Download or read book Defense management processes to estimate and track equipment reconstitution costs can be improved report to congressional committees written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Defense Management Processes to Estimate and Track Equipment Reconstitution Costs Can Be Improved written by United States Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Defense management written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Gao 05 293 Defense Management written by United States Government Accountability Office and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2018-01-28 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: GAO-05-293 Defense Management: Processes to Estimate and Track Equipment Reconstitution Costs Can Be Improved
Download or read book Global war on terrorism DOD needs to improve the reliability of cost data and provide additional guidance to control costs report to congressional committees written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 75 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: GAO found numerous problems in DOD's processes for recording and reporting costs for GWOT, raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DOD's reported cost data. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably know how much the war is costing and details on how appropriated funds are being spent, or have historical data useful in considering future funding needs. On the basis of GAO's work, DOD is taking steps to improve its cost reporting. Factors affecting the reliability of DOD's reported costs include long-standing deficiencies in DOD's financial systems, the lack of a systematic process to ensure that data are correctly entered into those systems, inaccurately reported costs, and difficulties in properly categorizing costs. In at least one case, reported costs may be materially overstated. Specifically, DOD's reported obligations for mobilized Army reservists in fiscal year 2004 were based primarily on estimates rather than actual information and differed from related payroll information by as much as $2.1 billion, or 30 percent of the amount DOD reported in its cost report. In addition, GAO found inadvertent double counting in the Navy's and Marine Corps' portion of DOD's reported costs amounting to almost $1.8 billion from November 2004 through April 2005. Because it was not feasible to examine all reported costs and significant data reliability problems existed, GAO was not able to determine the extent that total costs were misstated.
Download or read book Management of the Department of Defense Cost estimating and cost reporting in DOD weapon programs written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Readiness Subcommittee and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Comptroller General s Progress Report on Iraq written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Examining the Effectiveness of U S Efforts to Combat Waste Fraud Abuse and Corruption in Iraq written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Defense Logistics written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization, collectively known as equipment reset. Because of the potential for equipment reset costs to affect the Department of Defense's (DOD) future budget requirements and related readiness concerns, GAO initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) track and report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose and (2) can be assured that their reset strategies will sustain equipment availability while meeting ongoing operational requirements. GAO reviewed equipment reset policies and analyzed related budget data. Although the Army and Marine Corps track and report equipment reset expenditures in the operation and maintenance accounts in detail, they do not report detailed equipment reset expenditures within the procurement accounts in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose because the DOD Financial Management Regulation does not require them to specifically report procurement expenditures for reset in detail. As directed by the Conference Report accompanying DOD's appropriations act for 2007, the Army and Marine Corps report detailed reset obligations and expenditures in their operation and maintenance accounts. While the Army and Marine Corps track reset expenditures and obligations in detail within the procurement accounts, they do not report those expenditures at the same level of detail as with the operation and maintenance accounts because they are not legally required do so. Neither the Army's nor the Marine Corps' monthly Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Reports identify the types of equipment at the subactivity group level, such as aircraft or vehicles. Until the Army and Marine Corps are required to report the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for reset in the procurement accounts at a more detailed level, Congress will not have the visibility it needs to exercise effective oversight and to determine if the amount of funding appropriated for equipment reset has been most appropriately used for the purposes intended. The Army and Marine Corps cannot be assured that their reset strategies will sustain equipment availability for deployed units as well as units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan while meeting ongoing operational requirements because neither the Army's nor the Marine Corps' reset implementation strategies target shortages of equipment on hand and prioritize equipment needs of units preparing for deployment over longer-term modernization goals. While the Army's Force Generation implementation strategy and reset implementation guidance state that the goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to improve next-to-deploy units' equipment-on-hand levels, the Army's reset strategy is based on resetting equipment that it expects will be returning to the United States in a given fiscal year and not on targeting shortages of equipment for units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the Marine Corps' reset goal is to ensure that the Corps is equipped to perform both ongoing operations and future missions; however, over 80 percent of its reset budget is for procurement of equipment that will not be available for many months. Units can continue to report significant shortages during their training cycles that affect their ability to train. Thus, the services may be sacrificing short-term equipment needs for longer-term modernization goals. Until the services' reset strategies target shortages of equipment needed to equip units preparing for deployment and give priority to those units over longer-term needs, the Army and Marine Corps will be unable to minimize operational risk by ensuring the needs of deploying units can be met.
