Download or read book Contractual Arrangements Under Asymmetric Information written by Chongwoo Choe and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 218 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Asymmetric information and contractual arrangements written by Syed Salman Ali Shah and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 137 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Information Asymmetries in Developing Country Financing written by Mr.George C. Anayotos and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1994-07-01 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper assesses the impact of information asymmetries on developing country financing and considers alternative techniques to reduce the adverse implications of such asymmetries. Following an introduction, Section II examines in general terms the role of information in financial markets and analyzes the incentive and risk sharing properties of alternative financial contracts. Information asymmetries which are present in domestic finance are more prevalent in international finance, in particular in developing country financing. Section III reviews measures aiming to resolve information asymmetries. Borrowing and creditor country regulations and policies, as well as innovative contractual agreements help to resolve a range of issues related to information asymmetries. However, despite their contribution, residual problems remain unresolved. The international financial institutions, and in particular the Fund, have an important role to play in alleviating information asymmetries.
Download or read book Asymmetric Information and Contractual Arrangements written by Syed Salman Ali Shah and published by . This book was released on 19?? with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets written by Ricardo N. Bebczuk and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2003-08-21 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Asymmetric information (the fact that borrowers have better information than their lenders) and its theoretical and practical evidence now forms part of the basic tool kit of every financial economist. It is a phenomenon that has major implications for a number of economic and financial issues ranging from both micro and macroeconomic level - corporate debt, investment and dividend policies, the depth and duration of business cycles, the rate of long term economic growth - to the origin of financial and international crises. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets aims to explain this concept in an accessible way, without jargon and by reducing mathematical complexity. Using elementary algebra and statistics, graphs, and convincing real-world evidence, the author explores the foundations of the problems posed by asymmetries of information in a refreshingly accessible and intuitive way.
Download or read book Contracting Under Asymmetric Information and Externalities written by Petra Nieken and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project which has an external effect on player B. Yet, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A's self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Yet, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in the case of ultimatum game bargaining as well as in the case of unstructured bargaining with free-form communication.
Download or read book Asymmetric Information Corporate Finance and Investment written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2009-05-15 with total page 354 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2002-10-17 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Download or read book Contract Economics written by T.V.S.Ramamohan Rao and published by New Age International. This book was released on 2004 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contracts Are A Major Organizational Arrangement To Conduct Transactions. Economic Theory Has Been Making Attempts To Come To Grips With Four Pertinent Issues. Why Is Contracting Superior To Imperfect Markets And Hierarchical Control In Decentralized Organizations? What Basic Institutional Mechanisms Should Be In Place To Ensure Efficiency Of Contracts? What Determines The Choice Of Contract Forms (In Particular, The Behavioral Responses Of Self-Interest Seeking To Reactions Of Others) And Contract Parameters?Can Contracts Provide A Better Alternative To Regulated Markets? Keeping Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity As The Focal Points This Book Deals With The Following Mechanisms Of Exchange-Markets (Including Transfer Prices), Contingent Claims Contracts, Incomplete And Incentive Contracts, And Implicit Contracts.The Emphasis Is On The Efficient Structuring Of Such Contracts And The Choice Of Suitable Contract Parameters. One Chapter Is Also Devoted To Trust And Informal Dimensions Of Contracts Since It Is Recognized That Defining And Enforcing Formal Contracts Becomes Difficult As Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity Reach Their Limits. The Level Of Algebraic Complexity In The Derivations Is Kept To A Minimum To Make The Book Accessible To A Wide Audience.
Download or read book The Design of Asymmetric Information Contracts for Public Sector Projects with Private Sector Participation written by Renato E. Reside and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study uses a simple model to solve for the optimal contracts under a situation where the government has asymmetric information about the quality of investors in essential infrastructure goods and services. The analysis concludes that it is possible for the government to offer a set of incentive-compatible contracts to investors.
Download or read book Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information written by Sanford J. Grossman and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Introduction to the Economics of Information written by Inés Macho-Stadler and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1997 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A textbook on optimal contract theory, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals or organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is thecondition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first year postgraduatestudents of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics: Moral Hazard--when the asymmetryarises after the contract has been signed Adverse Selection--when the agent has relevant private infromation before the contract is signed Signalling--when the informed part is able to reveal private information through behaviour before the agreement is formalized The wide range of economicsituations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labor economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same frameworkthroughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. Solved exercises test the student's understanding of the material, and develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
Download or read book Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information written by Markus K. Brunnermeier and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2001-01-25 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Asset prices are driven by public news and information that is often dispersed among many market participants. These agents try to infer each other's information by analyzing price processes. In the past two decades, theoretical research in financial economics has significantly advanced our understanding of the informational aspects of price processes. This book provides a detailed and up-to-date survey of this important body of literature. The book begins by demonstrating how to model asymmetric information and higher-order knowledge. It then contrasts competitive and strategic equilibrium concepts under asymmetric information. It also illustrates the dependence of information efficiency and allocative efficiency on the security structure and the linkage between both efficiency concepts. No-Trade theorems and market breakdowns due to asymmetric information are then explained, and the existence of bubbles under symmetric and asymmetric information is investigated. The remainder of the survey is devoted to contrasting different market microstructure models that demonstrate how asymmetric information affects asset prices and traders' information , which provide a theoretical explanation for technical analysis and illustrate why some investors "chase the trend." The reader is then introduced to herding models and informational cascades, which can arise in a setting where agents' decision-making is sequential. The insights derived from herding models are used to provide rational explanations for stock market crashes. Models in which all traders are induced to search for the same piece of information are then presented to provide a deeper insight into Keynes' comparison of the stock market with a beauty contest. The book concludes with a brief summary of bank runs and their connection to financial crises.
Download or read book Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics written by Elena D'Agostino and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-11-21 with total page 84 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the most controversial issues concerning the use of pre-drafted clauses in fine print, which are usually included in consumer contracts and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By applying a multi-disciplinary approach that combines consumer’s psychology and seller’s drafting power in the logic of efficiency and good faith, the book provides a fresh and unconventional analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. Moving from the unconscionability doctrine, it criticizes (and in some cases refutes) its main conclusions based on criteria which are usually invoked to sustain the need for public intervention to protect consumers, and specifically related to Law (contract complexity), Psychology (consumer lack of sophistication criterion) and Economics (market structure criterion). It also analyzes the effects of different regulations, such as banning vexatious clauses or mandating disclosure clauses, showing that none of them protect consumers, but in fact prove to be harmful when consumers are more vulnerable, that is whenever sellers can exploit some degree of market power. In closing, the book combines these disparate aspects, arguing that the solution (if any) to the problem of consumer exploitation and market inefficiency associated with the use of contracts of adhesion in these contexts cannot be found in removing or prohibiting hidden clauses, but instead has to take into account the effects of these clauses on the contract as a whole.
Download or read book The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information written by Ulrich Schwalbe and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.
Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Download or read book Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information written by Kenneth Kletzer and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
