Download or read book Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies written by John R. Hauser and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2015-06-11 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies: The Implications of Relevant Set-Response Analysis Consumers choose from among those brands they consider relevant. Advertising spending influences whether consumers consider brands as relevant. Firms set advertising and price and react, re-react, etc., until an equilibrium is reached. We demonstrate how advertising affects the price equilibrium, how price affects the advertising equilibrium, and how external factors affect both. We show how the ability to anticipate competitive response affects advertising strategies and profits and we compare the competitive formulation to a noncompetitive formulation. The analysis is compatible with an evaluation cost theory of consumer behavior. We examine empirical support for the theories. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Download or read book Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies written by John R. Hauser and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2017-11-22 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies: The Implications of Relevant Set-Response Analysis The key question in this section is whether a model of rational utility maximization implies that consumers evaluate only a small number of the available brands. The basic idea is that consumers balance evaluation cost with potential gains from further evaluation. This idea is not new. It is related to search theories in Gould Nelson and Schmalensee It is consistent with the behavioral science observation that consumers use heuristics to eliminate alternatives (tversky and Kahneman 1974. Shugan 1980. And Bettman and it is used prescriptively to select advertising copy (gross Our contribution is to formalize the idea in the context of relevant sets and to compare its predictions to data. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Download or read book Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies written by John R. Hauser and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies written by John R Hauser and published by Palala Press. This book was released on 2018-03 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Download or read book Supplemental Appendices to Competitive Advertising and Pricing in Duopolies written by John R. Hauser and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Advertising and Pricing Policies in a Mature Market written by Sheng C. Hu and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Dynamic Models of Advertising Competition written by Gary M. Erickson and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I am gratified that there is sufficient interest in the subject matter so as to support the offering of a second edition of this monograph. The of differential games dynamic interpretation and game theoretic foundation form a powerful and vital methodology for helping us study and understand marketing competition. This second edition offers a blend of what proved to be successful with the first edition and new material. The first two chapters, reviewing empirical and modeling research, have been updated to include contributions in the last decade that have advanced the area. I have not changed the essential content in the duopoly analyses in chapters 3, 4, and 5. A notable addition to the present edition are the new chapters, 6, 7, and 8, which offer analysis of three triopoly models. In the final chapter, I offer my summary view of the area and hope for continued contributions. I want to express my appreciation for the support of Josh Eliashberg, editor of the International Series in Quantitative Marketing, as well as Zachary Rolnik, Director, and David Cella, Publishing Editor, of Kluwer. Their encouragement has provided crucial motivation in this endeavor.
Download or read book Optimal Pricing and Advertising in a Durable Good Duopoly written by Anand Krishnamoorthy and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes dynamic advertising and pricing policies in a durable-good duopoly. The proposed infinite-horizon model, while general enough to capture dynamic price and advertising interactions in a competitive setting, also permits closed-form solutions. We use differential game theory to analyze two different demand specifications - linear demand and isoelastic demand - for symmetric and asymmetric competitors. We find that the optimal price is constant and does not vary with cumulative sales, while the optimal advertising is decreasing with cumulative sales. Comparative statics for the results are presented.
