Download or read book Chevron Deference written by LandMark Publications and published by . This book was released on 2017-06 with total page 562 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the administrative law doctrine of Chevron deference, established by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The selection of decisions spans from 2015 to the date of publication.The Chevron two-step acts as a check on administrative overreach. Agencies may act only when and how Congress lets them. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) ("[A]n agency literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it."); Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("Agencies owe their capacity to act to the delegation of authority, either express or implied, from the legislature."). To vindicate that important principle, Chevron requires courts to determine first whether Congress authorized the agency to act. See Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 706 F.3d 499, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[W]e always first examine the statute ..., employing traditional tools of statutory construction."). Where Congress "has directly spoken" to the parameters of the agency's authority, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But if Congress grants an agency flexibility to flesh out a particular policy, the regulation will be upheld "as long as the agency stays within that delegation." Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Cent. United Life Ins. Co. v. Burwell, 827 F. 3d 70 (DC Cir. 2016).

Download or read book Chevron Deference written by Landmark Publications and published by . This book was released on 2021-03-09 with total page 544 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret, and discuss the doctrine of Chevron deference in environmental law cases. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * "We evaluate challenges to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers within the two-step Chevron deference framework." Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492, 507 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Lawrence + Mem'l Hosp. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2016)); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). At Chevron Step One, we ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If Congress's directive is unambiguous, both the agency and the courts are bound by that mandate. Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, instead, "the statute if silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the analysis proceeds to Chevron Step Two. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see also Catskill Mountains, 846 F.3d at 507. At that step, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778.In evaluating reasonableness at Chevron Step Two, "we will accord deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute so long as it is supported by a p.170 reasoned explanation, and 'so long as the construction is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.'" Catskill Mountains, 846 F.3d at 507 (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005)). Because "a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps," the agency's interpretation must only be reasonable, and need not be the sole permissible or even most reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id. at 520 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000)); see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218, 129 S.Ct. 1498, 173 L.Ed.2d 369 (2009). Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. US EPA, 961 F. 3d 160 (2nd Cir. 2020)

Download or read book The Chevron Doctrine written by Thomas W. Merrill and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2022-05-17 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: “Wise and illuminating...Merrill’s treatment of the rise of Chevron, and its various twists and turns over the decades, is keenly insightful.” —Cass R. Sunstein, New York Review of Books “Merrill is one of the brightest and best scholars of administrative law in his generation. This book...is must-reading for any citizen who has an interest in the constitutionality of the administrative state.” —Steven G. Calabresi, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law “A model of how to conduct rigorous, level-headed, and fair-minded analysis of a subject that has generated enormous legal controversy. There is no more judicious mind among American legal scholars than Thomas Merrill’s.”—Nicholas Parrillo, Yale Law School “A must-read for practicing or prospective administrative lawyers. They, as well as a broader audience, will find much good sense in the author’s judicious treatment of perennial questions of lawful government.”—Michael S. Greve, Claremont Review of Books The Constitution makes Congress the principal federal lawmaker. But for a variety of reasons, including partisan gridlock, Congress increasingly fails to keep up with the challenges facing our society. Power has shifted to the executive branch agencies that interpret laws and to the courts that review their interpretations. Since the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, this judicial review has been highly deferential: courts must uphold agency interpretations of unclear laws so long as these are “reasonable.” But the Chevron doctrine faces backlash from constitutional scholars and, now, from Supreme Court justices who insist that courts, not administrative agencies, have the authority to say what the law is. Critics of the administrative state charge that Chevron deference enables unaccountable bureaucratic power. In this groundbreaking book, Thomas Merrill reviews the history and consequences of the Chevron doctrine and suggests a way forward.

