Download or read book Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts written by Jan Bouwens and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts written by J. L. Bouwens and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts written by Jan Bouwens and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using data from a third-party survey on compensation practices at 151 Dutch firms, we show that less noisy or distorted performance measures and higher cash bonuses are associated with better-directed effort and improved employee selection. Specifically, 1) an increase in the cash bonus increases the selection effects of incentive contracts, but does not independently affect the effort that employees deliver, and 2) performance measure properties directly impact both effort and the selection functioning of incentive contracts. These results hold after controlling for an array of incentive contract design characteristics and for differences in organizational context. Our estimation procedures address several known problems with using secondary datasets.

Download or read book Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development written by Edward B. Roberts and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development: A Preliminary Research Report In the past several years an effort has originated in the Defense Department (and followed by other government agencies) to discourage the use of cost-p1us=fixed fee (cpff) contracts and substitute contractual incentive arrangements. This effort supposedly relies upon the profit motive to reduce requirements for direct government control and to stim ulate better contractor performance and cost estimating. Incentive type contracts are not new in government contracting. Production contracts have been awarded on a fixed price basis for many years. The fixed price contract provides maximum correlation of contract profits with contract cost, and in theory might offer maximum cost incentive. How ever the use of incentive arrangements on r&d contracts is the novel feature of the dod (and nasa) programs of the past several years. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Download or read book Ambiguity in Performance Pay written by David J. Cooper and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many incentive contracts are inherently ambiguous, lacking an explicit mapping between performance and pay. Using an online labor market, Amazon Mechanical Turk, we study the effect of ambiguous incentives on willingness to accept contracts to do a real-effort task, the probability of completing the task, and performance at the task. Even modest levels of ambiguity about the relationship between performance and pay are sufficient to eliminate the positive selection effect associated with piece rates, as high ability individuals are no more likely than low ability individuals to accept a contract. Piece rate contracts significantly improve performance relative to fixed wages, primarily due to selection, but this positive effect is not present with ambiguous incentive contracts. Modest levels of ambiguity reduce the probability that subjects accept an incentive contract and all types of ambiguous incentive contracts increase the probability of quitting after having accepted an incentive contract. Information about individual ability at the task reduces the probability that subjects choose and complete the task.

Download or read book Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction determined Contracts written by Laurent Lamy and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Decision Aids and the Design of Incentive Compensation Contracts written by Elaine G. Mauldin and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Effects of Tournament Incentive Contracts and Relative Performance Feedback on Task Effort Learning Effort and Performance written by George Lee and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When employees work hard, they exert more effort on job tasks (task effort); and when employees learn hard, they exert more effort to learn (learning effort). Task effort and learning effort are important causes of improved performance. This thesis investigates whether the use of tournament schemes motivates employees to work harder and learn harder, and also whether providing performance feedback in tournament schemes has any impact on task effort and learning effort.This thesis has three goals. The first is to investigate the relationship between incentives, learning, and performance. The literature on whether learning interacts with incentives to improve performance is inconclusive, because no prior research has provided a good test of this question (as noted by Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Bailey and Fessler 2011; Bailey et al. 1998, and as remains true today). The second goal is to investigate the motivational effect of tournament schemes on effort. The literature suggests that effort is difficult to observe directly or to quantify; as a result, it is hard to verify whether tournament schemes motivate employees' task effort and learning effort. This thesis uses an eye-tracking device to measure effort, by measuring eye position, eye movements, and pupil size. The third goal is to investigate the effect of performance feedback on task effort, learning effort, and performance in the tournament setting.I posit and show evidence that both task effort and learning effort are higher in multiple-winner schemes than in either winner-takes-all schemes or piece-rate schemes. Task effort is directly positively associated with performance, while learning effort causes learning transfer to a job task, also yielding a positive effect on performance. I find that providing relative performance feedback in the tournament setting has no significant impact on task effort or learning effort.These findings have practical value for many corporations, which are constantly re-evaluating the effectiveness of their incentive schemes and reporting systems while investing in learning initiatives to help employees transfer learned skills to job tasks. Organizations may use the insights of this thesis to help them design learning initiatives and motivate employees to transfer learned skills to their job tasks.

Download or read book The Application of the Controllability Principle and Managers Responses written by Franz Michael Fischer and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2010-07-24 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Franz Michael Fischer investigates the relationships between the application of the controllability principle and managers’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. The author further explores the impact of several important contextual factors on the basic relationships and, thus, develops moderated mediation models. He reveals that the application of the controllability principle has a significant effect on role stress and role orientation which, in turn, are related to managerial performance and affective constructs.

Download or read book The Performance Implication of Goal Achievability in Incentive Contracts and Feedback written by Yasheng Chen and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the performance feedback and goal achievability in incentive effects on employees' effort and performance. We perform an experiment to examine whether the use of goal-specific feedback and incentive contracts have an interaction effect on task performance. Using the Mirametrix S2 eye tracking device to measure the level of effort, we find that the feedback effect on effort depend on goal achievability specified in the incentive contract. Specifically, we find that when employees are contracted based on achievable goals, feedback decreases their level of effort. By contrast, when employees are contracted based on more challenging but attainable goals, feedback increases their level of effort. Furthermore, we find that the level of effort has a significant positive impact on task performance. These findings have important implications for the design of control and compensation systems in organizations that aim for a higher employees' performance.

Download or read book The Effectiveness of Incentive Schemes in the Presence of Implicit Effort Costs written by Sebastian J. Goerg and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agents' decisions to exert effort depends on the provided incentives as well as the potential costs for doing so. So far most of the attention has been on the incentive side. However, our lab experiments underline that both the incentive and cost side can be used separately to shape work performance. In our experiment, subjects work on a real-effort task. Between treatments, we vary the incentive scheme used for compensating workers. Additionally, by varying the available outside options, we explore the role of implicit costs of effort in determining workers' performance. We observe that incentive contracts and implicit costs interact in a non-trivial manner. Performance reacts significantly to changes in implicit effort costs under low-powered piece-rate and target-based bonus contracts, but not under a high piece rate contract. In addition, comparisons between the incentive schemes depend crucially on the implicit costs.

Download or read book Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development a Preliminary Research Report written by Edward Baer Roberts and published by . This book was released on 1966 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Equilibrium Incentive Contracts written by Espen R. Moen and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers Envy Their Boss written by Albertus Johannes Dur and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives for Helping on the Job written by Robert William Drago and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentive Contracts and Efficiency in a Frictional Market written by Benoit Julien and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex ante search problem, and adverse selection and moral hazard ex post. We fully characterise the equilibrium for quasi linear preferences, and derive some comparative statics. If using appropriate transfers the equilibrium allocation is constrained welfare optimal, in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because searching requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilateral contracting, and agents enjoy more efficient risk sharing. With a constraint on transfers search and moral hazard interact and may induce an inefficient allocation; principal competition results in over-insurance of the agents and too little effort in equilibrium.