Download or read book Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes written by Alessandra Casella and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction
Download or read book Democracy Undone written by Alessandra Casella and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, for any minority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Download or read book The Economics of Voting written by Dan Usher and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 401 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The economics of voting is about whether and to what extent self-interest may be relied upon in voting. The central proposition in economics is that the world’s work gets done satisfactorily when each person does what they think is best for themselves. The commonsense view of the matter is that this outcome alone would be chaos. This book examines voting in four key terms: self-interest, bargaining, duty and rights. Self-interest creates a voting equilibrium on various issues, notably the redistribution of income. Bargaining has a larger role to play in voting than in commerce, as it becomes essential in the formation of platforms of political parties and for the passage of laws. A duty to vote arises from the fact that a person’s vote has only an infinitesimal chance of influencing the outcome of an election. Rights are a democracy’s first line of defense against exploitation that, unless constrained, the majority rule voting enables voters to expropriate the corresponding minority, undermining democracy completely. Four key questions are asked in this book. When is there self-interest in majority rule voting comparable to the general interest in markets? To what extent does ‘government by majority rule voting’ depend upon bargaining as well as voting? Can willingness to vote be attributed to self-interest or is a sense of duty required? Does democracy require property rights? Through an examination of these terms, this book argues that they are indispensable requirements for the maintenance of government by majority rule voting. This book is essential for those who study political economy, economic theory and philosophy as well as political theory.
Download or read book Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition written by Kenneth A. Shepsle and published by Psychology Press. This book was released on 2001 with total page 113 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: First published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Download or read book Vote trading in a Competitive Market written by Geoffrey Clive Philpotts and published by . This book was released on 1971 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Storable Votes written by Alessandra Casella and published by Oxford University Press on Demand. This book was released on 2012-01-12 with total page 381 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Storable votes allow the minority to win occasionally while treating every voter equally and increasing the efficiency of decision-making, without the need for external knowledge of voters' preferences. This book complements the theoretical discussion with several experiments, showing that the promise of the idea is borne out by the data: the outcomes of the experiments and the payoffs realized match very closely the predictions of the theory.
Download or read book Political Equilibrium A Delicate Balance written by Peter C. Ordeshook and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle If the inaugural date of modern economics is set at 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, then the analytical tradition in the study of politics is not even a decade younger, commencing nine years later with the publication of the Marquis de Condorcet's Essai sur l'application de l'analyse iz la probabilite des decisions rendues iz la pluralite des voix. The parallel, however, stops there for, unlike Smith and other classical economists who laid an intel lectual foundation upon which a century of cumulative scientific research pro ceeded, analytical political science suffered fits and starts. Condorcet, himself, acknowledges the earlier work (predating the Essai by some fourteen years) of Borda and, from time to time during the nineteenth century, their contributions were rediscovered by Dodgson, Nanson, and other political philosophers and arithmeticians. But, by century's end, there was nothing in political science to compare to the grand edifice of general equilibrium theory in neoclassical eco nomics. Despite roots traversing two centuries, then, the analytical study of poli tics is a twentieth-century affair. The initial inspiration and insight of Condorcet was seized upon just after World War II by Duncan Black, who wrote several papers on the equilibrium properties of majority rule in specific contexts (Black, 1948a, b). He expanded upon these themes in his now deservedly famous monograph, The Theory of xi PREFACE xii Committees and Elections, and the lesser-known essay with R.A.
Download or read book The Political Logic of Poverty Relief written by Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-02-26 with total page 259 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. They also assess whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs.
Download or read book Principles of Macroeconomics for AP Courses 2e written by Steven A. Greenlaw and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Principles of Macroeconomics for AP® Courses 2e covers the scope and sequence requirements for an Advanced Placement® macroeconomics course and is listed on the College Board's AP® example textbook list. The second edition includes many current examples and recent data from FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data), which are presented in a politically equitable way. The outcome is a balanced approach to the theory and application of economics concepts. The second edition was developed with significant feedback from current users. In nearly all chapters, it follows the same basic structure of the first edition. General descriptions of the edits are provided in the preface, and a chapter-by-chapter transition guide is available for instructors.
Download or read book Shareholder Decisionmaking in the Presence of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership written by Jordan M. Barry and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider securities markets in which economic interests in firms and shareholder voting rights are traded independently; such markets allow for "empty voters" who hold voting rights in a firm that exceed their economic interests. We demonstrate that, in such settings, competitive equilibria generally do not exist and may be inefficient even when they do exist. As the competitive equilibrium solution concept does not provide useful predictions in the presence of empty voting, we focus on cooperative game-theoretic "core outcomes." We show that core outcomes always exist, are always efficient, and can be reached from any initial allocation through voluntary trading; moreover, at a core outcome, agents have efficient incentives with regards to information revelation.
Download or read book The Organization of Economic Activity written by Harold Demsetz and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Behavioral Theory of Elections written by Jonathan Bendor and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-02-06 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. This title provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors - politicians as well as voters - are only boundedly rational.
Download or read book A Unified Theory of Voting written by Samuel Merrill and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1999-09-13 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions--for both voter choice and candidate strategy--in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multiparty electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.
Download or read book The Welfare Economics of Markets Voting and Predation written by Dan Usher and published by Manchester University Press. This book was released on 1992 with total page 520 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work dwells upon two themes, each of which differs from traditional welfare economics - predation or taking (as a source of inefficiency in the economy) and the tension between voting and markets as alternative methods of decision-making.
Download or read book Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory written by Stephen P. Magee and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1989-08-25 with total page 466 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An example of special interest protection is provided by this study's general equilibrium theory that explains income distribution with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties and voters all pursuing their self interests.
Download or read book Political Competition written by John E ROEMER and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2009-06-30 with total page 349 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.
Download or read book A Unified Theory of Party Competition written by James F. Adams and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2005-03-21 with total page 344 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