Download or read book The Chevron Doctrine written by Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2017-06-20 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chevron is one of the most influential administrative law cases decided by the Supreme Court in the past half-century. It provides principles to determine the extent to which a court reviewing agency action should give deference to the agency's construction of a statute that the agency has been delegated to administer. The case first arose in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as a challenge to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations under the Clean Air Act defining the statutory term "stationary source." Ordinarily, a permit may be issued for new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution only if the permittee meets various stringent conditions. Under the regulation challenged in Chevron, EPA allowed the states to treat all pollution control devices in a single plant as one "stationary source," such that a polluter could install or modify control equipment in the plant without meeting the new source requirements, as long as the alteration would not increase aggregate emissions for the plant. The Supreme Court ultimately approved EPA's definition. In the course of the opinion, the Court stated that when a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute it administers, that court must first determine whether Congress "has spoken to the precise question at issue." If so, the inquiry ends, because the courts and agencies must "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." When Congress explicitly left a gap in a program to fill, the agency's regulations are given controlling weight unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute. When such a gap is implicitly left by Congress, the court is not to substitute its own construction of the statute as long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable.

Download or read book Is Administrative Law Unlawful written by Philip Hamburger and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2014-05-27 with total page 646 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: “Hamburger argues persuasively that America has overlaid its constitutional system with a form of governance that is both alien and dangerous.” —Law and Politics Book Review While the federal government traditionally could constrain liberty only through acts of Congress and the courts, the executive branch has increasingly come to control Americans through its own administrative rules and adjudication, thus raising disturbing questions about the effect of this sort of state power on American government and society. With Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, Philip Hamburger answers this question in the affirmative, offering a revisionist account of administrative law. Rather than accepting it as a novel power necessitated by modern society, he locates its origins in the medieval and early modern English tradition of royal prerogative. Then he traces resistance to administrative law from the Middle Ages to the present. Medieval parliaments periodically tried to confine the Crown to governing through regular law, but the most effective response was the seventeenth-century development of English constitutional law, which concluded that the government could rule only through the law of the land and the courts, not through administrative edicts. Although the US Constitution pursued this conclusion even more vigorously, administrative power reemerged in the Progressive and New Deal Eras. Since then, Hamburger argues, administrative law has returned American government and society to precisely the sort of consolidated or absolute power that the US Constitution—and constitutions in general—were designed to prevent. With a clear yet many-layered argument that draws on history, law, and legal thought, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? reveals administrative law to be not a benign, natural outgrowth of contemporary government but a pernicious—and profoundly unlawful—return to dangerous pre-constitutional absolutism.

Download or read book The Rest is Silence written by Ambassador Nathan A. Sales and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Should agencies receive Chevron deference when interpreting the reach of their own jurisdiction? This article argues that, in general, they should not. We begin by identifying and detailing the various different types of jurisdictional questions that may arise in statutory interpretation. The article then surveys how the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have analyzed these different aspects of the jurisdiction problem, with a particular attention to statutory silences. The Court's Chevron jurisprudence strongly suggest that deference to agency determinations of their own jurisdiction should be disfavored, particularly where a statute is silent (and not merely ambiguous) about the existence of agency jurisdiction. In particular, we argue that courts should deny Chevron deference regardless of whether an agency is asserting or disclaiming jurisdiction. This no-deference rule should apply in both existence- and scope-of-power cases, but courts should continue to show deference where agencies assert the existence of a factual predicate that triggers jurisdiction. We support our proposal with arguments drawing on both traditional administrative law norms and public choice analyses of the incentives faced by agencies and other relevant actors. While there are strong counterarguments to our proposal - particularly the potential difficulty in distinguishing between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions - this article maintains that denying deference in the jurisdictional context is desirable and consistent with Chevron principles.

Download or read book Chevron Deference written by Landmark Publications and published by . This book was released on 2021-03-09 with total page 544 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret, and apply the doctrine of Chevron deference in environmental law cases. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * The APA states that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions" found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). The APA further states that "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." Id. § 706. When reviewing an agency's legal determination, the court generally applies the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See id. at 842-44 (asking "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," and if not, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").There are times, however, when Chevron is inapplicable. "[L]egislative rules and formal adjudications are always entitled to Chevron deference, while less formal pronouncements like interpretive rules and informal adjudications may or may not be entitled to Chevron deference." Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force."). In Sinclair, we determined that "Congress did not intend the EPA's interpretation of 'disproportionate economic hardship' to have the 'force of law.'" 887 F.3d at 993. And we concluded that informal adjudications of petitions to extend the small refinery exemption were not subject to Chevron deference. Id. at 992; see also id. (noting, among other things, that such adjudications lack "trial-like procedures" and "the benefit of notice-and-comment").When Chevron does not apply, "we follow the analysis set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)." Id. at 991 (parallel citations omitted). Skidmore review means that the weight provided to an administrative judgment "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140 (brackets added). Put another way, an administrative ruling under Skidmore may "claim the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight." Mead, 533 U.S. at 235. Renewable Fuels Association v. EPA, (10th Cir. 2020)

