has been given an appendix chapter to make the book self-contained. Graduate students and researchers in nonlinear analysis, pure and applied mathematics, game theory and mathematical economics will find this book useful.
Download or read book Monotone Equilibria in Nonatomic Supermodular Games written by Lukasz Balbus and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomic supermodular games for general action and players spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem with the stated theorem, provide a counterexample, and then correct the result under additional assumptions. We also provide a number of new results per existence of equilibria in more general classes of games of strategic complementarities that are monotone in players' name/trait, as well as provide a class of constructive methods for computing monotone equilibrium comparative statics.
Download or read book Games with Strategic Heterogeneity written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or two players only), the equilibrium set in a GSH is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable in the standard product order). Moreover, under mild assumptions (on one player only), parameterized GSH do not allow decreasing equilibrium selections. In general, this cannot be strengthened to conclude increasing selections. Monotone comparative statics results are presented for games in which some players exhibit strategic substitutes and others exhibit strategic complements. For two-player games with linearly ordered strategy spaces, there is a characterization. More generally, there are sufficient conditions. The conditions apply only to players exhibiting strategic substitutes; no conditions are needed for players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.
Download or read book Complementarities Comparative Statics and Nonconvexities in Market Economies written by Christina M. Shannon and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or two players only), the equilibrium set in a GSH is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable in the standard product order). Moreover, under mild assumptions (on one player only), parameterized GSH do not allow decreasing equilibrium selections. In general, this cannot be strengthened to conclude increasing selections. Monotone comparative statics results are presented for games in which some players exhibit strategic substitutes and others exhibit strategic complements. For two-player games with linearly ordered strategy spaces, there is a characterization. More generally, there are sufficient conditions. The conditions apply only to players exhibiting strategic substitutes; no additional conditions are needed for players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.
Download or read book American Doctoral Dissertations written by and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 816 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Monotone Games written by Tarun Sabarwal and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.
