Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Download or read book The Theory of Learning in Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1998 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Download or read book Understanding Institutions written by Francesco Guala and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-07-12 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A groundbreaking new synthesis and theory of social institutions Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of "looping effects" and "interactive kinds" defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us.
Download or read book Quantal Response Equilibrium written by Jacob K. Goeree and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Download or read book Foundations in Microeconomic Theory written by Matthew O. Jackson and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-11-30 with total page 541 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume collects papers from Hugo Sonnenschein's students. It aims to demonstrate his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades and present some of the most important articles in microeconomic theory. Each paper is accompanied with a preface by the student providing background on the paper and indicating Hugo's influence on its genesis. The papers all lie in microeconomic theory, and moreover all make fundamental contributions to the foundations of the theory.
Download or read book Handbook of Computational Economics written by Leigh Tesfatsion and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2006-05-15 with total page 905 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The explosive growth in computational power over the past several decades offers new tools and opportunities for economists. This handbook volume surveys recent research on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Empirical referents for "agents" in ACE models can range from individuals or social groups with learning capabilities to physical world features with no cognitive function. Topics covered include: learning; empirical validation; network economics; social dynamics; financial markets; innovation and technological change; organizations; market design; automated markets and trading agents; political economy; social-ecological systems; computational laboratory development; and general methodological issues.*Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers*Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys
Download or read book Assets Beliefs and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics written by Charalambos D. Aliprantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 733 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
Download or read book Beliefs Interactions and Preferences written by Mark J. Machina and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-03-09 with total page 373 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making mixes a selection of papers, presented at the Eighth Foundations and Applications of Utility and Risk Theory (`FUR VIII') conference in Mons, Belgium, together with a few solicited papers from well-known authors in the field. This book addresses some of the questions that have recently emerged in the research on decision-making and risk theory. In particular, authors have modeled more and more as interactions between the individual and the environment or between different individuals the emergence of beliefs as well as the specific type of information treatment traditionally called `rationality'. This book analyzes several cases of such an interaction and derives consequences for the future of decision theory and risk theory. In the last ten years, modeling beliefs has become a specific sub-field of decision making, particularly with respect to low probability events. Rational decision making has also been generalized in order to encompass, in new ways and in more general situations than it used to be fitted to, multiple dimensions in consequences. This book deals with some of the most conspicuous of these advances. It also addresses the difficult question to incorporate several of these recent advances simultaneously into one single decision model. And it offers perspectives about the future trends of modeling such complex decision questions. The volume is organized in three main blocks: The first block is the more `traditional' one. It deals with new extensions of the existing theory, as is always demanded by scientists in the field. A second block handles specific elements in the development of interactions between individuals and their environment, as defined in the most general sense. The last block confronts real-world problems in both financial and non-financial markets and decisions, and tries to show what kind of contributions can be brought to them by the type of research reported on here.
Download or read book The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis written by Sanjit Dhami and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the sixth volume of focused texts developed from leading textbook The Foundations of Behavioral Economics. Authoritative, cutting edge, and accessible, this volume covers behavioral modes of learning.
Download or read book The Belief in Intuition written by Adriana Alfaro Altamirano and published by University of Pennsylvania Press. This book was released on 2021-04-23 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Within the Western tradition, it was the philosophers Henri Bergson and Max Scheler who laid out and explored the nonrational power of "intuition" at work in human beings that plays a key role in orienting their thinking and action within the world. As author Adriana Alfaro Altamirano notes, Bergon's and Scheler's philosophical explorations, which paralleled similar developments by other modernist writers, artists, and political actors of the early twentieth century, can yield fruitful insights into the ideas and passions that animate politics in our own time. The Belief in Intuition shows that intuition (as Bergson and Scheler understood it) leads, first and foremost, to a conception of freedom that is especially suited for dealing with hierarchy, uncertainty, and alterity. Such a conception of freedom is grounded in a sense of individuality that remains true to its "inner multiplicity," thus providing a distinct contrast to and critique of the liberal notion of the self. Focusing on the complex inner lives that drive human action, as Bergson and Scheler did, leads us to appreciate the moral and empirical limits of liberal devices that mean to regulate our actions "from the outside." Such devices, like the law, may not only carry pernicious effects for freedom but, more troublingly, oftentimes "erase their traces," concealing the very ways in which they are detrimental to a richer experience of subjectivity. According to Alfaro Altamirano, Bergson's and Scheler's conception of intuition and personal authority puts contemporary discussions about populism in a different light: It shows that liberalism would only at its own peril deny the anthropological, moral, and political importance of the bearers of charismatic authority. Personal authority thus understood relies on a dense, but elusive, notion of personality, for which personal authority is not only consistent with freedom, but even contributes to it in decisive ways.
Download or read book Interactive Epistemology written by Robert J. Aumann and published by World Scientific Economic Theo. This book was released on 2023-01-29 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.
Download or read book Decisions Games and Markets written by Pierpaolo Battigalli and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 373 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Decisions, Games and Markets is designed to stimulate new developments in decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory, as well as in their applications to economics. The book is divided into three parts - Decision Theory, Game Theory, and the Theory of Markets. Though its orientation is primarily methodological, some articles are more applied. The consistent use of formal analysis and methodological individualism constitutes the unifying theme of the book. Decisions, Games and Markets will be of considerable interest to both students and teachers of microeconomics and game and decision theory.
Download or read book The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis written by Sanjit S. Dhami and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016 with total page 1799 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Download or read book Collective Rationality written by Paul Weirich and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-01 with total page 283 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.
Download or read book Multiagent Systems written by Yoav Shoham and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2008-12-15 with total page 505 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests or different information. This overview of the field offers a computer science perspective, but also draws on ideas from game theory, economics, operations research, logic, philosophy and linguistics. It will serve as a reference for researchers in each of these fields, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming.
Download or read book Game Theory and Behavior written by Jeffrey Carpenter and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-12-06 with total page 725 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to game theory that offers not only theoretical tools but also the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. This introductory text on game theory provides students with both the theoretical tools to analyze situations through the logic of game theory and the intuition and behavioral insights to apply these tools to real-world situations. It is unique among game theory texts in offering a clear, formal introduction to standard game theory while incorporating evidence from experimental data and introducing recent behavioral models. Students will not only learn about incentives, how to represent situations as games, and what agents “should” do in these situations, but they will also be presented with evidence that either confirms the theoretical assumptions or suggests a way in which the theory might be updated. Features: Each chapter begins with a motivating example that can be run as an experiment and ends with a discussion of the behavior in the example. Parts I–IV cover the fundamental “nuts and bolts” of any introductory game theory course, including the theory of games, simple games with simultaneous decision making by players, sequential move games, and incomplete information in simultaneous and sequential move games. Parts V–VII apply the tools developed in previous sections to bargaining, cooperative game theory, market design, social dilemmas, and social choice and voting. Part VIII offers a more in-depth discussion of behavioral game theory models including evolutionary and psychological game theory. Instructor resources include solutions to end-of-chapter exercises, worksheets for running each chapter's experimental games using pencil and paper, and the oTree codes for running the games online.