Download or read book Defining Deference Down written by Randolph J. May and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Surprisingly, although the rationale articulated in Chevron in support of the deference doctrine might suggest that independent agencies should receive less deference than executive branch agencies, the question has not been examined in the courts and it has received very little attention in the academic literature. This article begins that examination in the hope of spurring further commentary.In Part II below, the Article recounts Chevron and its rationale grounding the deference doctrine primarily (but not exclusively) in notions of political accountability inherent in constitutional separation of powers principles. Part III briefly examines the Supreme Court's recent Brand X decision to show how in that particular fact situation, involving a ruling of the FCC, a so-called independent agency, Chevron deference trumped stare decisis. In effect, this allowed the agency to alter the interpretation of a statutory provision that previously had been construed differently by an appellate court. Part IV sketches the skimpy scholarly literature that hints, in light of Chevron's political accountability rationale, that the decisions of independent regulatory agencies should receive less deference than those of executive branch agencies. Part V argues that there is considerable law and logic to support these heretofore underexplored, sparse suggestive comments. Since independent agencies such as the FCC are, as a matter of our current understanding of the law and of historical practice, mostly free from executive branch political control, Chevron's political accountability rationale should imply that statutory interpretations of independent agencies receive less judicial deference.In light of the peculiar constitutional status of the independent agencies, which often are referred to as the headless fourth branch, Part VI concludes with an explanation as to why a reconception of the Chevron doctrine, which would accord less judicial deference to the decisions of these agencies, is more consistent with our constitutional tradition than is the current conception.

Download or read book The Administrative State written by Dwight Waldo and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-09-04 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This classic text, originally published in 1948, is a study of the public administration movement from the viewpoint of political theory and the history of ideas. It seeks to review and analyze the theoretical element in administrative writings and to present the development of the public administration movement as a chapter in the history of American political thought.The objectives of The Administrative State are to assist students of administration to view their subject in historical perspective and to appraise the theoretical content of their literature. It is also hoped that this book may assist students of American culture by illuminating an important development of the first half of the twentieth century. It thus should serve political scientists whose interests lie in the field of public administration or in the study of bureaucracy as a political issue; the public administrator interested in the philosophic background of his service; and the historian who seeks an understanding of major governmental developments.This study, now with a new introduction by public policy and administration scholar Hugh Miller, is based upon the various books, articles, pamphlets, reports, and records that make up the literature of public administration, and documents the political response to the modern world that Graham Wallas named the Great Society. It will be of lasting interest to students of political science, government, and American history.

Download or read book The Chevron Doctrine written by United States. Congress and published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. This book was released on 2017-11-29 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Chevron doctrine : constitutional and statutory questions in judicial deference to agencies : hearing before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, second session, March 15, 2016.

Download or read book Chevron Deference in the Courts of Appeals written by Barczewski and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Politics of Selecting Chevron Deference written by Kent H. Barnett and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative law: when do federal circuit courts decide to use the Chevron deference framework and when do they select a framework that is less deferential to the administrative agency's statutory interpretation? The question is important because the purpose of Chevron deference is to give agencies -- not judges -- policymaking space within statutory interpretation. We expect, nonetheless, that whether to invoke the Chevron framework is largely driven by political dynamics, with judges adopting a less deferential standard when their political preferences do not align with the agency's decision. To provide insight, we analyze circuit-court decisions from 2003 until 2013 that review agency statutory interpretations. Our results -- from the largest and most comprehensive database of its kind -- provide partial confirmation of our expectations. When courts reviewed liberal agency interpretations, all panels -- liberal, moderate, and conservative -- were equally likely to apply Chevron. But when reviewing conservative agency interpretations, liberal panels selected the Chevron deference framework significantly less frequently than conservative panels. Contrary to limited prior studies, we find no evidence of “whistleblower” or disciplining effects when judges of different judicial ideologies comprised the panel. Viewed together, our results provide important implications for the current debate on whether to eliminate, narrow, or clarify Chevron's domain.

