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Book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Treasury Auctions

Download or read book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We use when-issued transactions data to assess the US Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Consistent with this, mark-ups tend to be smaller under uniform auctions. Also, under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information production and lower the short squeeze.

Book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium

Download or read book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium written by Talat Genc and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A goal of this paper is to compare results for discriminatory auctions to results for uniform-price auctions when suppliers have capacity constraints. We have a pretty good understanding of what equilibrium results look like for the uniform-price auctions. But an unresolved problem is what happens when a discriminative auction is run and suppliers have capacity constraints. We formulate a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model in continuous offer schedules with inelastic, time varying demand and with single step marginal cost function to compare two auction institutions in the presence of capacity constraints. We show that payments made to the suppliers in the unique equilibrium of the discriminatory auction can be less than the payments in the uniform-price auction, depending on which uniform-price auction equilibrium is selected. For the high demand and/or low excess capacity cases we also characterize mixed strategy supply function equilibrium under the discriminatory auction.

Book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Auctions

Download or read book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Auctions written by and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Treasury Auctions

Download or read book Discriminatory Versus Uniform Treasury Auctions written by Kjell G. Nyborg and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Auctions with Variable Supply

Download or read book Auctions with Variable Supply written by Damian S. Damianov and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions

Download or read book Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions written by Natalia Fabra and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.

Book Collusion in Uniform Price Auctions

Download or read book Collusion in Uniform Price Auctions written by Gautam Goswami and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We provide experimental evidence that non-binding pre-play communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-price auctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in discriminatory auctions. When communication between bidders is introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-price auctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions. This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently-employed discriminatory procedure.

Book Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform  and Discriminatory price Auctions

Download or read book Demand Reduction and Bidder Collusion in Uniform and Discriminatory price Auctions written by Alexander Elbittar and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Common Value Auctions with Unknown Number of Bidders

Download or read book Common Value Auctions with Unknown Number of Bidders written by Ilia Tsetlin and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets

Download or read book Bidding and Investment in Wholesale Electricity Markets written by Bert Willems and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information

Download or read book Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information written by Emmanuel Morales-Camargo and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Book Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions

Download or read book Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions written by Orly Sade and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations.

Book Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions  an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

Download or read book Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets written by Klaus Abbink and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: