Download or read book Auctions with Resale Markets written by Sushil Bikhchandani and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with Resale Markets written by Philip A. Haile and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with Resale When Private Values Are Uncertain written by Andreas Lange and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet, whether, and to what extent, the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with theory. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. Beyond testing theory, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Download or read book Auctions with Resale Opportunities written by Chintamani Jog and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue-efficiency trade-off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer-advantaged resale case.
Download or read book Auctions with Resale when Private Values are Uncertain written by Andreas Lange and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction theory is one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades. Yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions remains under researched. This study begins by developing theory to explore auctions with resale when private values are uncertain. We put our theory to the test by examining both field data and experimental data from the lab. Our field data are from a unique data set that includes nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia from 1996-2000. In comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not, we find evidence that is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Critical evaluation of the reduced-form bidding model, however, reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted effect. We find that while it does have the predicted effect, a theoretical model based on risk-averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk-neutral bidders. More generally, the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data.
Download or read book Auctions with Resale Markets written by Sushil Bikhchandani and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with Resale Markets written by Philip A. Haile and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions With Resale Markets written by Sushil Bikhchandani and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-03-23 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Auctions With Resale Markets: A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions The Treasury bills are then delivered to the winning bidders and can be resold at an active secondary market. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Download or read book Auctions with Resale Markets written by William A. Brock and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with Resale written by Krista Jabs Saral and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. This essay examines a second price auction with uncertain private values in three environments: market-based limited liability, statutory limited liability, and full liability. Market-based limited liability is induced through inter-bidder resale following the auction. Statutory limited liability is created through a default option in the event that a bidder would make a loss. Bids are theoretically shown to be higher under resale, and this result is confirmed in the experimental results. The default option was varied between a high and low penalty. Bid are also theoretically higher under statutory default, but this result only empirically holds for low penalty default, which results in the highest bids. Revenue is highest under a market-based resale limited liability environment, and lowest in the low penalty default treatment given the high rate of default.
Download or read book Resales at Maryland Tobacco Auctions written by Clarence I. Hendrickson and published by . This book was released on 1956 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Auctions with resale market and asymmetric information written by Rodrigo Harrison and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Multi Object Auctions with Resale written by Marco Pagnozzi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the effects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale affects bidders' strategies, and hence the allocation of the objects on sale and the seller's revenue. Our experimental design consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary both the bargaining mechanism and the amount of information available in the resale market. As predicted by theory: without resale, asymmetry among bidders reduces demand reduction; resale increases demand reduction by high-value bidders; low-value bidders speculate by bidding more aggressively with resale. Therefore, resale induces speculation and demand reduction which reduce auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency and may not reduce the seller's revenue. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency also reduce the seller's revenue.
Download or read book Efficiency in Auctions with Failed Resale written by Marco Pagnozzi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze how the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders using a combination of theory and experiments. The resale market is modeled as an unstructured bargaining game between auction bidders. Our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that bidders participate in a resale market after the auction. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency. When there is a low probability of a resale market, final efficiency is actually lower than in an auction without resale.
Download or read book Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities written by Philip A. Haile and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Optimality of Being Efficient written by Lawrence M. Ausubel and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper provides a new defense for emphasizing efficient auction design rather than optimal auction design. Because in auction markets followed by perfect resale, it is optimal to be efficient.In an optimal auction, a revenue-optimizing seller often awards goods inefficiently, either by placing them in the wrong hands or by withholding them from the market. This conclusion rests on two assumptions: (1) the seller can prevent resale among bidders after the auction, and (2) the seller can commit to not selling the withheld goods after the auction.Ausubel and Cramton examine how the optimal auction problem changes when those assumptions are relaxed. In sharp contrast to the no-resale assumption, they assume perfect resale: all gains from trade are exhausted in resale. In a multiple-object model with independent signals, they characterize optimal auctions with resale. They prove generally that with perfect resale, the seller can do no better than assign goods efficiently. Moreover, any misassignment of goods strictly lowers the seller`s revenue from the optimum. In auction markets followed by perfect resale, it is optimal to be efficient.The authors' results provide a new defense for emphasizing efficient auction design rather than optimal auction design. The presence of a perfect resale market forces even the most selfish seller, whose sole objective is maximizing revenues, to focus-out of necessity-on efficiency. Given the vast and active resale market in Treasury securities, it seems safe to assert that the model with perfect resale is a better description of the U.S. Treasury market than the model without any resale-so its predictions ought to be taken more seriously.This paper - a product of the Private Participation in Infrastructure Division, Private Sector Development Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study issues arising from private participation in infrastructure. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Auctions in Infrastructure (RPO 682-58). The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
