Download or read book Efficient Mechanism Design written by Vijay Krishna and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Designing Cost Efficient Mechanisms written by Lawrence J Kamm and published by SAE International. This book was released on 1993-07-01 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A successful engineer and entrepreneur shares his secrets for producing consistently superior designs at substantial cost savings. Minimum constraint design (MinCD) is a new systematic design strategy that yields major cost reductions and greatly improves the reliability of manufactured mechanisms. For the first time, this practical reference provides the "how-to-do-it" information you need to put this powerful design tool to work right away -- no matter what your level of training or experience. Based upon the author's extensive experience in product design, this timely book clearly explains the advantages of MinCD and tells you how to create better, more cost-efficient product designs using readily available commercial components. Packed with original ideas, design tips, helpful examples, and references - including directories of component vendors - this unique blend of practical and theoretical knowledge will revolutionize the way you work. Contents include: Part 1 - Minimum Constraint Design (MinCD), Semi-MinCD, and Redundant Constraint Design (RedCD) General Description Degrees of Constraint Kinds of Constraint Beneficial Non-MinCD Part 2 - Designing with Commercial Components General Discussion Rotary Motion Linear Motion Power Other Components Part 3 - Topics in Design Engineering Designing with Uncommon Manufacturing Processes Manfacturing Engineering Optimum Level of Mechanization and Automation Robots Robot Grippers Selecting Power Forms Backlash Hype Prod Deterioration Electrical and Mechanical Technologies: Competition and Cooperation References and Bibliography Reviews
Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.
Download or read book Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2014-03-13 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
Download or read book Mechanism Design written by Kevin Russell and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the field of mechanism design, kinematic synthesis is a creative means to produce mechanism solutions. Combined with the emergence of powerful personal computers, mathematical analysis software and the development of quantitative methods for kinematic synthesis, there is an endless variety of possible mechanism solutions that users are free to e
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Download or read book Mechanism Design written by Rakesh V. Vohra and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2011-05-09 with total page 185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Download or read book Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-05-22 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Download or read book Behavioural and Experimental Economics written by Steven Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-04-30 with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Download or read book Mechanism Design and Analysis Using PTC Creo Mechanism 4 0 written by Kuang-Hua Chang and published by SDC Publications. This book was released on 2017 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism Design and Analysis Using PTC Creo Mechanism 4.0 is designed to help you become familiar with Mechanism, a module of the PTC Creo Parametric software family, which supports modeling and analysis (or simulation) of mechanisms in a virtual (computer) environment. Capabilities in Mechanism allow users to simulate and visualize mechanism performance. Capabilities in Mechanism allow users to simulate and visualize mechanism performance. Using Mechanism early in the product development stage could prevent costly redesign due to design defects found in the physical testing phase; therefore, contributing to a more cost effective, reliable, and efficient product development process. The book is written following a project-based learning approach and covers the major concepts and frequently used commands required to advance readers from a novice to an intermediate level. Basic concepts discussed include: model creation, such as body and joint definitions; analysis type selection, such as static (assembly) analysis, kinematics and dynamics; and results visualization. The concepts are introduced using simple, yet realistic, examples. Verifying the results obtained from computer simulation is extremely important. One of the unique features of this textbook is the incorporation of theoretical discussions for kinematic and dynamic analyses in conjunction with simulation results obtained using Mechanism. The theoretical discussions simply support the verification of simulation results rather than providing an in-depth discussion on the subjects of kinematics and dynamics.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Dynamic Allocation and Pricing written by Alex Gershkov and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2024-06-11 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods. Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings. Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.
Download or read book Optimal Threats and Efficient Mechanism Design written by Paul Samuel Njiki Njiki and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where agents' utility depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate. A VCG mechanism maximizes the expected revenue of the planner among efficient mechanisms that induce the truthful participation of all the agents. The class of VCG mechanisms considered in this paper extends the one in Krishna and Perry (2000). In addition to a basis (whose components are critical types of the agents) the planner must choose appropriate threats to agents who do not participate. I show that the solution of the design problem can be found by a max-min choice of the critical types and threats.
Download or read book Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks written by Zhu Han and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012 with total page 555 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unified 2001 treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies and a wide range of techniques for modeling, design and analysis.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
