Download or read book Capital Structure Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Christian M. Pfeil and published by . This book was released on 2002-04-01 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains three essays that focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Xinping Li and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Role of Managerial Incentive and Corporate Governance in Asset Restructuring written by Chinmoy Ghosh and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the effect of corporate governance on equity carve-out decisions during the period of 1990 to 2014. Consistent with the notion that managerial incentives drive corporate decisions, we find that firms where the CEO and management have larger stock ownership are more likely to carve-out their subsidiaries. Larger firms with prior poor performance are also more likely to carve-out their divisions. Among equity carve-out parents, larger firms with higher profitability, higher managerial ownership and CEO incentive-based compensation tend to retain higher portions of their subsidiaries. We finally demonstrate that for wealth-enhancing strategic decisions such as equity carve-outs CEO tenure and classified board are negatively related to value, while outsider dominated boards are perceived positively by the investors. Our results offer new insights on the role of managerial incentive and corporate governance in asset restructuring.
Download or read book Complementarities in Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2002-06-04 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance reform is currently on the agenda in the European Union, the United States, Japan and in emerging market economies. This book takes a fresh look at the reform debate by focusing on the trade-offs involved in reconciling the diverging interests of shareholders, creditors and managers. It shows how effective corporate governance systems exploit complementarities between the incentives generated by the capital structure, the ownership structure, investor monitoring, takeover threats, and management compensation to minimize the sum of all agency costs facing the public corporation. The book combines a general theoretical treatment with a detailed study of the institutions of corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the United States and a critical assessment of recent reforms.
Download or read book A Study on Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Ryoonhee Kim and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Capital structure and corporate governance are the important areas that represent salient part of corporate finance research. By studying various aspects of the two areas, this study attempts to deepen our understanding of the two. First, this study provides both a theoretical model and empirical evidence on the interaction between capital structure and managerial incentive compensation (one of key measures of corporate governance). Researchers acknowledge that the two interact to each other and the interaction should affect their optimal determination, but few studies formally consider the interaction. This study shows that due to the interaction through agency conflicts, key firm characteristics that represent agency costs affect leverage and managerial incentive compensation in opposite directions. After controlling for the opposite interactions, the two are shown to be positively related. Second, this study provides empirical evidence on the interaction between financial structure and product market performance by examining business group affiliated firms. The firms that are affiliated to a business group is not only affected by their own financial position, but also affected by the position of business groups which the firms belong to. The empirical investigation suggests that affiliated firms lose market shares to their rivals in their product market when their business group is financially weak due to high group leverage. Third, this study examines whether special governance structure of business groups is actually beneficial to the groups0́9 member firms. The study exploit unique dataset of firms that were once stand alone, but later acquired by business groups. The empirical methodology we employ can account for the fact that the firms which are acquired by business groups can be very different from other firms which are not acquired. The findings from matching estimator suggest that performance increase of the acquired firms is significantly greater than the performance of matched stand alone firms, implying that business groups are actually helping their affiliated firms to perform better than stand alone firms.
Download or read book Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics written by Li-Kai (Connie) Liao and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (2012) predict that a self-interested manager prefers a leverage level that is lower than the shareholders' desired level, and effective corporate governance encourages timely capital structure rebalancing. In a U.S. sample during 1996-2008, we confirm that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with a better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO-Chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when the initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Capital Structure written by Larry Lang and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Stock Options Managerial Incentives and Capital Structure written by Richard D. MacMinn and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Empirical Results on Managerial Incentives and Capital Structure written by Nicholas J. Gonedes and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Complementarities in Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Capital Structure written by Marc Schauten and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm there still is a big gap between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani amp; Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders' point of view. Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders' interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure. Furthermore, the issue of corporate control and, related, the issue of corporate governance, receive a lion's part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) has to deal with more issues than the maximization of the firm's market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We show that capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are widely available.
Download or read book Capital Structure Implications for Corporate Governance written by Nishanth Rajan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays that look at the outcome of agency costs of debt on the firm's capital structure and governance decisions. The first essay considers how monitoring of management by a shareholder aligned board of directors may induce an asymmetric information problem between shareholders and creditors. To mitigate this problem, the board may be more lenient with the manager and may have an incentive to be inherently weaker. In the second essay, I consider how creditors and shareholders interact when both actively monitor the manager. I demonstrate that, ex-post to floating debt, active shareholders may unilaterally shirk their monitoring duties to shift the burden of costly monitoring to debt claimants.
Download or read book Financial Crisis Corporate Governance and Bank Capital written by Sanjai Bhagat and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-03-10 with total page 259 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the aftermath of the 2007–8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law.
Download or read book Corporate Governance Ownership Structure and Firm Performance written by Hoang N. Pham and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2022-01-25 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.
Download or read book U S Corporate Governance written by Donald H. Chew and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2009-09-22 with total page 385 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of U.S. governance in achieving that end. They address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the "right" investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's "earnings game." Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.
Download or read book Corporate Governance Matters written by David Larcker and published by FT Press. This book was released on 2011-04-14 with total page 497 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate Governance Matters gives corporate board members, officers, directors, and other stakeholders the full spectrum of knowledge they need to implement and sustain superior governance. Authored by two leading experts, this comprehensive reference thoroughly addresses every component of governance. The authors carefully synthesize current academic and professional research, summarizing what is known, what is unknown, and where the evidence remains inconclusive. Along the way, they illuminate many key topics overlooked in previous books on the subject. Coverage includes: International corporate governance. Compensation, equity ownership, incentives, and the labor market for CEOs. Optimal board structure, tradeoffs, and consequences. Governance, organizational strategy, business models, and risk management. Succession planning. Financial reporting and external audit. The market for corporate control. Roles of institutional and activist shareholders. Governance ratings. The authors offer models and frameworks demonstrating how the components of governance fit together, with concrete examples illustrating key points. Throughout, their balanced approach is focused strictly on two goals: to “get the story straight,” and to provide useful tools for making better, more informed decisions.
Download or read book Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives written by Sanford J. Grossman and published by . This book was released on 1979 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
