Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information Fairness and the Hold Up Problem written by Ferdinand von Siemens and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information Fairness and the Hold up Problem written by Ferdinand A. von Siemens and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]
Download or read book Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining written by Daniel Keniston and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper uses detailed data on sequential offers from seven vastly different real-world bargaining settings to document a robust pattern: agents favor offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers on the table. Our settings include negotiations for used cars, insurance injury claims, a TV game show, auto rickshaw rides, housing, international trade tariffs, and online retail. We demonstrate that this pattern can arise in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an alternating-offer game with two-sided incomplete information, but this equilibrium is far from unique. We then provide a robust-inference argument to explain why agents may view the two most recent offers as corresponding to the potential surplus. Split-the-difference offers under this weaker, robust inference can then be viewed as fair. We present a number of other patterns in each data setting that point to split-the-difference offers as a strong social norm, whether in high-stakes or low-stakes negotiations.
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Download or read book Advanced Microeconomic Theory written by Felix Munoz-Garcia and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-08-11 with total page 891 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An introduction to advanced topics in microeconomics that emphasizes the intuition behind assumptions and results, providing examples that show how to apply theory to practice. This textbook offers an introduction to advanced microeconomic theory that emphasizes the intuition behind mathematical assumptions, providing step-by-step examples that show how to apply theoretical models. It covers standard topics such as preference relations, demand theory and applications, producer theory, choice under uncertainty, partial and general equilibrium, monopoly, game theory and imperfect competition, externalities and public goods, and contract theory; but its intuitive and application-oriented approach provides students with a bridge to more technical topics. The book can be used by advanced undergraduates as well as Masters students in economics, finance, and public policy, and by PhD students in programs with an applied focus. The text connects each topic with recent findings in behavioral and experimental economics, and discusses these results in context, within the appropriate chapter. Step-by-step examples appear immediately after the main theoretical findings, and end-of chapter exercises help students understand how to approach similar exercises on their own. An appendix reviews basic mathematical concepts. A separate workbook, Practice Exercises for Advanced Microeconomic Theory, offers solutions to selected problems with detailed explanations. The textbook and workbook together help students improve both their theoretical and practical preparation in advanced microeconomics.
Download or read book Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Peter B. Linhart and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 576 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information and the Design of Legal Rules written by Eric Leonard Talley and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts the Hold up Problem and Asymmetric Information written by Patrick Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 13 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts the Hold up Problem and Asymmetric Information written by Patrick Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Allan Richard Young and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On the Bargaining Problem with Incomplete Information written by Frank Weidner and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information written by Roger B. Myerson and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bargaining Under Incomplete Information written by Reinhard Selten and published by . This book was released on 1974 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on how to Mitigate Hold ups written by Fabienne Miller and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 392 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Simple Contracts Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information and the Hold Up Problem written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties' valuations are private information.
Download or read book Solutions for Two person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information written by Roger B. Myerson and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information written by Shmuel Zamir and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