Download or read book Defense Logistics written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: With the nation facing fiscal challenges and the potential for tighter defense budgets, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have placed more attention on controlling the billions of dollars spent annually on weapon system operating and support (O & S) costs. These costs include, costs for repair parts, maintenance, and personnel, and account for about 70 percent of the total costs of a weapon system over its life cycle. The selected acquisition report (SAR) is DOD's key recurring status report on the cost, schedule, and performance of major defense acquisition programs and is intended to provide authoritative information for congressional oversight of these programs. Oversight of O & S costs is important because many of the key decisions affecting these life-cycle costs are made during the acquisition process. GAO reviewed weapon system O & S cost estimates that DOD submits in the SAR. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the SARs provide consistent and reliable O & S cost estimate information that enables effective oversight of these weapon system costs. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed SAR data for 84 major systems that submitted O & S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR and selected a nonprobability sample of 15 systems for more in-depth review. To enhance visibility of weapon system O & S costs during acquisition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its guidance to program offices on cost reporting and also improve its process for reviewing these costs prior to final submission of the SAR to Congress. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Download or read book Army and Marine Corps Reset Strategies for Ground Equipment and Rotorcraft written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Readiness Subcommittee and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 96 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Human Capital written by and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Department of Defense (DOD) has improved its methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost to the taxpayer of work performed by military and civilian personnel and contractor support, but the methodology continues to have certain limitations. Best practices state that cost estimating rules should include a common set of standards that minimize conflicts in definitions, but DOD's methodology does not provide guidance for certain costs. For instance, its estimate of service training costs divides total training funding by the number of servicemembers. Using this method yields an average training cost of $6,490 per servicemember in the Army for fiscal year 2012. However, Army data show that training for a general aviation officer can be as high as $93,600 a year, while the training for an enlisted infantryman can be as low as about $4,600 a year. DOD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office has not provided more specific direction on training costs, although some officials have requested it. Additionally, CAPE officials told GAO they did not include Reserve and National Guard personnel in the methodology because usually these personnel are used on a short-term basis. However, a portion of these personnel do serve in a full-time capacity. The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board has noted that a cost methodology should include any resources directly or indirectly used to perform work, and DOD relies on Reserve and National Guard personnel, for example, to provide airlift capabilities in support of military operations. Further, CAPE has not yet evaluated certain retirement-related cost elements. A portion of these cost elements may not be appropriate to include because they are not attributable to current military and civilian personnel. Without more specific direction in these areas, it will be more difficult for DOD to have reasonable assurance that its cost estimates and comparisons reflect the full and most accurate cost to the taxpayer of work performed by its various workforces.
Download or read book Warfighter Support written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard equipment in Iraq, that is equipment not included on units' standard list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011. GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents, interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities to (1) finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard equipment; (2) designate a focal point to oversee this equipment; and (3) undertake a thorough life-cycle cost estimate for its MRAPs. DOD concurred with our third recommendation, partially concurred with our first, and did not concur with the second. Given DOD's lack of visibility over tactical nonstandard equipment, GAO continues to believe a focal point is needed.
Download or read book Defense Acquisitions written by United States. Government Accountability Office and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected weapon programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from other military and major nondiscretionary government demands. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs, identifying potential risks when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Of the 72 programs GAO assessed this year, none of them had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, or mature production processes by critical junctures of the program, each of which are essential for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The absence of wide-spread adoption of knowledge-based acquisition processes by DOD continues to be a major contributor to this lack of maturity. Aside from these knowledge-based issues, GAO this year gathered data on four additional factors that have the potential to influence DOD's ability to manage programs and improve outcomes--performance requirements changes, program manager tenure, reliance on nongovernmental personnel to help perform program office roles, and software management. GAO found that 63 percent of the programs had changed requirements once system development began, and also experienced significant program cost increases. Average tenure to date for program managers has been less than half of that called for by DOD policy. About 48 percent of DOD program office staff for programs GAO collected data from is composed of personnel outside of the government. Finally, roughly half the programs that provided GAO data experienced more than a 25 percent increase in the expected lines of software code since starting their respective system development programs. In response to previous GAO recommendations and congressional direction, DOD has recently taken actions that could help move the department toward more sound, knowledge-based acquisition processes. For example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system configuration changes could enable department officials to make more informed decisions in the early stages of a program and better match program requirements and resources, a key first step. Improvements to individual program acquisition outcomes will likely hinge on the success of initiatives like these, paired with knowledge-based strategies.
Download or read book Defense Management written by Sharon L. Pickup and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: DOD is estimating and publishing approximate costs for selected types of internally and externally required reports, but in some cases its approach is not fully consistent with relevant cost estimating best practices and cost accounting standards. Specifically, DOD entities have been directed to use the cost estimating tool to capture marginal costs of activities associated with completing a report or study that would not have been performed otherwise. These costs consist of certain manpower costs (such as the prorated salaries of military and civilian personnel based on the time they spent) and nonlabor costs (such as contract services, travel, or printing). DOD currently lacks a means to ensure that organizations are developing cost estimates for all required types of reports and studies, but is taking steps to enhance its ability to monitor the preparation of reports and studies to satisfy reporting requirements, including those for which a cost estimate is required to be generated. DOD's guidance on using the tool identified 10 specific types of reports or studies that require a cost estimate. The guidance states that the DOD component preparing a report or study is responsible for ensuring that a cost estimate, if required, is included. However, the guidance does not include any process or requirement to track whether organizations are developing required cost estimates. According to CAPE officials who developed the tool, they were not directed to ensure that cost estimates have been developed for all required reports and studies, and they added that the cost estimating tool was not designed to track reports and studies that require a cost estimate. These same officials noted that the magnitude of DOD's reporting requirements makes it challenging to identify the universe of these requirements and to track the completion of reports and studies to meet them, including whether cost estimates have been generated. In the past year, DOD has initiated efforts to improve its visibility over its internal and external reporting requirements.
Download or read book Accountability During Contingency Operations written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