Download or read book Chevron Deference written by Valerie C. Brannon and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Chevron Deference and Extraterritorial Regulation written by William S. Dodge and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What happens when Chevron deference meets the presumption against extraterritoriality? Many statutes with potential extraterritorial applications are administered by federal agencies. Should courts determine the geographic scope of such statutes for themselves by applying the presumption? Or should courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of geographic scope? Are agencies free to change their interpretations of a statute's geographic scope or to interpret that scope differently than courts have?This Article argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be incorporated at step two of the Chevron framework. Courts should defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute's geographic scope if the agency has considered the normative values that underlie the presumption against extraterritoriality. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, not all normative canons are applied at Chevron step one; moreover, the presumption against extraterritoriality never has been. Agency interpretations of geographic scope should receive deference because agencies are likely to have a better understanding than courts of statutory purposes, regulatory options, and potential conflicts with foreign interests. Agencies can also calibrate extraterritorial regulation to maximize effectiveness and minimize conflicts far better than courts. Finally, this Article argues that agencies may change their minds about geographic scope and that they are free to depart from lower court decisions applying the presumption against extraterritoriality and perhaps even from Supreme Court decisions applying the presumption.

Download or read book Judging Statutes written by Robert A. Katzmann and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2014-08-14 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

Download or read book Deference is Dead Long Live Chevron written by Nathan D. Richardson and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chevron v. NRDC has stood for more than 35 years as the central case on judicial review of administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes. Its contours have long been debated, but more recently it has come under increasing scrutiny, with some--including two sitting Supreme Court justices--calling for the case to be overturned. Others praise Chevron, calling deference necessary or even inevitable. All seem to agree the doctrine is powerful and important. This standard account is wrong, however. Chevron is not the influential doctrine it once was and has not been for a long time. It has been eroded from the outside as a series of exclusions have narrowed its scope, and has been hollowed out from the inside as Justices have become ever more willing to find clear meaning in statutes, thereby denying deference to agencies. In recent years, agencies have won only a handful of statutory interpretation cases, and none in more than four years. Only once since 2015 has deference been outcome-determinative. At the Supreme Court level (though not, for now, in the circuit courts), deference is dead. The once-crystal Chevron has turned to mud. As a result, however, it is less likely to be formally overturned than widely believed--critics of deference and of administrative power on the Court would gain little. Instead, Chevron's future is likely to be one of further decline, at least in the short term. This has implications for major policy areas like climate change, health care, and immigration where regulatory policy is necessary and challenges are likely to reach the Court.

Download or read book Chevron s Consensus written by Evan J. Criddle and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For nearly a quarter-century, federal courts have deferred to administrative agencies' statutory interpretations under the renowned Chevron doctrine. Despite Chevron's widespread appeal, its theoretical foundations remain contested. Judges and academics have debated whether Chevron rests on a theory of congressional delegation, administrative expertise, deliberative rationality, the executive branch's political responsiveness and accountability, or concerns for national regulatory uniformity. This Article challenges the terms of this longstanding debate by demonstrating that Chevron does not rest exclusively upon any of these competing rationales. Instead, Chevron forges a pragmatic consensus between several leading theories, none of which can properly be considered redundant. By embracing pluralism and practical wisdom in statutory interpretation, Chevron furnishes an enduring response to the fragmentation of contemporary legal and political theory. In United States v. Mead Corporation, the Supreme Court appeared to abandon Chevron's consensus by endorsing congressional delegation as the touchstone for Chevron deference. By all accounts, Mead has sown confusion and discord in the circuit courts. What Mead's critics have failed to appreciate, however, is that the Supreme Court actually employs the congressional delegation theory instrumentally to sustain Chevron's consensus: Where agency decision-making processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court applies Chevron. Conversely, where any of the leading rationales for deference remains unsatisfied, the Court evaluates agency statutory interpretations under the residual Skidmore test. The time has come to dismantle Mead's delegation fiction and expressly reconstruct Chevron's pluralist consensus as the definitive test for Chevron deference. By candidly reaffirming Chevron's consensus, the Supreme Court would clarify the scope of Chevron's domain and enhance judicial transparency and accountability in statutory interpretation.