Download or read book When and How Should Firms Differentiate Quality Advertising and Pricing Decisions in a Duopoly written by Dominique Olie Lauga and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the hallmarks of competitive interaction is each firm's desire to differentiate from rivals. Although differentiation may be achieved through product related choices, advertising levels may constitute another key mechanism. In this paper, we examine under what conditions firms will elect to differentiate through product quality vs. advertising intensity and characterize the set of equilibria that emerge. Consumers can only purchase from the set of products they are informed about through advertising, and choose the alternative that maximizes their utility. Firms select product quality in a first stage, advertising levels in a second stage, and prices in the last stage. We study two forms of advertising-blanket and targeted. Under blanket advertising, firms communicate indiscriminately and a consumer's probability of seeing an ad depends on the level of ad expenditure. We find that when advertising is ineffective, i.e., the additional awareness generated by a heavy level is modest relative to the cost, both firms choose a light ad spending. This allows them to minimally differentiate in qualities without concern of intense price competition, as each firm expects to have a segment of 'captive' consumers that are only aware of its product. When advertising is moderately effective, one firm shifts to expending heavily on advertising, hence all consumers are aware of its product. However, the rival prefers to differentiate by advertising lightly, while choosing the same maximal quality level. This strategy softens price competition by inducing the heavy-advertiser to price highly more often in order to capitalize on its captive segment and allows the light-advertiser to increase its average price. Interestingly, we show that even if advertising heavily entails no extra cost, one firm will choose to advertise lightly in equilibrium for strategic reasons. When advertising is very effective, both firms advertise heavily. In this scenario, firms must differentiate in qualities in order to achieve positive profits. Under targeted advertising, we let firms choose the segment(s) they wish to inform. We identify conditions such that both firms choose equally high quality products, but advertise to distinct segments; thereby achieving differentiation through ad targeting. We further show that this can result in a pocket of unserved consumers, even though consumers with lower willingness to pay purchase. Generally speaking, we show that allowing market awareness to be determined endogenously suggests far less product differentiation than previously suspected and reveals regions where advertising creates viable differentiation.
Download or read book Advertising and Consumer Search written by Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Dynamic Models of Advertising Competition written by Gary M Erickson and published by . This book was released on 2002-10-31 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Generic and Brand Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly written by Frank M. Bass (deceased) and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: To increase the sales of their products through advertising, firms must integrate their brand-advertising strategy for capturing market share from competitors and their generic-advertising strategy for increasing primary demand for the category. This paper examines whether, when, and how much brand advertising versus generic advertising should be done. Using differential game theory, optimal advertising decisions are obtained for a dynamic duopoly with symmetric or asymmetric competitors. We show how advertising depends on the cost and effectiveness of each type of advertising for each firm, the allocation of market expansion benefits, and the profit margins determined endogenously from price competition. We find that generic advertising is proportionally more important in the short term and that there are free-riding effects leading to suboptimal industry expenditure on generic advertising that worsen as firms become more symmetric. Due to free-riding by the weaker firm, its instantaneous profit and market share can actually be higher. The effectiveness of generic advertising and the allocation of its benefits, however, have little effect on the long-run market shares, which are determined by brand-advertising effectiveness. Extensions of the model show that market potential saturation leads to a decline in generic advertising over time.
Download or read book Do Newspaper JOA s Charge Monopoly Advertising Rates written by Charles J. Romeo and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Price Signaling in a Two Market Duopoly written by Matthew Hughes (Donald) and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Within any industry, firms typically produce related products over multiple subsequent periods in an attempt to build consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales. Apple releases new iPhones and car companies produce new models every year, relying on consumers believing each new product is of high quality. Firms rely on the spillover effects from previous markets, where firms are able to more easily demonstrate their product's quality to the consumers before purchase. The goal is to find a range of prices which allows the high quality firm to distinguish its type to consumers via the price pH and if spillover effects in subsequent markets can occur. We look at a duopoly of two firms, of high and low qualities, where each firm produces a product in an initial market and a second, related product in a subsequent market. Using each firm's expected profits, based on Bayesian probabilities, we analyze a firm's mimicking strategy to find the range of pH that allows for a separating equilibrium and spillover effects. In a second market where firms are the same qualities as in the first market, the high quality firm experiences spillover effects and can signal its quality with a lower price than in the first market. When firms change qualities in the second market, no spillover effect occurs and the newly high quality firm must increase pH from the previous market in order to separate.
Download or read book Existence Advertising Price Competition and Asymmetric Market Structure written by Buford Curtis Eaton and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Price Competition and Advertising Signals written by Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2016-04-05 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but non-standard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multi-sender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero-profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high-quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, depending on the differentiation, the separating prices of both firms may be distorted upwards or downwards compared to the complete information benchmark.
Download or read book The Advertising Budget s Determinants in Duopoly written by Julian Lincoln Simon and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
